

Measuring the Evolution of Transport Protocols in the Internet

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Abstract— In this paper we explore the evolution of both the Internet’s most heavily used transport protocol, TCP, and the current network environment with respect to how the network’s evolution ultimately impacts end-to-end protocols. The traditional end-to-end assumptions about the Internet are increasingly challenged by the introduction of intermediary network elements (middleboxes) that intentionally or unintentionally prevent or alter the behavior of end-to-end communications. This paper provides measurement results showing the impact of the current network environment on a number of traditional and proposed protocol mechanisms (e.g., Path MTU Discovery, Explicit Congestion Notification, etc.). In addition, we investigate the prevalence and correctness of implementations using proposed TCP algorithmic and protocol changes (e.g., selective acknowledgment-based loss recovery, congestion window growth based on byte counting, etc.). We present results of measurements taken using an active measurement framework to study web servers and a passive measurement survey of clients accessing information from our web server. We analyze our results in the context of gaining further understanding of the differences between the behavior of the Internet in theory versus the behavior we observed through measurements. In addition, these measurements can be used to guide the definition of more realistic Internet modeling scenarios.

I. INTRODUCTION

While the Internet’s architecture, protocols and applications are constantly evolving, there is often *competing evolution* between various network entities. This competing evolution can impact performance and robustness, and even halt communications in some cases. For instance, [36] shows that when setting up a TCP connection to a web server, attempting to negotiate Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) usage [40] interfered with connection establishment for over 8% of the web servers tested in 2000. For such web servers, the client can only establish a TCP connection by re-attempting the connection without negotiating ECN usage. The connection failures in the presence of ECN negotiation were caused by firewalls configured to interpret the attempt to negotiate ECN as the signature of a port-scanning tool [20]. On the one hand, these firewalls can be seen as incorrectly associating new functionality with one of the first appearances of that new functionality in an undesirable application. On the other hand, the firewalls can also be seen as doing their job of blocking unwanted traffic. This example shows the fundamental problem of different evolution paths that can become crossed to the detriment of smooth traffic flow on the Internet.

In this paper, we investigate the evolution of TCP [39], the Internet’s most heavily used transport protocol, in the context of ongoing changes to the Internet’s basic architecture. In particular, we study the ways in which so-called “middleboxes” (fire-

walls, NATs, proxies, etc.) — which change the Internet’s basic *end-to-end principle* [41] — impact TCP. We seek to elucidate unexpected interactions between layers and ways in which the Internet differs from its textbook description, including the difficulties various real-world “gotchas” impose on the evolution of TCP (and end-to-end protocols in general). The measurements presented in this paper also serve as lessons for efforts that wish to further evolve end-to-end protocols and the Internet architecture.

Internet research is driven by simulations, experiments, analysis, and deployment studies designed to address particular problems in the Internet. However, the design of effective and accurate network models is challenging due to the intrinsic complexity of the Internet and the dynamic nature of the elements composing it. Researchers need better models of networks and protocols to ground their investigations, such that they can provide practical benefit on the evolving network [24]. Therefore, a second component of our work assesses the current deployment status of various proposed TCP algorithmic and protocol modifications and updates the literature with respect to the capabilities of a “modern” TCP stack. This will aid researchers in accurately conducting future evaluations of the network and proposed changes.

In this paper, we bring both active and passive measurement techniques to bear to study web traffic in the context of the above stated issues. We use active measurements to assess the capabilities and algorithms used by web servers (the primary data senders in web transactions). Data senders are ultimately in control of TCP’s congestion control and reliability algorithms. Therefore, our active measurements are focused on studying which congestion control algorithms, loss recovery schemes and options are implemented and how they work in the context of today’s Internet architecture. As a second component, we present passive measurements of the capabilities and limits imposed by web clients (the primary data receivers). Data receivers do not directly control the data flow on a TCP connection. However, clients can optionally provide information to the data sender to increase performance (e.g., selective acknowledgments). In addition, limits imposed by receivers (e.g., the advertised window size) can have a dramatic impact on the performance a connection obtains [9].

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes related work on measurement studies of transport protocols. Section III describes the tools and methodology we use in our study. Section IV presents the results of our measurements of the deployment of various TCP mechanisms in web servers. Section V explores interactions between middleboxes and transport protocols. Section VI reports the results

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of our measurements about the deployment of TCP mechanisms in web clients. Section VII discusses lessons learned in the study that challenged our assumptions and ultimately shaped our measurements and tools. Section VIII presents our conclusions, and discusses open questions and future work.

II. RELATED WORK

This paper uses and extends the methodology from [36] on the TCP Behavior Inference Tool (TBIT). Independent and parallel work on TBIT extensions detailed at [29] includes tests for Limited Transmit, Early Retransmit, and support for the Window Scaling option in TCP. TBIT follows an earlier history of active probing of TCP. For instance, [17] treats TCP implementations as black boxes, observing how they react to external stimuli, and studying specific TCP implementations in order to assess the adherence to the specification.

There is also a considerable body of work on passive tests of TCP based on the analysis of packet traces. [37] outlines *tcp-analy*, a tool for analyzing a TCP implementation’s behavior by inspecting sender and receiver packet traces of TCP connections run between pairs of hosts, while [38] outlines observed packet dynamics based on *tcpanaly*’s analysis. Finally, [9] assesses the properties of web clients using packet traces of TCP connections to a particular web server.

In addition, there is some research in the literature on the effect of middleboxes on transport protocols (e.g., [10]). We, however, do not discuss the body of research on general architectural evaluations of middleboxes, or on the effect of middleboxes on DNS, BGP, and the like. Rather, the study presented in this paper focuses on interactions between middleboxes and transport protocols.

Finally, there is a large body of literature on active and passive approaches for estimating end-to-end network path properties using TCP [37], [11], [21]. In this paper we do not discuss TCP-based tests for estimating path properties such as loss rates, available or bottleneck bandwidth and durations of congestion episodes. Also prevalent in the literature, yet out of scope for the current effort, is the body of work based on passive measurements of traffic on a particular link to determine the breakdown of the traffic in terms of round-trip times, application layer protocols, transfer sizes, etc.

III. MEASUREMENTS: TOOLS AND DATA

As discussed above, we employ both active and passive measurements in our study into the characteristics of web clients and servers. Web servers act as data senders and web clients as data receivers in web transactions. Therefore, we use active measurements to probe web servers for congestion control and loss recovery capabilities, while using passive measurements to assess the options and resource limits enforced by web clients. Our motivation, approach and methodology is presented in the following two subsections.

A. Active Tests

We use TBIT [36] to conduct active measurements that probe web servers for their characteristics. A few of the active TBIT tests we present, such as the test that determines the size of the initial window, could just as easily be performed by passive

packet trace analysis. However, many of the TBIT tests are not amenable to straightforward post-facto analysis of packet traces. For example, consider a test to determine if a TCP data sender is responding correctly to SACK information. To evaluate the data sender, a certain pattern of loss events is required (e.g., multiple packets lost per window of data). An active tool like TBIT can easily induce such a specific loss pattern and evaluate the behavior of the data sender in comparison to the expected behavior. Meanwhile, passive analysis would require a tool that possessed a very general understanding of a range of loss patterns and the expected responses — which would be quite tricky to get right. Inducing a specific loss pattern does run the risk of tripping pathological behavior that is not indicative of the overall behavior of the TCP implementation under study. We believe the risk for biasing our overall results in this way is small given our large sample of web servers (discussed below).

Another class of tests that involve actively attempting alternative schemes in connection initiation cannot be performed by passive trace analysis alone. For instance, consider a test for middleboxes that block TCP SYN segments when the SYNs carry advertisements for ECN. Packet traces can indicate whether connections attempting to use ECN succeed or fail. However, determining the reason a connection attempting to negotiate ECN failed is due to a middlebox blocking ECN-capable SYNs takes active insertion of SYNs with and without ECN advertisements.

TBIT provides a set of tests, each of which is designed to examine a specific aspect of the behavior of the remote web servers, or of the path to and from the web server. Most of these tests examine the characteristics of the TCP implementations on the web servers. However, the tests are not restricted to TCP (e.g., the Path MTU Discovery [34] tests). TBIT establishes a TCP connection with the remote host at the user level. TBIT composes TCP segments (or segments from another protocol), and uses raw IP sockets to send them to the remote host. TBIT also sets up a host firewall to prevent incoming packets from reaching the kernel of the local machine; a BSD packet filter is used to deliver incoming packets to the TBIT process. TBIT’s user-level connection is used to control the sending of carefully constructed packets (control, data, acknowledgment, etc.) as desired from the local host. Note that all the TBIT tests are susceptible to network conditions to some degree. For instance, if an ACK sent by TBIT is lost in transit to the web server the result of the test could be inconclusive or even wrongly reported. We have taken test-specific measures to make each of our tests as robust as possible. In addition, our large set of web servers (described below) helps to minimize any biases that bogus tests introduce into our results.

The list of target web servers used in our study was gathered from IRCaches, the NLANR Web Caching project [1]. We used web cache logs gathered from nine different locations around the United States. Table I shows the cache logs used from February 2004, along with the log sizes, expressed as the number of unique IP server addresses from each cache. Since the caches are located within the continental US, most of the cached URLs correspond to domain names within the US. However, the cache logs also contain a sizable set of web servers located in the other

Server name	Location	Cache size
pb.us.ircache.net	Pittsburgh, PA	12867
uc.us.ircache.net	Urbana-Champaign, IL	18711
bo.us.ircache.net	Boulder, CO	42120
sv.us.ircache.net	Silicon Valley, CA	28800
sd.us.ircache.net	San Diego, CA	19429
pa.us.ircache.net	Palo Alto, CA	5511
sj.us.ircache.net	MAE-West, San Jose, CA	14447
rtp.us.ircache.net	Research Triangle Park, NC	33009
ny.us.ircache.net	New York, NY	22846

TABLE I
IRCACHE SERVERS AND LOCATIONS

continents. Of the 84,394 unique IP addresses¹ found in the cache logs: 82.6% are from North America, 10.2% are from Europe, 4.9% are from Asia, 1.1% are from Oceania, 1.0% are from South America and 0.2% are from Africa.

All the TBIT tests outlined in this paper were conducted between February and May 2004. The TBIT client was always run from a machine on the local network at our research laboratory. There is no local firewall between the machine running TBIT and our Internet connection.

Given that data senders (web servers in our study) implement most of TCP’s “smarts” (congestion control, loss recovery, etc.), most of the remainder of this paper outlines active TBIT tests to determine various characteristics of TCP implementations and networks and where the evolutionary paths collide.

B. Passive Tests

When characterizing web clients, passive packet trace analysis is more amenable than active probing for two main reasons. First, initiating a connection to a web client to probe its capabilities is difficult because often web clients are user machines that do not run publicly available servers. In addition, data receivers (web clients) do not implement subtle algorithms whose impact is not readily observable in packet headers (as is the case with data senders). Rather, data receivers expose their state, limits and capabilities to the data sender in packet headers and options (e.g., SACK information, advertised window limits, etc.). Therefore, by tracing packets near a web server, client TCP implementations can be well characterized with respect to client impact on web traffic. Section VI outlines our observations of web clients.

IV. DEPLOYMENT OF TRANSPORT MECHANISMS

This section describes TBIT tests to assess the deployment status of various TCP mechanisms in web servers. Such tests are useful from a number of angles. First, it is useful for protocol designers to understand the deployment cycle for proposed changes. In addition, as discussed previously, it is useful to test the actual behavior of proposed mechanisms in the Internet, keeping an eye out for unexpected behaviors and interactions. Another goal of this section is to guide researchers in constructing models for the design and evaluation of transport protocols. For example, if TCP deployments are dominated by NewReno and SACK TCP, then it is odd for researchers to evaluate congestion control performance with simulations, experiments, or

¹We note that the list of servers could be biased by a single machine having multiple unique IP addresses – which would tend to skew the results. However, due to the size of the server list, we believe that such artifacts, while surely present, do not highly skew the overall results.

TCP Stack	Servers (%) May 2001	Servers (%) February 2004
Total Number of Servers	4550	84394
I. Classified Servers	3728 (72%)	27914 (33%)
I.A. NewReno	1571 (35%)	21266 (25%)
I.B. Reno	667 (15%)	3925 (5%)
I.C. Reno, Aggressive-FR	279 (6%)	190 (0.2%)
I.D. Tahoe	201 (4%)	983 (1.2%)
I.E. Tahoe, No FR	1010 (22%)	1181 (1.4%)
I.F. Aggressive Tahoe-NoFR	0	7 (0%)
I.G. Uncategorized	–	362 (0.4%)
II. Classified but ignored (due to unwanted drops)	–	11529 (14%)
III. Errors	822 (18%)	44950 (53%)
III.A. No Connection	–	2183 (2.6%)
III.B. Not Enough Packets	–	22767 (27%)
III.C. No Data Received	–	3352 (4%)
III.D. HTTP Error	–	13903 (16%)
III.E. Request Failed	–	839 (1%)
III.F. MSS Error	–	266 (0.3%)
III.G. Other	–	2035 (2.4%)

TABLE II
RENO/NEWRENO DEPLOYMENT IN WEB SERVERS.

analysis based on Reno TCP.

A. Reno/NewReno Test

The Reno/NewReno test, adapted from the original TBIT [36], determines whether a web server uses Tahoe, Reno, or NewReno loss recovery and congestion control mechanisms for a TCP connection that is not SACK-capable. It is well-known that Reno’s congestion control mechanisms perform poorly when multiple packets are dropped from a window of data [19]. Tracking the deployment of NewReno can guide researchers in their choices of models for simulations, experiments, or analysis of congestion control in the Internet. Another reason for these tests is to look for unanticipated behaviors; for example, the Reno/NewReno tests in [36] discovered a variant of TCP without Fast Retransmit that resulted from a vendor’s buggy implementation.

The Reno/NewReno test determines the sender’s congestion control mechanism by artificially creating packet drops that elicit the congestion control algorithm of the server. In order to enable the server to have enough packets to send, TBIT negotiates a small MSS (256 bytes in our tests). However, using a small MSS increases the chances of observing reordering packets (see Section VII), and this reordering can change the behavior elicited from the server. Therefore, the current test has evolved from the original TBIT test to make it more robust to packet reordering, and consequently to be able to classify behavior the original TBIT was not able to understand. The framework of the Reno/NewReno test is as described in [36], with the receiver dropping the 13th and 16th data packets.

Table II shows the results of the Reno/NewReno test. The Tahoe, Tahoe without Fast Retransmit (FR), Reno, and NewReno variants are shown in [36]. Reno with Aggressive Fast Retransmit, called RenoPlus in [36], is also shown in [36]; Reno with Aggressive Fast Retransmit has some response to a partial acknowledgment during Fast Recovery, but does not take the NewReno step of retransmitting a packet in response to such a partial acknowledgment. For each TCP variant, the table shows the number and percentage of web servers using that variant. We note that the results from May 2001 and February 2004 are not directly comparable; they use different lists of web servers, and the February 2004 list is considerably larger than the May 2001

SACK Type	Servers (%) May 2001	Servers (%) February 2004
Total Number of Servers	4550	84394
I. Not SACK-Capable	2696 (59%)	24607 (29%)
II. SACK-Capable	1854 (41%)	57216 (68%)
II.A. Uses SACK Info:	550 (12%)	23124 (27%)
II.A.1. Proper SACK	–	15172 (18%)
II.A.2. Semi-Sack	–	7952 (9%)
II.B. Doesn't use SACK Info:	759 (17%)	2722 (3%)
II.B.1. NewReno	–	1920 (2%)
II.B.2. TahoeNoFR	–	802 (1%)
II.C. Inconsistent Results	545 (12%)	173 (0.2%)
II.D. Not enough Packets		20740 (24.5%)
II.E. No Data Received		549 (0.5%)
II.F. HTTP Errors		9853 (12%)
II.G. Request Failed		2 (0%)
II.H. MSS Error		55 (0%)
III. Errors		2569 (3%)
III.A. No Connection		1770 (2%)
III.B. Other		799 (1%)

TABLE III
SACK DEPLOYMENT IN WEB SERVERS

list. However, Table II implies that the deployment of NewReno TCP has increased significantly in the last few years; NewReno is now deployed in 77% of the web servers on our list for which we could classify the loss recovery strategy. In addition, the deployment of TCP without Fast Retransmit has decreased significantly; this poorly-behaving variant was discovered in [36], where it was reported to be due to a vendor's failed attempt to optimize TCP performance for web pages that are small enough to fit in the socket buffer of the sender.

B. Web Server SACK Usage

The SACK Behavior test reports the fraction of servers that are SACK-capable, and categorizes the variant of SACK congestion control behavior for a TCP connection with a SACK-capable client. TCP's Selective Acknowledgment (SACK) option [32] enables the transmission of extended acknowledgment information to augment TCP's standard cumulative acknowledgment. SACK blocks are sent by the data receiver to inform the data transmitter of non-contiguous blocks of data that have been received and queued. The SACK information can be used by the sender to retransmit only the data needed by the receiver.

The SACK Behavior test builds on the original TBIT test, with added robustness against packet reordering. TBIT first determines if the server is SACK-capable by attempting the negotiation of the SACK_PERMITTED option during the connection establishment phase. For a SACK-capable server, the test determines if the server uses the information in the SACK blocks sent by the receiver. TBIT achieves this by dropping packets 15, 17 and 19, and sending appropriate SACK blocks indicating the blocks of received data. Once the SACK blocks are sent, TBIT observes the retransmission behavior of the server.

Table III shows the results for the SACK test. The servers reported as "Not SACK-Capable" are those that did not agree to the SACK_PERMITTED option negotiated by TBIT. The servers listed as "Proper SACK" are those that responded properly by re-sending only the data not acknowledged in the received SACK blocks. The servers listed as "Semi-SACK" make some use of the information in the SACK blocks. In contrast, the servers listed as "NewReno" and "Tahoe-NO-FR" make no use of the information in the SACK blocks, even though they claim to be SACK-capable. The four types of SACK behaviors

Type of Server	Servers (%)
Total Number of Servers	84394
I. Not SACK-Capable	24361 (28.8%)
II. SACK Blocks OK	54650 (64.7%)
III. Shifted SACK Blocks	346 (0.5%)
IV. Errors	5037 (6%)
IV.A. No Connection	4493 (5.3%)
IV.B. Early Reset	376 (0.4%)
IV.C. Other	160 (0.2%)

TABLE IV
GENERATING SACK INFORMATION AT WEB SERVERS

are shown in Figure 4 in [36].

While the 2001 and 2004 results are not directly comparable, the results in Table III indicate that the fraction of web-servers that report themselves as SACK-capable has increased somewhat since 2001, and that most of the SACK-capable web servers now, in fact, make use of the information in SACK blocks. As suggested by the results in the next section, some of the results in Table III that are not "Proper SACK" could be influenced by middleboxes that translate the TCP sequence space, but do not properly translate SACK blocks.

C. Web Server SACK Generation

In the previous section we evaluated the web server's behavior in response to incoming SACK information from the web client. The web server's use of SACK information is the primary performance enhancement SACK provides to web traffic. In this section, however, we focus on whether web servers generate accurate SACK information. In the normal course of web transactions this matters little because little data flows from the web client to the web server. However, while not highly applicable to web performance, this test serves to illustrate potential problems in passing SACK information over some networks. This test calls for the client to split an HTTP GET request into several segments. Some of these segments are not actually sent, to appear to the server as having been lost. These data losses seen by the server should trigger SACK blocks (with known sequence numbers) to be appended to the ACKs sent by the server.

Table IV shows the results of the server SACK generation test. The row "Not SACK-Capable" shows the number of servers that did not agree to the SACK_PERMITTED option during connection setup. The row listed "SACK OK" shows the number of web servers that generated SACK blocks correctly. As Table IV shows, most of the servers show proper SACK behavior.

A relatively small number of servers, however, return improper SACK blocks. The row listed as "Shifted SACK Blocks" indicates cases where the SACK blocks received contained sequence numbers that did not correspond to the sequence space used by connection. Instead, the sequence space in the SACK blocks was *shifted*. This shifting could have been caused by a buggy TCP implementation, or by incorrect behavior from middleboxes on the path from the server to the client.

Two plausible scenarios whereby middleboxes may cause incorrect SACK blocks to be returned to the web client are:

- Shifting of TCP sequence numbers can be done by a NAT box that modifies the URL in a request, and as a consequence has to shift the TCP sequence numbers in the subsequent data packets. In addition, the cumulative acknowledgment number and SACK blocks should be altered accordingly in the ACKs transmitted to the clients. However, due to ignorance or a bug, the SACK

blocks may not be properly translated, which could explain the results of our tests.

- The shifting of TCP sequence numbers also occurs with TCP/IP fingerprint scrubbers [43] designed to modify sequence numbers in order to make it hard for attackers to predict TCP sequence numbers during an attack. One way that TCP/IP fingerprint scrubbers modify sequence numbers is by choosing a random number for each connection, X_i . Then, the sequence number in each TCP segment for the connection traveling from the *untrusted* network is incremented by X_i . Likewise, each segment traveling in the opposite direction has its acknowledgment number decremented by X_i . However, if the sequence numbers in the SACK blocks are not modified as well, then the SACK blocks could be useless to the data sender.

In some cases these bogus SACK blocks will simply be thrown away as useless by the data sender. In cases when the SACK blocks are merely offset a little from the natural segment boundaries, but otherwise are within the connection’s sequence space, these incorrect SACK blocks can cause performance problems by inducing TCP to retransmit data that does not need retransmitted and by forcing reliance on the (often lengthy) retransmission timeout to repair actual loss.

While the topic of web server SACK generation is not important in terms of the performance of web transactions, the interactions illustrated are germane to all TCP connections, and are possible explanations for some of the results in the previous section when web servers negotiated SACK but did not use “Proper SACK” recovery.

D. Congestion Window Halving

A conformant TCP implementation is expected to halve its congestion window after a packet loss [12]. This congestion control behavior is critical for avoiding congestion collapse in the network [23]. The Congestion Window Halving test, from the original TBIT, verifies that servers effectively halve their congestion window upon a loss event. The test works by initiating a transfer from the web server, waiting until the server has built up to a congestion window of eight segments, and then dropping a packet. After the loss, the server should reduce the congestion window to four segments. We classify the result as “Window Halved” if the congestion window is reduced to at most five packets after the loss, and we classify the result as “Window Not Halved” otherwise. TBIT is only able to determine a result for those servers that have enough data to send to build up a congestion window of eight segments. A detailed description of the test is available in [36]. TBIT maintains a receive window of 8 segments, to limit the congestion window used by the sender.

Table V shows the results for the Congestion Window Halving test. Table V shows that, as in 2001, most of the servers exhibited correct window halving behavior. For the servers that did not halve the congestion window, a look at the packet traces suggests that these are servers limited by the receive window, whose congestion windows at the time of loss would otherwise have been greater than eight segments. One possibility is that these servers maintain the congestion window independently from the receive window, and do not properly halve the effective window when the congestion window is greater than the receive window.

Window Halving Behavior	Servers (%) May 2001	Servers (%) April 2004
Total Number of Servers	4550	84394
I. Classified Servers	3461 (76%)	30690 (36%)
I.A. Window Halved	3330 (73%)	29063 (34%)
I.B. Window Not Halved	131 (2.8%)	1627 (2%)
II. Errors	1089 (24%)	53704 (64%)
II.A. No Connection		5097 (6%)
II.B. Not Enough Packets		22362 (26%)
II.C. No Data Received		4966 (6%)
II.D. HTTP Error		13478 (16%)
II.E. Request Failed		976 (1.7%)
II.F. MSS Error		354 (0.4%)
II.G. Unwanted Reordering		4622 (5.5%)
II.H. Unwanted drops		732 (0.9%)
II.I. Other		1117 (1.3%)

TABLE V
WINDOW HALVING TEST RESULTS

We note that RFC 2581 specifies that after a loss, the sender should determine the amount of outstanding data in the network, and set the congestion window to half that value in response to a loss.

E. Byte Counting

As described in RFC 2581 [12], TCP increases the congestion window (*cwnd*) by one MSS for each ACK that arrives during slow start (so-called “packet counting”, or “PC”). Delayed ACKs, described in [13], [12], allow a TCP receiver to ACK up to two segments in a single ACK. This reduction in the number of ACKs transmitted effectively leads to a reduction in the rate with which the congestion window opens. In order to compensate for this retarded growth, [5], [6] propose increasing *cwnd* based on the number of bytes acknowledged by each incoming ACK, instead of basing the increase on the number of ACKs received. Furthermore, [6] argues that an *Appropriate Byte Counting* (ABC) algorithm should only be used in the initial slow start period, not during slow start-based loss recovery. Also note that ABC closes a security hole by which receivers may induce senders to increase the sending rate inappropriately by sending ACK packets that each ACK a fraction of the sequence space in a data packet [42].

The Byte Counting test is sensitive to the specific slow start behavior exhibited by the server. We have observed a large number of possible slow start congestion window growth patterns in servers which do not correspond to standard behavior. For this reason, we were forced to implement an elaborate test for an algorithm as simple as Byte Counting. The test works as follows (for an initial congestion window of one segment).

1. Receive and acknowledge the first data packet. After this ACK is received by the server, the congestion window should be incremented to two packets (using either PC or ABC).
2. ACK the second and third data packets with separate ACK packets. After these two ACKs are received, the server should increment its congestion window by two packets (using either PC or ABC).
3. ACK the next four packets with a single cumulative ACK (e.g., with an acknowledgment of the seventh data packet).
4. Continue receiving packets without ACKing any of them until the server times out and retransmits a packet.
5. Count the number of new packets, N , that arrived at least three quarters of a round-trip time after sending the last ACK.
6. Count the number of earlier ACKs, R , (out of the three earlier

Slow-Start Behavior	Number (%)
Total Number of Servers:	44579
I. Classified Servers	23170 (52%)
I.A. Packet Counting	15331 (51.9%)
I.B. Appropriate Byte Counting	65 (0.1%)
II. Unknown Behavior	288 (0.6%)
III. Errors	21121 (47.4%)
II.A. No Connection	528 (1.2%)
II.B. Not enough packets	13112 (29.4%)
II.C. No data received	386 (0.9%)
II.D. HTTP Error	215 (0.5%)
II.E. Request Failed	181 (0.4%)
II.F. Packet Size Changed	5762 (13%)
II.G. Unwanted Reordering	827 (2%)
II.H. Other	7 (0%)

TABLE VI

BYTE COUNTING TEST RESULTS

ACKs) which were sent within an RTT of the first of the N packets above. These are ACKs that were sent shortly before the last ACK. For servers with the standard expected behavior, R should be 0.

7. Compute the increase, L , in the server congestion window triggered by the last ACK as follows:

$$L = N - 4 - 2 * R \quad (1)$$

- If $L = 1$, then PC was used.
- If $L > 1$, then the server increased its congestion window by L segments in response to this ACK. We classify this as the server performing Byte Counting with a limit of at least L .

The observation behind the design of this test is that N is the number of packets that the server sent after receiving the ACK packets in the preceding RTT. These N packets are assumed to include two packets for each ACK received that ACKed only one packet. These N packets are also assumed to include four packets due to the advance in the cumulative acknowledgment field when the last ACK was received. Any extra packets sent should be due to the increase in the congestion window due to the receipt of the last ACK. We note that the complexity of this test is an example in which the difference between theory and practice in protocol behavior significantly complicates the scenarios that need to be considered. Table VI shows the results of the Byte Counting test. We observe that Byte Counting is not largely deployed in the Internet.

F. Limited Transmit

TCP's Limited Transmit algorithm, standardized in [7], allows a TCP sender to transmit a previously unsent data segment upon the receipt of each of the first two duplicate ACKs, without inferring a loss or entering a loss recovery phase. The goal of Limited Transmit is to increase the chances for low-bandwidth connections to receive the three duplicate ACKs required to trigger a fast retransmission and avoid a costly retransmission timeout. The Limited Transmit test assesses deployment in web servers. Like the Byte Counting test, this test is sensitive to the size of the initial window employed by the server. The strategy of the test in all cases is the same but the presence or absence of Limited Transmit must be determined in the context of a specific ICW. For an ICW of four packets, the test works as follows:

1. Acknowledge the first data segment in the initial window of four segments. Upon receiving this ACK, the server should open its window from four to five segments, and send two more packets, the 5th and 6th segments.

Limited Transmit (LT) Behavior	Number (%)
Total Number of Servers	38652
I. Classified Servers	29023 (75%)
I.A. LT Implemented	8924 (23%)
I.B. LT Not Implemented	20099 (52%)
II. Errors	9629 (25%)
II.A. No Connection	420 (1.1%)
II.B. Not enough packets	3564 (9.2%)
II.C. No Data Received	257 (0.7%)
II.D. HTTP Errors	224 (0.6%)
II.E. Request Failed	163 (0.4%)
II.F. Packet Size Changed	4900 (12.7%)
II.G. Other	101 (0.3%)

TABLE VII

DEPLOYMENT OF LIMITED TRANSMIT

2. Drop the second segment.

3. TBIT sends two duplicate ACKs triggered by the reception of segments 4 and 5. TBIT does not send ACKs when segments 3 and 4 arrive, to provide for increased robustness against unexpected server congestion window growth. Only one duplicate ACK would suffice to trigger the Limited Transmit mechanism at the server but TBIT sends two to account for the possibility of ACK losses.

4. If the server does not implement Limited Transmit, then it will do nothing when it receives the duplicate ACK. If the server does implement Limited Transmit, then it will send another segment when it receives the duplicate ACK.

We note that if the duplicate ACKs sent by TBIT are dropped in the network, then TBIT will see no response from the web server, and will interpret this as a case where Limited Transmit is not deployed. Greater accuracy could be gained by running the test several times for each web server, as was done with the TBIT tests in [36].




Fig. 1. Limited Transmit Test: Example for ICW = 4

Figure 1 shows a time-sequence plot of the test described above for a server with an initial window of four packets. Table VII shows the results from our tests. The table shows that Limited Transmit is deployed in at least a fifth of the web servers in our dataset. The Limited Transmit test is sensitive to the size of the initial window and therefore care needs to be exercised with respect to the size of packets being received from the server. Note that if there is a change in the packet size for packets in the middle of the connection, TBIT flags the result "Packet Size Changed", and does not classify that server. As shown in the table, this happened with some frequency and renders that test inconclusive. Furthermore, a certain minimum number of packets need to be transferred for TBIT to be able to classify a

server, therefore servers with small web pages are classified as not having enough packets.

G. Congestion Window Appropriateness

When the TCP sender does not have data to send from the application, or is unable to send more data because of limitations of the TCP receive window, its congestion window should reflect the data that the sender has actually been able to send. A congestion window that doesn't reflect current information about the state of the network is considered invalid [25]. TBIT's Congestion Window Appropriateness test examines the congestion window used by web servers following a period of restrictions imposed by the receive window.

In this test, TBIT uses a TCP receive window of one segment to limit the web server's sending rate to one packet per RTT. After five RTTs, TBIT increases the receive window significantly, and waits to see how many packets the web server sends in response. Consider a web server using standard slow-start from an initial window of K segments, increasing its congestion window without regard to whether that window has actually been used. Such a web server will have built up a congestion window of $K + 5$ segments after five round-trip times of sending one packet per round-trip time, because each ACK increases the congestion window by one segment. The web server could suddenly send $K + 5$ packets back-to-back when the receive window limitation is removed. In contrast, a web server using the Congestion Window Validation procedure from [25] will have a congestion window of two or three segments, depending on the initial window.




Fig. 2. The congestion window after a receive-window-limited period

Figure 2 shows the number of segments that each server sends in response to the increased receive window at the end of the Congestion Window Appropriateness test. The majority of servers respond with an window of two to four packets, showing moderate behavior. A smaller fraction of the servers respond with a large window of eight or nine packets, suggesting that the server increases its congestion window without regard for the actual number of segments sent.

In some cases the number of segments transmitted shows that the server is violating the standard rules for opening the congestion window during slow-start, even aside from the issue of the appropriateness of a congestion window that has never been used. Because a conformant web server can have an initial window of at most four segments, a conformant web server can have a congestion window of at most nine segments after five single-packet acknowledgments have been received.

H. Initial Congestion Window

The Initial Congestion Window (ICW) test from [36] determines the initial congestion windows used by web servers. Traditionally, TCP started data transmission with a single segment and using slow start to increase the congestion window [13]. However, [12] allows an initial window of two segments, and [8] allows an initial window of three or four segments, depending on the segment size. As a result, there is interest in tracking the changes in the ICW.

The test starts with TBIT establishing a TCP connection to a given web server using a 256 byte MSS. The small MSS increases the chances that the server will have enough packets to exercise its ICW. TBIT then requests the corresponding web page, and receives all packets initially sent by the server, without ACKing any of the incoming segments. The lack of ACKs forces the server to retransmit the first segment in the ICW. TBIT then counts the number of segments received, reports the ICW value computed and terminates the test.

Despite the small MSS, there still may be some servers without enough data to fill their ICW. TBIT detects such cases by watching for the FIN bit set in one of the data segments. Such tests are inconclusive; the corresponding servers have an ICW equal to or larger than the number of packets received. We report only those servers that had enough data to send their entire ICW without setting the FIN bit.




Fig. 3. Initial Window Test, for an MSS of 256 bytes.

Figure 3 shows the distribution of ICWs used by the measured web servers. The figure shows that most web servers use an initial window of one or two segments, and a smaller number of servers use an initial window of three or four segments. In addition, there are a few servers using ICW values of more than four segments – including some servers using ICWs larger than 10 segments. These results are similar to those from 2001 [36], which show 2% of the web servers had an initial window of three or four segments, and 3% had initial windows larger than four segments. Thus, TCP initial windows of three or four segments are seeing very slow deployment in web servers.

We note that the ICWs shown in Figure 3 could change with different values for the MSS. For example, www.spaceimaging.com has an ICW of 64 segments when the MSS is restricted to 256 bytes, but an ICW of *only* 14 segments with an MSS of 1460 bytes.

Figure 4 shows the fraction of packets dropped and the fraction of packets reordered as a function of the ICW value used by




Fig. 4. Percent of connections with dropped/reordered packets vs. ICW

the server hosting the associated connections. The web servers with larger initial windows of three or four packets do not experience higher packet drop rates overall. Even the occasional TCP connections with ICWs greater than four segments do not experience increased packet drop rates. In addition, reordering rates are similar for ICWs of 1–3 segments and then the percentage of servers experiencing reordering drops off.

V. MIDDLEBOXES AND TRANSPORT PROTOCOLS

The increased prevalence of middleboxes puts into question the general applicability of the end-to-end principle. Middleboxes introduce dependencies and hidden points of failure, and can affect the performance of transport protocols and applications in the Internet in unexpected ways. Middleboxes that divert an IP packet from its intended destination, or modify its contents, are generally considered fundamentally different from those that correctly terminate a transport connection and carry out their manipulations at the application layer. Such diversions or modifications violate the basic architectural assumption that packets flow from source to destination essentially unchanged (except for TTL and QoS-related fields). The effects of such changes on transport and application protocols is unpredictable in the general case. In this section we explore the ways that middleboxes might interfere in unexpected ways with end-to-end communications.

A. ECN-capable Connections

Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [40] is a mechanism that allows routers to mark packets to indicate congestion, instead of dropping them. After the initial deployment of ECN-capable TCP implementations, there were reports of middleboxes (in particular, firewalls and load-balancers) that blocked TCP SYN packets attempting to negotiate ECN-capability, either by dropping the TCP SYN packet, or by responding with a TCP Reset [20]. [36] includes test results showing the fraction of web servers that were ECN-capable and the fraction of paths to web servers that included middleboxes blocking TCP SYN segments attempting to negotiate ECN-capability. The TBIT test for ECN is described in [36].

Table VIII shows the results of the ECN test for 84,394 web servers. Only a small fraction of servers are ECN-Capable – this percentage has increased from 1.1% in 2000 to 2.1% in 2004. After a web server has successfully negotiated ECN we send a segment marked “Congestion Experienced (CE)” and record whether the mark is reflected back to the TBIT client. The results are given on lines II.B.1 and II.B.2 on the table. In roughly

ECN Status	Number (%) Sep 2000	Number (%) Feb 2004
Total Number of Servers	24030	84394
I. Classified Servers	21879 (91%)	80498 (95.4%)
I.A. Not ECN-capable	21602 (90%)	78733 (93%)
I.B. ECN-Capable	277 (1.1%)	1765 (2.1%)
I.B.1 no ECN_ECHO in ACK	255 (1.1%)	1302 (1.5%)
I.B.2 ECN_ECHO in ACK	22 (0.1%)	463 (0.5%)
I.C. Malformed SYN/ACK	0	183 (0.2%)
II. Errors	2151 (9%)	3896 (4.6%)
II.A. No Connection	2151 (9%)	3194 (3.8%)
II.A.1. only with ECN	2151 (9%)	814 (1%)
II.A.2. also without ECN	0	2380 (2.8%)
II.B. HTTP Error	–	336 (0.4%)
II.C. No Data Received	–	54 (0%)
II.D. Others	–	312 (0.4%)

TABLE VIII
ECN TEST RESULTS

ECN fields in data packets	Number (%)
ECN-capable servers	1765
Received data packets w/ ECT 00 (Not-ECT)	758 (42%)
Received data packets w/ ECT 01 (ECT(1))	0 (0%)
Received data packets w/ ECT 10 (ECT(0))	1167 (66%)
Received data packets w/ ECT 11 (CE)	0 (0%)
Received data packets w/ ECT 00 and w/ ECT 10	174 (10%)

TABLE IX
CODEPOINTS IN PACKETS FROM ECN-CAPABLE SERVERS

three-quarters of cases when ECN is negotiated a congestion indication is not returned to the client. This could be caused by a bug in the web server’s TCP implementation or a middlebox that is clearing the congestion mark as the segment traverses the network. Finally, we also observe a small number of web servers send a malformed SYN/ACK packet, with both the ECN ECHO and Congestion Window Reduced (CWR) bits set in the SYN/ACK packet.

For 3194 of the web servers, no TCP connection was established. For our TBIT test, if the initial SYN packet is dropped, TBIT resends the same SYN packet – TBIT does not follow the advice in RFC 3168 of sending a new SYN packet that does not attempt to negotiate ECN. Similarly, if TBIT receives a TCP Reset in response to a SYN packet, TBIT drops the connection, instead of sending a subsequent SYN packet that does not attempt to negotiate ECN-capability.

In order to assess how many of these connection failures are caused by the attempt of ECN negotiation, we run two back-to-back TBIT tests to each server. The first test does not attempt to negotiate ECN. After a two-second idle period, another connection is attempted using ECN. We observe that 814 connections (1% of the web servers, or 25% of the connection failures) are apparently refused because of trying to negotiate ECN, since the connection was established successfully when no ECN negotiation was attempted. Table VIII indicates that the fraction of web servers with ECN-blocking middleboxes on their path has decreased substantially since September 2000 – from 9% in 2000 to 1% in 2004.

We further explored the behavior of ECN-capable servers by recording the ECT codepoints in the data packets received by TBIT. Table IX shows the number of servers from which the different codepoints were observed. TBIT received data packets with the ECT 00 codepoint from about 42% of the ECN-capable servers. The ECN specification defines two ECT code points that may be used by a sender to indicate its ECN capabilities in IP packets. The specification further indicates that protocols

that require only one such a codepoint *should* use $ECT(1) = 10$. We observe that ECN-capable servers do use $ECT(1)$ and found no server made use of the $ECT(0) = 01$ codepoint. We further observe that no router between our TBIT client and the ECN-capable servers reported Congestion Experienced (CE) in any segment. Finally, TBIT received both data segments with $ECT = 00$ and $ECT = 10$ in the same connection from about 10% of the ECN-capable servers. This behavior may indicate that the ECT code point is being erased by a network element (e.g. router or middlebox) along the path between the ECN-capable server and the client.

B. Path MTU Discovery

[35] shows that TCP performance is directly proportional to the segment size employed. However, [27] argues that packet fragmentation can cause poor performance. As a compromise, TCP can use Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD) [34], [33] to determine the largest segment that can be transmitted across a given network path without being fragmented. Initially, the data sender transmits a segment with the IP “Don’t Fragment” (DF) bit set and whose size is based on the MTU of the local network. Routers along the path that cannot forward the segment without first fragmenting it (which is not allowed because DF is set) will return an ICMP message to the sender noting that the segment cannot be forwarded because it is too large. The sender then reduces its segment size and retransmits. Problems with PMTUD are documented in [30], which notes that many routers fail to send ICMP messages and many firewalls and other middleboxes are often configured to suppress all ICMP messages, resulting in PMTUD failure. If the data sender continues to retransmit large packets with the DF bit set, and fails to receive the ICMP messages indicating that the large packets are being dropped along the path, the packets are said to be disappearing into a PMTUD *black hole*. We implemented a PMTUD test in TBIT to assess the prevalence of web servers using PMTUD, and the success or failure of PMTUD for these web servers. The test is as follows:

1. TBIT is configured with a *virtual link MTU*, MTU_v . In our tests, we set MTU_v to 256 bytes.
2. TBIT opens a connection to the web server using a SYN segment that contains an MSS Option of 1460 bytes (which is based on the MTU of the network to which the TBIT client is attached).
3. The TCP implementation at the server accepts the connection and sends MSS-sized segments, resulting in transmitted packets of $MSS + 40$ bytes. If the data packets from the server do not have the DF bit set, then TBIT classifies the server as not attempting to use PMTUD. If TBIT receives a packet with the DF bit set that is larger than MTU_v TBIT rejects the packet, and generates an ICMP message to be sent back to the server.
4. If the server is capable of receiving and processing such ICMP packets, it will reduce the MSS to the value specified in the MTU field of the ICMP packet, minus 40 bytes for packet headers, and resume the TCP connection. In this case, TBIT accepts the proper-sized packets and the communication completes.
5. If the server is not capable of receiving and processing ICMP packets it will retransmit the lost data using the same packet

PMTUD Status	Number (%)
Total Number of Servers	81776
I. Classified Servers	71737 (88%)
I.A. PMTUD not-enabled	24196 (30%)
I.B. Proper PMTUD	33384 (41%)
I.C. PMTUD Failed	14157 (17%)
II. Errors	9956 (12%)
II.A. Early Reset	545 (0.6%)
II.B. No Connection	2101 (2.5%)
II.C. HTTP Errors	2843 (3.4%)
II.D. Others	4467 (5.5%)

TABLE X
PMTUD TEST RESULTS

size. Since TBIT rejects packets that are larger than MTU_v the communication will eventually time out and terminate and TBIT classifies the server/path as failing to properly employ PMTUD.

Table X shows that PMTUD is used and succeeded for slightly less than half of the servers on our list. For 31% of the servers on our list, the server did not attempt Path MTU Discovery. For 18% of the servers on our list, Path MTU Discovery failed, presumably because of middleboxes that block ICMP packets on the path to the web server.

Alternate methods for determining the path MTU are being considered in the Path MTU Discovery Working Group in the IETF, based on the sender starting with small packets and progressively increasing the segment size. If the sender does not receive an ACK packet for the larger packet, it changes back to smaller packets.

In a similar strategy, called *black-hole detection*, if a packet with the DF bit set is retransmitted a number of times without being acknowledged, then the MSS will be set to 536 bytes [2]. We performed a variant of the PMTUD test in which TBIT does not send the ICMP packets, to see if any server reduces the size of the packets sent simply because it didn’t receive an ACK for the larger packet. We didn’t find any servers performing black-hole detection.

Since a non-trivial number of network elements discard well-known ICMP packets the results of our tests do not offer hope for protocol designers proposing to use new ICMP messages to signal various network path properties to end systems (e.g., for explicit corruption notification [28], handoff or outage notification, etc.).

C. IP Options

IP packets may contain options to encode additional information at the end of IP packets. A number of concerns have been raised regarding the use of IP options. One concern is that the use of IP options may significantly increase the overhead in routers, because in some cases packets with IP options are processed on the *slow path* of the forwarding engine. A second concern is that receiving IP packets with malformed IP options may trigger alignment problems on many architectures and OS versions. Solutions to this problem range from patching the OS, to blocking access to packets using unknown IP options or using IP options in general. A third concern is that of possible denial of service attacks that may be caused by packets with invalid IP options going to network routers. These concerns, together with the fact that the generation and processing of IP options is non-mandatory at both the routers and the end hosts, have led routers, hosts, and middleboxes to simply drop packets with unknown

IP options, or even to drop packets with standard and properly formed options. This is of concern to designers of transport protocols because of proposals for new transport mechanisms that would involve using new IP options in transport protocols (e.g., [4], [18]).

TBIT’s IP options test considers TCP connections with three types of IP options in the TCP SYN packet, the *IP Record Route Option*, the *IP Timestamp Option*, and a new option called *IP Option X*, which is an undefined option and represents any new IP option that might be standardized in the future. We experimented with two variants of Option X, both of size 4. The first variant uses a copy bit of zero, class bits set to zero and 25 as the option number. The second variant of IP Option X sets the class bits to a reserved value, and uses an option number of 31. The results for experiments with both Option X variants are similar.




Fig. 5. Handling IP Options in TCP SYN packets.

Figure 5 shows the TCP connection behavior with different IP options in the associated SYN packets. For each attempted connection there are three possible outcomes: no connection established, connection established with the IP option ignored, or IP option accepted. As Figure 5 shows, in many cases no connection was established when the Record Route Option or the Timestamp Option was included in the SYN packet. When IP Option X is included in the SYN segment, the connection was not established to over 70% of the web servers tested. This does not bode well for the deployment of new IP options in the Internet.

Most IP options are usually expressed in the first packet (e.g., the TCP SYN packet) in the communication between end hosts. We performed an additional test to assess the behavior when IP option X is placed in data packets in the middle of an established connection. For each established connection TBIT offers two classifications: “success” or “broken connection”. The former indicates that the server successfully delivered its data regardless of the IP option insertion. The latter classification indicates that the insertion of the IP option forced the connection to be idle for at least 12 seconds (which we then define as “broken”). We performed two sets of tests, with and without insertion of option X. The connection failure rate across both sets of tests is roughly 3%. The tests without IP options show nearly 6% of the connections are “broken” for some reason. Meanwhile, when inserting IP option X into the middle of the transfer, 44% of the connections are broken, indicating a significant issue when attempting to utilize IP options in mid-connection.

D. TCP Options

Next we turn our attention to potential problems when TCP options are employed. TCP options are more routinely used than

IP options (see Section VI). For instance, TCP uses the timestamp option [26] to (among other things) take round-trip time measurements more frequently than once per round-trip time, for the Protection Against Wrapped Sequences [26] algorithm and for detecting spurious timeouts [31].

However, middleboxes along a path can interfere with the use of TCP options, in an attempt to thwart attackers trying to fingerprint hosts. Network mapping tools such as NMAP (Network Mapper) use information from TCP options to gather information about hosts; this is called *fingerprinting*. Countermeasures to fingerprinting, sometimes called *fingerprint scrubbers* [43], attempt to block fingerprinting by inspecting and minimally manipulating the traffic stream. One of the strategies used by fingerprint scrubbers is to reorder TCP options in the TCP header; any unknown options may be included after all other options. In order to avoid being fingerprinted, some sites may reject connections negotiating specific or unknown options, or drop packets encountered in the middle of the stream that contain those options.

The TCP options test first assesses the behavior of the web server when the TCP Timestamp option is included in the SYN packet. To test for performance with unknown TCP options, we also initiate connections using an unallocated option number, *TCP Option Y*, in the SYN packet. Our tests indicate a connection failure rate of about 0.2% in all scenarios. Option Y is ignored in the remainder of the connections. The timestamp option is ignored by roughly 15% of the servers (but the connection is otherwise fine). The reason the servers ignore the timestamp option is not visible to TBIT, but could be either a middlebox stripping or mangling the option or the web server not supporting timestamps. Next we assess the use of options in the middle of a TCP connection, by establishing a connection without TCP options and then using the Timestamp option or Option Y on a data packet in the middle of the connection. The connection failure rate for both options is roughly 3% – indicating that sending unknown options midstream is not problematic for most web servers.

VI. CLIENT-SIDE PASSIVE MEASUREMENTS

The previous sections discuss results from active measurements targeted from a TBIT client machine to a set of web server destinations. Such analysis sheds light on the correctness and performance characteristics of a significant population of in-the-field web servers, and also provides insights into the characteristics of the intermediate nodes on the paths that carry packets between the TBIT client and the servers. However, this is only one part of the story. We are also interested in observing the Internet from the perspective of web clients. To achieve this perspective we collect full packet traces of traffic to and from the web server of our research laboratory. In this section we present the result from the analysis of those traces.

We collected packet traces of full TCP packets to and from port 80 on our lab’s web server for roughly two weeks (from February 24, 2004 to March 10, 2004). Capturing entire packets allowed us to verify the TCP checksum and discard packets that did not pass. In the dataset we observed 206,255 connections from 28,364 clients (where a “client” is defined as an IP address). Of these, 632 (or, 0.3%) connections were not analyzed

due to the packet trace missing the initial SYN sent by the client and therefore throwing off our analysis². We do not believe that deleting these connections biased our results.

The first set of items we measure are the capabilities the client TCPs advertise during connection startup. Of all the clients, 205 (or 0.7%) show inconsistent capabilities across connections from the same IP address. An example inconsistency would be one connection from a particular IP address advertising support for SACK, while a subsequent connection does not. Our inconsistency check includes the SACK permitted option, the timestamp option, the window scale option (and the advertised value), the MSS option (and the MSS value) and whether the connection advertises support for ECN. Options may be inconsistent due to a NAT between the client and our server that effectively hides multiple clients behind a single IP address. Alternatively, system upgrades and configuration changes may also account for inconsistency over the course of our dataset.

We next study TCP’s cumulative acknowledgment and the selective acknowledgment (SACK) option [32]. In our dataset, 24,906 clients (or 87.8%) advertised “SACK permitted” in the initial SYN. Across the entire dataset 236,192 SACK blocks were returned from the clients to our web server. We observe loss (retransmissions from the server) without receiving any SACK blocks with only two clients. This could be due to a bug in client implementations, middlebox interference or simple network dynamics (e.g., ACK loss). Therefore, we conclude that clients advertising “SACK permitted” nearly always followup with SACK blocks, as necessary.

As outlined in section IV-C, the TBIT SACK tests yield some transfers where the sequence numbers in the SACK blocks from the clients are “shifted” from the sequence numbers in the lost packets. Inaccurate SACK blocks can lead to the sender spuriously retransmitting data that successfully arrived at the receiver, and waiting on a timeout to resend data that was advertised as arriving but which was never cumulatively acknowledged. To look for such a phenomenon in web clients or middleboxes close to clients we analyzed the SACK blocks received from the clients and determined whether they fall along the segment boundaries of the web server’s transmitted data segments. We found 1,242 SACK blocks (or 0.5%) do not fall along data segment boundaries. These SACK blocks were generated by 49 clients (or 0.2%). The discrepancy between the rate of receiving strange SACK blocks and the percentage of hosts responsible for these SACK blocks suggests a client-side or middlebox bug. These results roughly agree with the results in Section IV-C. Of the bogus SACK blocks received 397 were offset – i.e., the sequence numbers in the SACK block were within the sequence space used by the connection, but did not fall along data segment boundaries. Meanwhile, the remaining 845 bogus SACK blocks were for sequence space never used by the connection. Note: a possible explanation for some of the strange SACK blocks is that our packet tracing infrastructure missed a data segment and therefore when a SACK arrives we have no record of the given packet boundaries. However, given that (i) the discrepancy between the overall rate of observing these SACKs when compared to the percentage of clients involved and (ii) many of

the bogus SACK blocks were completely outside the sequence space used by the connection, we believe that packet capturing glitches are not the predominant cause of these bogus SACK blocks.

We also investigated whether there were cases when the cumulative acknowledgment in incoming ACKs did not fall on a segment boundary. Of the roughly 4.7 million ACKs received by our web server, 18,387 ACKs contained cumulative ACK numbers that did not agree with the segments sent. These ACKs were originated by 36 clients. The rate of receiving these strange ACKs is 0.4% in the entire dataset, meanwhile the number of clients responsible for these ACKs represents 0.1% of the dataset, indicating that buggy clients or middleboxes may be the cause of these ACKs.

In our dataset, the timestamp option is advertised by 6,106 clients (or 21.5%). Clients that do not accurately echo timestamp values to the server or middleboxes that alter the timestamp of a passing packet may cause performance degradation to the connection by increasing or reducing the retransmission timeout (RTO) estimate of the server. If the RTO is too small the data sender will timeout prematurely, needlessly re-sending data and reducing the congestion window. If the RTO is too large performance will suffer due to needless waiting before retransmitting a segment. In our dataset, 20 clients returned at least one timestamp that the server never sent (some of the timestamps returned by these clients were valid). This result suggests that the network and the endpoints are faithfully carrying timestamps in the vast majority of cases.




Fig. 6. Distribution of advertised windows use by web clients.

We next examine the advertised windows used by web clients. [9] shows how the client’s advertised window was found to often dictate the ultimate performance of the connection. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the maximum window advertisement observed for each client in our dataset. Roughly, the distribution shows modes at 8 KB, 16 KB and 64 KB. These results show an increase in advertised window sizes over those reported in [9] (in 2000). In our dataset the median advertised window observed is just over 32 KB and the mean is almost 44 KB, whereas [9] reports the median advertised window as 8 KB and a mean of 18 KB. Additionally, 7,540 clients (or 26.6% of our dataset) advertised support for TCP’s window scaling option [26], which calls for the advertised window to be scaled by a given factor to allow for larger windows than can naturally be advertised in the

²The dataset actually includes one trace for every 24 hour period. Therefore, it is fairly common for the trace to start in mid-connection.

given 16 bits in the TCP header. Just over 97% of the clients that indicate support for window scaling advertise a window scale factor of zero — indicating that the client is not scaling its advertised window (but understands window scaling if the server wishes to scale its window). Just over 1% of the clients in our dataset use a scale factor of 1, indicating that the advertised window in the client’s segments should be doubled before using. We observed larger window scale factors (as high as 9) in small numbers in our dataset.

We next look at the MSS advertised by web clients in the initial three-way handshake. Two-thirds of the clients used an MSS of 1460 bytes (Ethernet-sized packets). Over 94% of the clients used an MSS of between 1300 bytes and 1460 bytes. The deviation from Ethernet-sized packets may be caused by tunnels. Roughly 4% of the clients in our dataset advertised an MSS of roughly 536 bytes. We observed advertisements as small as 128 bytes and as large as 9138 bytes. This analysis roughly agrees with [9].

Finally, we note that we observed 49 clients (or 0.2% of the clients in our dataset) advertising the capability to use Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [40]. That is, only 49 clients sent SYNs with both the ECN-Echo and Congestion Window Reduced bits in the TCP header set to one.

VII. MEASUREMENT LESSONS

In conducting the measurements presented in this paper we observed a number of properties of the network and the end systems that challenged our assumptions and ultimately shaped our tools. In this section, we distill several lessons learned that others conducting similar measurements should keep in mind.




Fig. 7. Minimum MSS Test

The TBIT tests presented in this paper attempt to use a small MSS so that the web server splits the data transfer into more segments than it naturally would. In turn, this provides TBIT with additional ways to manipulate the data stream. For instance, if a server transmits one segment of 1280 bytes then TBIT cannot easily conduct certain tests, such as assessing the Initial Window. However, if the server is coaxed into sending 10 segments of 128 bytes each the test becomes possible. The original TBIT tests presented in [36] employed a 100 byte MSS. When we initiated the present study we found this MSS to be too small for a significant number of web servers. Therefore, determining the smallest allowable MSS is important for TBIT-like measurements. Figure 7 shows the distribution of minimum MSS sizes we measured across the set of web servers used in our study. As shown, nearly all servers will accept an MSS as small as 128 bytes, with many servers supporting MSS sizes of 32 and 64 bytes. Another aspect of the segment size that surprised us is that segment sizes sometimes change during the course of a connection (e.g., as reported in the tests of ABC in Section IV).

Therefore, we encourage researchers to design tests that are robust to changing packet sizes (or, at the least warn the user of a test when such an event is observed).




Fig. 8. Reordering vs MSS

Choosing a small MSS to maximize the number of segments the web server transmits is a worthy goal. However, we also find that as the MSS is reduced the instances of packet reordering increase. Figure 8 shows the percentage of reordered segments as a function of the MSS size. One explanation of this phenomenon is that using a smaller MSS yields transfers that consist of more segments and therefore have more opportunities for reordering. Alternatively, small packets may be treated differently in the switch fabric — which has been shown to be a cause of reordering in networks [14]. Whatever the cause, researchers should keep this result in mind when designing experiments that utilize small segments. Additionally, the result suggests that performance comparisons done using small segments may not be directly extrapolated to real-world scenarios where larger segments are the rule (as shown in Section VI) since reordering impacts performance [14], [15], [44].

As outlined in Section IV, we find web servers’ slow start behaviors to be somewhat erratic at times. For instance, Section IV-E finds some web servers using “weak slow start” where the web server does not increase the congestion as quickly as allowed by the standards³. In addition, we also found cases where the congestion window is opened more aggressively than allowed. These differences in behavior make designing TBIT-like tests difficult since the tests cannot be staked around a single expected behavior.

Also, we found that some of our TBIT measurements could not *self contained* as were all the tests from the original TBIT work [36]. Some of the tests we constructed depended on peculiarities of each web server. For instance, the Limited Transmit tests outlined in Section IV-F require a priori knowledge of the web server’s initial window. This sort of test complicates measurement because multiple passes are required to assess some of the capabilities of the web servers.

Finally, we note that in our passive analysis of web client characteristics *verifying the TCP checksum is key* to some of our observations. In our dataset, we received at least one segment with a bad TCP checksum from 120 clients (or 0.4% of the clients in the dataset). This prevalence of bogus checksums is larger than the prevalence of some of the identified characteristics of the web client (or network). For instance, we identified

³Such non-aggressive behavior is explicitly allowed under the standard congestion control specification [12], but we found it surprising that a web server would be more conservative than necessary.

TCP Mechanism	Section	Deployment Status
Loss Recovery	VI, IV-B IV-A	SACK is prevalent (in two-thirds of servers and nine-tenths of clients). NewReno is the predominant non-SACK loss recovery strategy.
Congestion Response	IV-D	Most servers halve their congestion window correctly after a loss.
Byte Counting	IV-E	Most web servers use packet counting to increase the congestion window.
Initial Cong. Window	IV-H	Most web servers use an ICW of 1 or 2 segments.
ECN	V-A	ECN is not prevalent.
Advertised Window	VI	The most widely used advertised window among clients is 64 KB with many clients using 8 KB and 16 KB, as well.
MSS	VI	Most of the clients in our survey use an MSS of around 1460 bytes.

TABLE XI
INFORMATION FOR MODELING TCP BEHAVIOR IN THE INTERNET.

Behavior	Section	Possible Interactions with Routers or Middleboxes
SACK	IV-B,VI	In small numbers of cases, web clients and servers receive SACK blocks with incorrect sequence numbers.
ECN	V-A	Advertising ECN prevents connection setup for a small (and diminishing) set of hosts.
PMTUD	V-B	Less than half of the web servers successfully complete Path MTU Discovery. PMTUD is attempted but fails for one-sixth of the web servers.
IP Options	V-C	For roughly one-third of the web servers, no connection is established when the client includes an IP Record Route or Timestamp option in the TCP SYN packet. For most servers, no connection is established when the client includes an unknown IP Option.
TCP Options	V-D	The use of TCP options does not interfere with connection establishment. Few problems were detected with unknown TCP options, and options included in data packets in mid-stream.

TABLE XII
INFORMATION ON INTERACTIONS BETWEEN TRANSPORT PROTOCOLS AND ROUTERS OR MIDDLEBOXES.

only 49 clients that advertise support for ECN and report receiving bogus SACK blocks from 36 clients. If we had not verified the TCP checksum these two characteristics could have easily been skewed by mangled packets and we'd have been none-the-wiser. In our experiments, we used *tcpdump*⁴ to capture full packets and then *tcpurify*⁵ to verify the checksums and then store only the packet headers in the trace files we further analyzed⁶.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Our goals have been to track the deployment (or lack thereof) of transport-related mechanisms in end-to-end protocols and in middleboxes; to look out for the ways that the performance of mechanisms in the Internet differs from theory; and to consider how researchers should update their models of transport protocols in the Internet to take into account current practice. The measurements reported in this paper explore the deployment of TCP mechanisms in web servers and browsers. Table XI provides a set of high-level aspects of a "modern" version of TCP that are in widespread use and researchers can use as a set of rules of thumb when conducting TCP evaluations. Our measurements involving the interactions between TCP and the middleboxes along the network path are summarized in Table XII.

An extended version of this paper will be available shortly on the TBIT web site [3] with sections that were deleted from this paper due to lack of space. These include sections on TCP's

Window Scale Option, Minimum RTO, Minimum MSS, and the Deployment of D-SACK (Duplicate SACK). These also include sections of detecting middleboxes that perform TTL-rewriting, and tests on the effects of reordering on transport protocols. The updated TBIT software will also be available.

There are a wealth of important TCP behaviors that we have not examined in our tests. For example, we have not explored the TCP restart behavior after an idle period or attempted to determine whether TCPs properly employ backoff when using the retransmission timer. In addition, new TCP mechanisms are continually being proposed, standardized and deployed (e.g., HighSpeed TCP [22]) and assessing their deployment, characteristics and behaviors are useful future work. Finally, periodically re-running the tests presented in this paper is useful to track changes in TCP, as well as in the interactions between end-to-end protocols and the evolving network architecture.

Another class of extensions to the work presented in this paper is to explore the behavior of TCP in alternate applications (e.g., peer-to-peer systems, email, web caching, etc.). One way to explore the TCP performance in client machines (which is more important for applications such as peer-to-peer systems than it is for the web transactions studied in this paper) would be to construct a web site that a client could visit to request that active TBIT-style tests be performed for the TCP implementation on the client machine. For instance, the web server could drop particular packets and observe the client's reaction (i.e., basically just flipping around our current TBIT tests).

Another interesting area for future investigation is in the area of using TBIT-like tools for performance evaluation. For instance, a performance comparison of a server using various ini-

⁴<http://www.tcpdump.org>

⁵<http://irg.cs.ohiou.edu/~eblanton/tcpurify/>

⁶Before truncating a captured packet to store on the headers for later processing, *tcpurify* stores a code in the TCP checksum field indicating whether the checksum in the original packet was right, wrong or whether *tcpurify* did not have enough of the packet to make a determination.

tial congestion window values might be useful. A TBIT-like tool can impose an initial window upon a web server via the advertised window. However, when that restriction is removed the web server may or may not behave as if its natural ICW was the imposed ICW. Techniques for conducting this kind of performance comparison in a solid and meaningful way (and detecting when such a comparison is not meaningful) is a rich area for future investigation.

As new transport protocols such as SCTP and DCCP begin to be deployed, another area for future work will be to construct tools to monitor the behavior, deployment and characteristics of these protocols in the Internet.

While we examined some ways that middleboxes interfere with communication, a key open question is that of assessing ways that middleboxes affect the *performance* of transport protocols or of applications. One middlebox that clearly affects TCP performance is that of Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs) [16] that break single TCP connections into two connections. For example, it has been suggested that there could be problems when PEPs use a different version of FTP or of TCP from that used by the end-nodes; active tests could be useful to investigate this further.

A completely different kind of test that could benefit from the active probing approach outlined in this paper would be one to detect the presence or absence of Active Queue Management mechanisms at the congested link along a path. To some extent, this can be done with passive tests, by looking at the pattern of round-trip times before and after a packet drop. However, active tests may be much more powerful, by allowing the researcher to send short runs of back-to-back packets, as well as potentially problematic, in attempting to induce transient congestion in the network.

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