
DRG SSH Username and Password Authentication Tag Clouds

2012-03-14 17:00:25 - 2012-03-21 17:00:25

most popular usernames

most popular passwords

123	1234	12345	12345	56 a	abc	abcd	abcde
adam	adm 2	dmin	admin	istrator	alex	amanda	apache
backup	bin	com cy	rus da	emon da	n david	db2	admin
demo	ftp ftp			nes geor			est halt
help	desk	httpd iI	nfo $f i$	nform	nix ja	imes jbo	ss john
linux	lp mail	mailtest	man	master 1	michael	mike 1	nysql
nag	gios n	amed ne	ews n	obody	operator	ora	cle
oracl	le8 par	ıl postfix	pos	stgres	postmaster	prueba	public
qwer	ty root	roc	Ji	rpm sal	es samb	a serve	r sir
smmsp	squid	ssh ssh	d stu	dent s	upport	sync	teamspeak
temp	test	test1	test123	test2	teste 1	ester	testing
testuse	r tmp	tomcat	toor	upload	use	r uucp	web
webadmii	n webma	il webn	naster	www	www-data	t xfs	zxcvb



http://www.dragonresearchgroup.org/insight/sshpwauth-cloud.html

Local ICSI hosts contacted via SSH by remote hosts

Weds Nov 10, 2010 - 1AM-11AM

# Local Hosts	Remote Host
512	202.148.2.22
140	95.155.122.12
140	161-96-207-82.ip.ukrtel.net
140	80.224.43.54.static.user.ono.com
140	adsl-074-238-205-245.sip.mem.bellsouth.net
140	adsl-70-247-71-201.dsl.hrlntx.swbell.net
140	nc-65-40-234-248.sta.embarqhsd.net
140	ip-62-129-164-36.evc.net
140	222.107.61.161
140	217-220-124-90-static.albacom.net
140	informatika.brkk.hu
140	208.124.238.246
140	166.129.109.202.dial.nc.jx.dynamic.163data.com.cn
140	201.227.239.11
140	200.182.126.166
140	static-adsl190-29-2-204.une.net.co
140	190.254.98.18
140	190.253.223.162
140	static-adsl190-248-8-19.une.net.co
140	190.144.81.234
140	189-210-153-50.static.axtel.net
140	189-20-68-59.customer.tdatabrasil.net.br
	187.53.57.247
140	180.168.5.184
140	150.162.10.60
140	147.subnet125-160-246.speedy.telkom.net.id
140	124.193.106.231
140	122.229.6.189
140	122.224.135.163
140	115-186-131-75.nayatel.pk
140	115-186-131-106.nayatel.pk
139	dsl-202-173-145-182.qld.westnet.com.au

Order	Password	Occurences	Percentage		
1	123456	567	3.11		
2	111111	322			
3	123123	200	1.1		
4	qwerty	196	1.08		
5	123321	157	0.86		
6	123456789	124	0.68		
7	12345	104	0.57		
8	666666	96	0.53		
9	1234567	80	0.44		
10	0	65	0.36		
11	7777777	60	0.33		
12	121212	58			
13	1234567890	54	0.3		
14	159753	53	0.29		
15	555555	48	0.26		
16	12345678	46	0.25		
17	112233	45			
18	q1w2e3	42	0.23		
19	qweqwe	41	0.23		
20	123qwe		0.22		
21	123		0.22		
22	life777	40	0.22		
23	654321	36			
24	qazwsx	31	0.17		
25	gfhjkm		0.16		

To: vern@ee.lbl.gov

Subject: RE: Russian spear phishing attack against .mil and .gov employees

From: jeffreyc@cia.gov

Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 19:51:47 +0100

Russian spear phishing attack against .mil and .gov employees

A "relatively large" number of U.S. government and military employees are being taken in by a spear phishing attack which delivers a variant of the Zeus trojan. The email address is spoofed to appear to be from the NSA or InteLink concerning a report by the National Intelligence Council named the "2020 Project". It's purpose is to collect passwords and obtain remote access to the infected hosts.

Security Update for Windows 2000/XP/Vista/7 (KB823988)

About this download: A security issue has been identified that could allow an attacker to remotely compromise a computer running Microsoft Windows and gain complete control over it. You can help protect your computer by installing this update from Microsoft. After you install this item, you may have to restart your computer.


Download:

http://mv.net.md/update/update.zip

or

http://www.sendspace.com/file/xwc1pi

Jeffrey Carr is the CEO of GreyLogic, the Founder and Principal Investigator of Project Grey Goose, and the author of "Inside Cyber Warfare". jeffreyc@greylogic.us



News

Solo Iranian hacker takes credit for Comodo certificate attack

Security researchers split on whether 'ComodoHacker' is the real deal

By Gregg Keizer

March 27, 2011 08:39 PM ET



Comments (5) Pecommended (37)






Computerworld - A solo Iranian hacker on Saturday claimed responsibility for stealing multiple SSL certificates belonging to some of the Web's biggest sites, including Google, Microsoft, Skype and Yahoo.

Early reaction from security experts was mixed, with some believing the hacker's claim, while others were dubious.

Last week, conjecture had focused on a state-sponsored attack, perhaps funded or conducted by the Iranian government, that hacked a certificate reseller affiliated with U.S.-based Comodo.

On March 23, Comodo acknowledged the attack, saying that eight days earlier, hackers had obtained nine bogus certificates for the log-on sites of Microsoft's Hotmail, Google's Gmail, the Internet phone and chat service Skype and Yahoo Mail. A certificate for Mozilla's Firefox add-on site was also acquired.



The Dutch government has revoked all trust in digital certificates issued by DigiNotar

The Dutch government says hackers who broke into a web security firm in the Netherlands last month issued hundreds of bogus security certificates that could be used on websites including the CIA and Israel's Mossad, as well as internet giants such as Google, Microsoft and Twitter.

More than 500 fake certificates, including some which could be used to send fake Windows updates to computers, and others which could be used when connecting to the CIA's site, were fraudulently issued in the hack, which occurred in July.

The Dutch government took the exceptional step of calling a press conference at 1.15am on Saturday morning to announce that it was revoking all trust in digital certificates issued by DigiNotar, which until then had been used for all online tax returns filed in the Netherlands.

Law Enforcement Appliance Subverts SSL

By Ryan Singel March 24, 2010 | 1:55 pm | Categories: Surveillance, Threats



That little lock on your browser window indicating you are communicating securely with your bank or email account may not always mean what you think its means.

Normally when a user visits a secure website, such as Bank of America, Gmail, PayPal or eBay, the browser examines the website's certificate to verify its authenticity.

At a recent wiretapping convention, however, security researcher Chris Soghoian discovered that a small company was marketing internet spying boxes to the feds. The boxes were designed to intercept those communications — without breaking the encryption — by using forged security certificates, instead of the real ones that websites use to verify secure connections. To use the appliance, the government would need to acquire a forged certificate from any one of more than 100 trusted Certificate Authorities.



Security Warning: Do you trust the Russian government?

Firefox has detected that your connection to this website is probably not secure. If you are attempting to access or transmit sensitive data, you should **stop** this task, and try again using a **different Internet connection**.

Firefox has detected a potential security problem while trying to access www.bankofamerica.com, a website visited at least 131 times in the past by persons using this computer.

In these previous browsing sessions, www.bankofamerica.com provided a security certificiate verified by a company in the **United States**.


However, this website is now presenting a different security certificate verified by a company based in **Russia**.


If you do not trust the government of Russia with your private data, or think it unlikely that Bank of America would obtain a security certificate from a company based there, this could be a sign that someone is attempting to intercept your secure communications.


Click here to learn more about security certificiates and this potentially risky situation.

If you trust the government of Russia and companies located there to protect your privacy and security, <u>click here</u> to accept this new certificate and continue with your visit to the site.

Get me out of here!











stop spam. read books.

Verify Your Registration * Enter the code shown: This helps prevent automated registrations.

Please enter the code you see below. what's this?

|--|--|

Qualifying question

Just to prove you are a human, please answer the following math challenge.

Q: Calculate:

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial x} \left[4 \cdot \sin \left(7 \cdot x - \frac{\pi}{2} \right) \right] \bigg|_{x=0}$$

A: | mandatory

Note: If you do not know the answer to this question, reload the page and you'll get another question.


Asirra

Asirra is a human interactive proof that asks users to identify photos of cats and dogs. It's powered by over **two million photos** from our unique partnership with <u>Petfinder.com</u>. Protect your web site with Asirra — free!










Advertising Programs - Business Solutions - About Google

@2009 - Privacy



Using the advertisement in blogs, social networks, etc significantly increases the efficiency of the business. Many services use pictures called CAPTCHAs in order to prevent automated use of these services.

Solve CAPTCHAs with the help of this portal, increase your business efficiency now!

Follow these steps:

Register

Login and follow the link inside to load funds to your account.

Your request will be processed ASAP.

You pay for correctly recognized CAPTCHAs only

The price is \$2 for 1000 CAPTCHAs. We accept payments from \$10.

If you use a third-party software the price could be different, contact the software vendor for more information.

Hi! I want to bypass captcha from my bots. Bots have different IPs. Is it possible to use your service from many IPs?

We have no restrictions about IP: with DeCaptcher you can bypass CAPTCHA from as many IPs as you need.

Hi. I need to crack captcha. Do you provide a captcha decoders?

DeCaptcher CAPTCHA solving is processed by humans. So the accuracy is much better than an automated captcha solver ones

Language	Example	AG	BC	BY	СВ	DC	IT	All
English	one two three	51.1	37.6	4.76	40.6	39.0	62.0	39.2
Chinese (Simp.)	- = =	48.4	31.0	0.00	68.9	26.9	35.8	35.2
Chinese (Trad.)	- = =	52.9	24.4	0.00	63.8	30.2	33.0	34.1
Spanish	uno dos tres	1.81	13.8	0.00	2.90	7.78	56.8	13.9
Italian	uno due tre	3.65	8.45	0.00	4.65	5.44	57.1	13.2
Tagalog	isá dalawá tatló	0.00	5.79	0.00	0.00	7.84	57.2	11.8
Portuguese	um dois três	3.15	10.1	0.00	1.48	3.98	48.9	11.3
Russian	один два три	24.1	0.00	0.00	11.4	0.55	16.5	8.76
Tamil	ஒன்று இரண்டு மூன்று	2.26	21.1	3.26	0.74	12.1	5.36	7.47
Dutch	een twee drie	4.09	1.36	0.00	0.00	1.22	31.1	6.30
Hindi	एक दो तीन	10.5	5.38	2.47	1.52	6.30	9.49	5.94
German	eins zwei drei	3.62	0.72	0.00	1.46	0.58	29.1	5.91
Malay	satu dua tiga	0.00	1.42	0.00	0.00	0.55	29.4	5.23
Vietnamese	một hai ba	0.46	2.07	0.00	0.00	1.74	18.1	3.72
Korean	일 이 삼	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	20.2	3.37
Greek	ένα δύο τρία	0.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	15.5	2.65
Arabic	ثلاثة اثنين واحد	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	15.3	2.56
Bengali	এক দুই তিন	0.45	0.00	9.89	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.72
Kannada	ಒಂದು ಎರಡು ಮೂರು	0.91	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.55	6.14	1.26
Klingon	$r < \epsilon$	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.12	0.19
Farsi	سه دو یک	0.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08

Table 2: Percentage of responses from the services with correct answers for the language CAPTCHAS.