

Encrypting/Decrypting, con't

CS 161: Computer Security

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Announcements / Goals For Today

- It's prudent to *double-check* the summing used on your midterm scores
- In general, see course homepage for procedure to request re-grading
- For Project #1, be sure to read Neo's tweets
- Today:
 - Review main themes from last lecture
 - Stream ciphers: approximating one-time pads
 - Begin public-key cryptography: no shared keys!

Review of Where We're At

- Alice employs an Encryptor **E** to produce *ciphertext* from *plaintext*.
- Bob employs a Decryptor **D** to recover plaintext from ciphertext.
- So far, both **E** and **D** are configured using the same key **K**.
- **K** is a **shared secret** between Alice and Bob
 - Eavesdropper Eve doesn't know it (otherwise, **disaster!**)
- Use of same secret key for **E** and **D** \Rightarrow “**symmetric key cryptography**”

One-Time Pad

- For each message, use a new, **independent** key
- Key has same length as message; $C = M \oplus K$
- **Provably secure** ... *if* we stick to these requirements
- Reuse of key = **disaster**
 - Eve can learn about *relationships* between messages
 - For **known plaintext attacks**, Eve can recover K and thus new message encrypted with its reuse
- *Not practical in most circumstances due to requiring huge volume of shared secret keys*

Block Ciphers


- Given a key, creates a seemingly random **bijjective** mapping on bitstrings of length n
 $\{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ n is the *blocksize*
- A popular, solid block cipher: **AES**
 - Block size $n = 128$ bits
 - Keys can be 128/192/256 bits (all work fine)
 - As usual, AES defines both an encryptor and a decryptor function. They use the same key K .
- AES is **very strong**: no known significant flaws
 - Change single bit in key or plaintext \Rightarrow output appears **completely different**
- In general, we think of block ciphers as one form of “primitive” that we then build on

Block Cipher Modes


- Problem with using block ciphers: what if message M not the same size as n (blocksize)?
 - If M smaller than n , we **pad** it
 - Don't worry about how to choose the padding or figure out the exact length (these aren't hard)
 - If M larger than n , need **multiple instances** of block cipher
- A block cipher **mode** = procedure to use multiple instances of block cipher to encrypt a single msg
- **Modes are tricky!** We want to make sure they don't **leak** information:
 - Not give away parts of message that are related
 - Not give away relationships between different messages

Block Cipher Modes, con't

- Simplest mode (**ECB**) **fails** (recall penguin image)
- To mask relationships between different blocks of M , ensure each block is “seeded” with something (very-)hard-to-predict
 - Lecture mentioned “intermingling”; that’s *one* way to do it
- To mask relationships between different messages, seed each use of a block cipher mode w/ unique #
 - **Initialization Vector (IV)**
 - A type of **nonce**: a value used only once (single context)
- Important: IV is **not sensitive!**
 - Alice sends (IV, C) to Bob. *Eve can see IV.*
- This led us to **CBC** = *Cipher Block Chaining* mode



(Nonce = Same as IV)



(Note, uses block cipher's *encryption* functionality, not decryption)