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# Principles for Measurability in Protocol Design

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*Brian Trammell (ETHZ)*

August 24, 2017



**ETH** zürich



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### ABSTRACT

Measurement has become fundamental to the operation of networks and at-scale services—whether for management, security, diagnostics, optimization, or simply enhancing our collective understanding of the Internet as a complex system. Further, measurements are useful across points of view—from end hosts to enterprise networks and data centers to the wide area Internet. We observe that many measurements are decoupled from the protocols and applications they are designed to illuminate. Worse, current measurement practice often involves the exploitation of side-effects and unin-

TCP/IP also includes mechanisms for explicit in-band measurement, for example TCP's timestamp option [17] to assess the feedback time or Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [31] to allow routers to signal congestion to end hosts. However, the diagnostic facilities currently available have proven woefully inadequate for applications, operators, policy makers, and researchers on the modern Internet:

- The diagnostics built into TCP/IP are useful for measuring a few specific attributes of the network, but are not germane

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# Network Measurement

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- ❖ Fundamental to network operation, application performance, and policy (not just research)
- ❖ But, today:
  - ❖ Minimal support from stack
  - ❖ Measurements rely on brittle hacks, unintended features, and inferences

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# Result: Important questions are hard

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- ❖ E.g.:
  - ❖ What's the best path to route traffic?
  - ❖ What is the capacity or utilization of a link?
  - ❖ How do networks interconnect?
  - ❖ What AS operates a given router?



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# Even simple inferences difficult!

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- ❖ How did packets arrive at a remote destination?



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- ❖ What are the endpoints in a communication?
  - ❖ (NATs, CGNs, aliases, IPv6)
- ❖ How did packets arrive at a remote destination?
  - ❖ (order? modified? mangled? path? queued?)



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# Reconsidering Measurability

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What if we re-think the stack with **measurability** as a **first-class** component?

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# Principles for Measurability

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P1. Explicit

P2. In-band

P3. Consumer bears cost

P4. Provider retains control

P5. Visible

P6. Cooperative



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# Principles for Measurability

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P1. Explicit

Remove ambiguity  
Transparency encourages adoption

P2. In-band

P3. Consumer bears cost

P4. Provider retains control

P5. Visible

P6. Cooperative

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# Principles for Measurability

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P1. Explicit

P2. In-band



Faithfully capture measurement  
objective

P3. Consumer bears cost

P4. Provider retains control

P5. Visible

P6. Cooperative



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
# Principles for Measurability

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P1. Explicit

P2. In-band

P3. Consumer bears cost



Measurement burden on  
consumer, not producer

P4. Provider retains control

P5. Visible

P6. Cooperative

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# Principles for Measurability

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P1. Explicit

P2. In-band

P3. Consumer bears cost

P4. Provider retains control

Measurement producers can make conscious decisions what to expose

P5. Visible

P6. Cooperative



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# Principles for Measurability

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P1. Explicit

P2. In-band

P3. Consumer bears cost

P4. Provider retains control

P5. Visible

Measurements require visibility into forward / reverse paths and packet modification

P6. Cooperative

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# Principles for Measurability

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P1. Explicit


P2. In-band

P3. Consumer bears cost

P4. Provider retains control

P5. Visible

P6. Cooperative




Measurements must cooperate with routers, middleboxes, and infrastructure



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# Primitives


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# Primitives

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Imagine packets carry measurement meta-data.

What should that meta-data include?



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# Candidate Primitive: HostID

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- ❖ Host ID:
  - ❖ Chosen randomly, included in packets
  - ❖ Removes IP address = host assumption
  - ❖ Remove NAT, load-balancer, IPv6, alias ambiguities that plague today's measurements

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# Candidate Primitive: HostID

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  - ❖ Chosen randomly, included in packets
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How to apply principles to make HostID viable?



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# Candidate Primitive: HostID


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- ❖ Host ID:
  - ❖ ID is ephemeral
  - ❖ Small ID space + change ID to prevent tracking
  - ❖ Large population requires observation over time, probabilistic inferences

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# Candidate Primitive: HostID

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
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- ❖ ID is ephemeral
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# Candidate Primitive: HostID




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- ❖ Host ID:  P1. Explicit
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- ❖ Large population requires observation over time, probabilistic inferences

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# Candidate Primitive: HostID

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
- ❖ Host ID:  P1. Explicit
- ❖ ID is ephemeral  P4. Provider retains control
- ❖ Small ID space + change ID to prevent tracking
- ❖ Large population requires observation over time, probabilistic inferences  P3. Consumer bears cost




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# HostID: Active Inference

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


# HostID: Active Inference






# HostID: Active Inference



Router 1 Aliases:

Router 2 Aliases:

# HostID: Active Inference




Router 1 Aliases:

Router 2 Aliases:



# HostID: Active Inference




Router 1 Aliases:



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# HostID



Router 1 Aliases:



Router 2 Aliases:



Router 3 Aliases:






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# HostID: Passive Inference

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What are the end points in a communication?




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# Candidate Primitive: Arrival Info

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- ❖ How packets arrive at destination
- ❖ Nonce tuple  $(N_{xmit}, N_{sum})$ :
  - ❖  $N_{xmit}$ : random, set by sender
  - ❖  $N_{sum}$ : sum of received  $N_{xmit}$  values echoed back
  - ❖ Permits sender to reconstruct arrival stream






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
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
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
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


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
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P5: Visibility






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P5: Visibility



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# Network support

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- ❖ Imagine increased cooperation and support from the network
  - ❖ Topology tuples
  - ❖ Path change tuples
  - ❖ Performance tuples
  - ❖ Accumulated performance tuples



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See paper for details on these

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# Conclusions

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- ❖ Network **measurement critical**, we need better tools, and better tools **need better support from the network**
- ❖ Propose guiding **principles** for viable measurement
- ❖ Demonstrate candidate **primitives** that address long-standing, important real-world measurement problems
- ❖ Position paper: spur discussion, debate, and **inform protocol development**