




# Comments on DNS Robustness

Mark Allman  
Reformed IETF Native


Applied Networking Research Workshop  
July 2018

*"Been away so long I hardly knew the place,  
Gee, it's good to be back home"*


# Observation #1



# Observation #2




# Observation #2



# How Robust Is DNS?


- “Good Enough”
- But, ... um ... ahem ...




# How Robust Is DNS?

- What do we mean by “robust”?
  - many dimensions
  - our focus:
    - *always* able to communicate with an auth server holding the DNS record we seek

# DNS Robustness




# DNS Robustness



- Community infrastructure
- Many named replicas  
e.g., a-root, b-root, etc.
- Many unnamed replicas  
i.e., via anycast routing




# DNS Robustness



# How Robust Is DNS?

- Let's measure some facets of the system at the SLD level that bear on robustness

# Datasets



Data courtesy of Verisign, Alexa, Emile Aben (RIPE) and Quirin Scheitle (TUM)

# Robustness Specifications


- RFC 1034: must have multiple authoritative nameservers for robustness
- RFC 2182: authoritative nameservers must be geographically and topologically diverse

# What Is Network Diversity?

- We start cheap & conservative:
  - use /24 address blocks to define diversity
  - two addresses in one /24: no diversity
  - two addresses in two /24s: diversity (but, really, who knows?!)
- Future work includes using historical routing data


# Spec. vs. Reality

= Min —+—




# Spec. vs. Reality

= Min —+— > Min —\*—




# Spec. vs. Reality

= Min     $\color{blue}{+}$     < Min     $\color{red}{\times}$     > Min     $\color{black}{*}$






# Shared Infrastructure



# Shared Infrastructure




# Shared Infrastructure

- Hierarchy belies much concentration
- Concentration compounds issues
- Perhaps concentration invites trouble

# Nameserver-Level Analysis

- For each SLD, determine the number of other SLDs that use the same set of nameservers (by IP address)
- Repeat for each month in dataset


# Nameserver-Level Analysis



# Network-Level Analysis

- For each SLD determine the number of other SLDs whose nameservers fall within the same /24 address blocks
- Repeat for each month in dataset

# Network-Level Analysis



# Top 10 SLD Groups

Rank	Num. SLDs	Num. /24s	Same Last Hop
1	71,472	2	✓
2	69,637	2	
3	15,421	2	✓
4	13,044	2	✓
5	8,347	2	
6	6,111	2	✓
7	5,568	3	x
8	5,076	2	
9	4,788	2	
10	4,611	4	
<b>Total</b>	204,075	23	

> 20% of the popular SLDs fall within 23 /24 blocks!  
> 9 edge networks!



# Conclusions

- DNS sky is not falling
- But, we have some unhealthy habits ...
  - too little auth server replication
  - too much auth server concentration
- Note: concentration is not *wholly bad*



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# Questions? Comments?



Draft paper:

<https://www.icir.org/mallman/pubs/All18>



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