```
Client: NICK [NIP]-IBM6N4SKA
 Client: USER YSNARFAL "ask0.org" "FCK" :YSNARFAL
 Client: JOIN #mipsel %#8b
  Server: :[NIP]-IBM6N4SKA!YSNARFAL@114-30-XXX-XX.ip.adam.com.au JOIN
  :#mipsel
  Server: :leaf.4714.com 332 [NIP]-IBM6N4SKA #mipsel :.silent on .killall
  .lscan .rlscan .esel [US], [FR], [IT], [GB], [ES], [DE] rejoin 10800 10800
  Server: :leaf.4714.com 333 [NIP]-IBM6N4SKA #mipsel DRS 1228994845
  Server: :leaf.4714.com 353 [NIP]-IBM6N4SKA @ #mipsel :[NIP]-IBM6N4SKA
  Server: :leaf.4714.com 366 [NIP]-IBM6N4SKA #mipsel :End of /NAMES list.
                 - flood URL with GET requests
.visit
.scan
                     - scans a random range for vulnerable routers/modems
               - scans a CIDR range for vulnerable routers/modems
.rscan
.lscan
                     - scans the local subnet for vulnerable routers/modems
                     - scans a range in the local subnet for vulnerable routers/modems
.lrscan
            - splits the workload of a scan thread into two threads
.split
.sql
          - scans for vulnerable MySQL servers and attempts to make them download and run URL
          - scans for vulnerable phpMyAdmin and attempts to make them download and run URL
.pma
                - makes the bot sleep for the given time
.sleep
.sel
                     - ???
                     - skip next part if locale is not X
.esel
                     - skip next part if version is not X
.vsel
                     - ???
.asel
.rejoin [delay]
                    - cycle the channel after delay
.upgrade
                     - download new bot from the distribution site
```

Client: PASS \$!00



It appears that Netcomm NB5 ADSL modems are not the only devices affected by this bot.

Modems with similar hardware configurations (unknown brands) from Italy, Brazil, Ecuador, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Peru, Malaysia, Columbia, India and Egypt (and likely more countries) also seem to be affected, and are spreading the bot.

Introduction:

The NB5 was a popular ADSL/ADSL2+ modem-router, produced by Netcomm circa 2005. The NB5 is based on the Texas Instruments TNETD7300, featuring a 32bit RISC MIPS 4KEc V4.8 processor, 2MB of flash ROM, 8MB of RAM, Ethernet + USB connectivity, and runs an embedded Linux distribution.

Welcome to Storm!




Done //


Would you like to be one of our newest bots? Just read your postcard!

(Or even easier: just wait 5 seconds!)

The Storm botnet



The Storm botnet



September 6th, 2007


Storm Worm botnet could be world's most powerful supercomputer

Posted by Ryan Naraine @ 8:41 am

Categories: Botnets, Browsers, Data theft, Exploit code, Firefox.....

Tags: Operation, Supercomputer, Malware, Worm, Ryan Naraine





Nearly nine months after it was first discovered, the Storm Worm Trojan continues to surge, building what experts believe could be the world's most powerful supercomputer.

The Trojan, which uses a myriad of social engineering lures to trick Windows users into downloading malware, has successfully seeded a massive botnet — between one million and 10 million CPUs — producing computing power

to rival the world's top 10 supercomputers

The [Storm] botnet reportedly is powerful enough as of September 2007 to force entire countries off the Internet, and is estimated to be capable of executing more instructions per second than some of the world's top supercomputers. However, it is not a completely accurate comparison, according to security analyst James Turner, who said that comparing a botnet to a supercomputer is like comparing an army of snipers to a nuclear weapon

If that made you catch your breath a bit, read on...

At certain points in time, the Storm worm used to spread the botnet has attempted to release hundreds or thousands of versions of itself onto the Internet, in a concentrated attempt to overwhelm the defenses of anti-virus and malware security firms. According to Joshua Corman, an IBM security researcher, "This is the first time that I can remember ever seeing researchers who were actually afraid of investigating an exploit."

Storm generates OIDs using its own PRNG given by the recurrence:

$$I_{i+1} = (a \cdot I_i + b \bmod 2^{32}) \bmod m$$

with a = 1664525, b = 1013904223, m = 32767, and the initial value I_0 is based on the system clock. The generator appears to be based on a well-known linear congruential PRNG described in the *Numerical Recipes*

Location Hal	lmarks					
Germany Rai	ndom OIDs with lower 10 bytes constant.					
Flo	Floods the Storm network aggressively with thou-					
san	ds of fake node IPs.					
Iran Rai	ndom OIDs biased to upper half of space (first					
bit	always set).					
Sweden Rai	ndom OIDs biased to upper half of space (first					
bit	always set). Does not appear in routing tables					
of a	my other peers.					
France One	e fixed OID, relatively passive crawler, appears					
to j	ust be sampling Storm.					
East Coast, US 257	OIDs evenly distributed in ID space behind					
one	one IP, port number used as upper two bytes of					
the	OID.					
East Coast, US Uni	form random OIDs, both a Storm implemen-					
tati	on and crawler behind the same IP, does not					
rep	ort other peers.					
West Coast, US Rai	ndom OIDs biased to upper half of space 100:1.					
Doe	es not report IPs in response to queries.					

Table 2: Other parties participating in the "encrypted" Storm network on April 4, 2008.






Figure 2: Estimates of the size of the Storm botnet using different notions of liveness over the first three weeks of March 2008 Note that the y-axis does not begin at zero to better separate the curves.

The Storm botnet






Obuzoustoychivy hosting is more expensive than usual, but you will have the full guarantee that your site no one ever closes, it will always be available to your customers!

MINI PLAN			
Volume disc	400 MB		
Domains	1		
Traffic *	Unlimited		
FTP-access	there is		
MySQL database	there is		
Control panel	there is		
COST	4 000 rub. / 1 month.		

STARTER PLAN			
Volume disc	500 mb		
Domains	3		
Traffic *	Unlimited		
FTP-access	there is		
MySQL database	there is		
Control panel	there is		
COST	5 000 rub. / 1 month.		
BUSINES	SS PLAN		
Volume disc 1000 m			
Domains	7		
Traffic *	Unlimited		
FTP-access	there is		
MySQL database	there is		
Control panel	there is		
COST	7 000 rub. / 1 month.		
PREMIUM PLAN			


Professional Bullet Proof Hosting -Ultrabulks.com

Solid Offshore Hosting BP Server Bulk Email Friendly!



Reliable Bullet Proof Web Hosting

-Email Marketing Service



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.com 💠

Submit) Check Available



✓ .com ✓ .net - Bullet Proof Domain \$100/Year

So Hosting Planss

SILVER PLAN

- Bullet Proof Hosting A
- 50MB Web Space
- 10GB Monthly Bandwidth
- Static Pages Only
- FTP Account
- 99.8% Uptime
- \$299.95/month

New Price \$199.95/month More... --- Order Now

GOLDEN PLAN

- Bulletproof Hosting B
- 50MB Web Space
- 10GB Monthly Bandwidth
- PHP/CGI/ASP Supported
- FTP Account
- 99.8% Uptime
- \$399.95/month

New Price \$299.95/month More... --- Order Now


&	Bullet Proof Hosting
8	Bullet Proof Domains
& &	Bullet Proof Server
1000	Reseller
& & &	BP URL
8	Contact Us
8	<u>Sitemap</u>



Partners:

Sun.

AMD



Bulletproof hosting plans for any requirement





Bulletproof without compromises







Host anything

We allow any kind of content and software, no questions asked.



Completely anonymous

We don't require any of your personal information from you, payments to us are completely anonymous through bitcoin.



Bulletproof

No abuse complaints or takedown requests will get through to you, your hosting is safe at any time.



Dedicated Network

All of our servers have their own network connection, you won't have to share your bandwith with anyone else.



Multiple Locations

We have a multiple different locations available, all of equally excellent quality.



Automatic Setup

We realize that time is money, server setup is completely automatic and ready within just minutes of ordering!



Low Prices

We have the lowest prices amongst all real bulletproof hosting providers.



Money Back Guarantee

If you're not satisfied with our services within the first 3 days of ordering, ask for a refund and we will refund you in full, no questions asked.

Bulletproof hosting plans for any requirement





VPS Basic	VPS Pro	Dedicated One	Dedicated Two	
Bulletproof	Bulletproof	Bulletproof	Bulletproof	
2GB Ram	4GB Ram	Amd 8 Core FX	Intel Xeon Processor E5-2697 (12 Core)	
CentOS 6, CentOS 7, Fedora, Windows	CentOS 6, CentOS 7, Fedora, Windows	16GB Ram	32GB Ram	
Free cPanel	Free cPanel	CentOS 6, CentOS 7, Fedora, Windows	CentOS 6, CentOS 7, Fedora, Windows	
1 IP Address	2 IP Address	Free cPanel	Free cPanel	
Dedicated 10 Mbit UP / DOWN	Dedicated 10 Mbit UP / DOWN	3 IP Addresses	3 IP Addresses	
Basic DDoS protection	Basic DDoS protection	Dedicated 100 Mbit UP / DOWN	Dedicated 100 Mbit UP / DOWN	
Storage 200GB	Storage 200GB	Professional DDoS protection	Professional DDoS protection	
Unlimited Bandwidth	Unlimited Bandwidth	Storage 2TB	128GB SSD OS Dedicated	
Full root access	Full root access	Unlimited Bandwidth	Storage 2TB	
\$199	\$249	Full root access	Unlimited Bandwidth	
(per month)	(per month)	\$499	Full root access	
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		ORDER NOW	(per month)	



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
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Spam Volumes Drop by Two-Thirds After Firm Goes Offline

The volume of junk e-mail sent worldwide plummeted on Tuesday after a Web hosting firm identified by the computer security community as a major host of organizations engaged in spam activity was taken offline. (**Note**: A link to the full story on McColo's demise is available here.)



Experts say the precipitous drop-off in spam comes from Internet providers unplugging McColo Corp., a hosting provider in Northern California that was the home base for machines responsible for coordinating the sending of roughly 75 percent of all spam each day.

In an alert sent out Wednesday morning, e-mail security firm IronPort said:

In the afternoon of Tuesday 11/11, IronPort saw a drop of almost 2/3 of overall spam volume, correlating with a drop in IronPort's SenderBase queries. While we investigated what we thought might be a technical problem, a major spam network, McColo Corp., was shutdown, as reported by The Washington Post on Tuesday evening.

Spamcop.net's graphic shows a similar decline, from about 40 spam e-



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Retail Fraud Rates Plummeted the Night McColo Went Offline

One month after the <u>shutdown of hosting provider McColo Corp.</u>, spam volumes are nearly back to the levels seen prior to the company's take down by its upstream Internet providers. But according to one noted fraud expert, spam wasn't the only thing that may have been routed through the Silicon Valley based host: New evidence found that retail fraud dropped significantly on the same day.

It is unclear whether the decrease in retail fraud is related to the McColo situation, but in speaking with **Ori Eisen**, founder of <u>41st</u> <u>Parameter</u>, he said close to a quarter of a million dollars worth of fraudulent charges that his customers battle every day came to a halt.

Eisen, whose company provides anti-fraud consulting to a number of big retailers and banks, told me at least two of the largest retailers his company serves reported massive declines in fraud rates directly following McColo's termination.

"It stopped completely that night," Eisen said, referring to a drop in fraudulent activity linked to purchases of high-value merchandise with stolen credit and debit cards on Nov. 11, the day McColo was shut down. "Yet, it will come back after [the scammers] erect their new infrastructure."

MegaD C&C's crafted response to "GET /"

```
HTTP/1.0 200 OK Server: Apache/1.3.37
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
<html>
 <head>
   <title> test page </title>
 </head>
   <body>
    <a href='http://www.microsoft.com/'>microsoft.com</a>
   </body>
</html>
```

test page

microsoft.com.

doretorza.com/ - Cached

test page

microsoft.com.

www.doretorza.com/ - Cached

test page

microsoft.com.

selementusaks.org/ - Cached

test page

microsoft.com.

kildamindak.net/ - Cached

test page

microsoft.com.

www.kildamindak.net/ - Cached


test page

microsoft.com.


216.32.90.186/





The PPI Eco-system















stop spam. read books.

Verify Your Registration · Enter the code shown: More into P This helps prevent automated registrations.

Please enter the code you see below. what's this?

		and the second second	School September 1	
STATE OF STREET	nederland the	Of the second		
		A Section of the section of the section of	the party and party party and	
Hart Co. P.		The state of the latest state of		

Qualifying question

Just to prove you are a human, please answer the following math challenge.

Q: Calculate:

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial x} \left[4 \cdot \sin \left(7 \cdot x - \frac{\pi}{2} \right) \right] \Big|_{x=0}$$

mandatory

Note: If you do not know the answer to this question, reload the page and you'll get another question.




Figure 2: Difficult but correctly transcribed examples from the internal street numbers dataset.



Figure 3: Examples of incorrectly transcribed street numbers from the large internal dataset





Figure 4: Examples of images from the hard CAPTCHA puzzles dataset.


Asirra

Asirra is a human interactive proof that asks users to identify photos of cats and dogs. It's powered by over **two million photos** from our unique partnership with <u>Petfinder.com</u>. Protect your web site with Asirra — free!










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Using the advertisement in blogs, social networks, etc significantly increases the efficiency of the business. Many services use pictures called CAPTCHAs in order to prevent automated use of these services.

Solve CAPTCHAs with the help of this portal, increase your business efficiency now!

Follow these steps:

Register

Login and follow the link inside to load funds to your account.

Your request will be processed ASAP.

You pay for correctly recognized CAPTCHAs only

The price is \$2 for 1000 CAPTCHAs. We accept payments from \$10.

If you use a third-party software the price could be different, contact the software vendor for more information.

Hi! I want to bypass captcha from my bots. Bots have different IPs. Is it possible to use your service from many IPs?

We have no restrictions about IP: with DeCaptcher you can bypass CAPTCHA from as many IPs as you need.

Hi. I need to crack captcha. Do you provide a captcha decoders?

DeCaptcher CAPTCHA solving is processed by humans. So the accuracy is much better than an automated captcha solver ones

Language	Example	AG	BC	BY	СВ	DC	IT	All
English	one two three	51.1	37.6	4.76	40.6	39.0	62.0	39.2
Chinese (Simp.)	- = =	48.4	31.0	0.00	68.9	26.9	35.8	35.2
Chinese (Trad.)	- = =	52.9	24.4	0.00	63.8	30.2	33.0	34.1
Spanish	uno dos tres	1.81	13.8	0.00	2.90	7.78	56.8	13.9
Italian	uno due tre	3.65	8.45	0.00	4.65	5.44	57.1	13.2
Tagalog	isá dalawá tatló	0.00	5.79	0.00	0.00	7.84	57.2	11.8
Portuguese	um dois três	3.15	10.1	0.00	1.48	3.98	48.9	11.3
Russian	один два три	24.1	0.00	0.00	11.4	0.55	16.5	8.76
Tamil	ஒன்று இரண்டு மூன்று	2.26	21.1	3.26	0.74	12.1	5.36	7.47
Dutch	een twee drie	4.09	1.36	0.00	0.00	1.22	31.1	6.30
Hindi	एक दो तीन	10.5	5.38	2.47	1.52	6.30	9.49	5.94
German	eins zwei drei	3.62	0.72	0.00	1.46	0.58	29.1	5.91
Malay	satu dua tiga	0.00	1.42	0.00	0.00	0.55	29.4	5.23
Vietnamese	một hai ba	0.46	2.07	0.00	0.00	1.74	18.1	3.72
Korean	일 이 삼	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	20.2	3.37
Greek	ένα δύο τρία	0.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	15.5	2.65
Arabic	ثلاثة اثنين واحد	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	15.3	2.56
Bengali	এক দুই তিন	0.45	0.00	9.89	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.72
Kannada	ಒಂದು ಎರಡು ಮೂರು	0.91	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.55	6.14	1.26
Klingon	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.12	0.19
Farsi	سه دو یک	0.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08

Table 2: Percentage of responses from the services with correct answers for the language CAPTCHAS.