Security Analysis of Mattermost

By Changze Cui & Weihao Dong

What is Mattermost



What is Mattermost

261test @welhao	=	r Town Square 🗸	2 A 🖈 🔾 Search	@ (P)
PUBLIC CHANNELS Demo Plugin Off-Topic Town Square	+	vegetable_chicken 5:21 PM. https://www.facebook.com/plugins/post.php?href=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2Fpermalink.php%3Fstory_fbid%3D551104579155306%26id%3D1000276730655898.width=500		
More		System 12:08 PM @vegetable_chicken was removed from the team.		
PRIVATE CHANNELS Chess: Surveybot VS DIRECT MESSAGES By github	+	weihao 1:55 PM https://twitter.com/PebblesPuss2014/status/1251476543538331648 Twitter Princess Pebbles on Twitter "Have a safe #Caturday everyone **		
 surveybot vegetable_chicken More 		https://twitter.com/joejothemainbro/status/1253463810272186368 Twitter Goseph on Twitter 'T have no words. This Travis Scott fortnite concert was spectacular. #fortnite" 💉		
		Today		
		weihao 1:47 PM ▷ <script></script>		

What is Mattermost

UC Berkeley ~ • changzecui	#general ☆ ≗ 1 Company-wide announcements and work-based matters	(i) Details
 Mentions & reactions Drafts A saved items People Apps Files ↑ Show less 		
Channels + general # random		
 Direct messages + Slackbot changzecui (you) Invite people 		
▪ Apps +		
	Monday, February 10th	
	changzecui 1009 AM joined #general.	
	Message #general	C
		Aa @ 🙂 🕼

Key Difference between Mattermost and Slack

	Mattermost	**slack		
Support Self-Hosting	yes	no		
Open Source	yes	no		

Mattermost envisions itself as an open source Slack alternative

Motivations



Project Timeline



Network Capture, Static Analysis, Manual Analysis, POC generation

Architecture of Mattermost



https://docs.mattermost.com/deployment/deployment.html

Features of Mattermost



https://docs.mattermost.com/deployment/deployment.html

Project Timeline



How We Come Up With Our Threat Model



https://docs.mattermost.com/deployment/deployment.html

Attackers in Server & Database



https://docs.mattermost.com/deployment/deployment.html

Attackers as Non-Admin Mattermost Users



https://docs.mattermost.com/deployment/deployment.html

Attackers as Non-Users



https://docs.mattermost.com/deployment/deployment.html

Project Timeline



Attackers in Server & Database



https://docs.mattermost.com/deployment/deployment.html

Attackers in Server & Database

Everything is readable. But is it the end of the nightmare?

- 1. Credential breach
- 2. Session token stealing
- 3. Integrated applications can be compromised

Attackers in Server & DB - Credential Breach

Password

- Plain text passwords can be used for credential stuffing
- Mattermost only stores **bcrypt** hashed passwords into database
- bcrypt is probably not the best choice with the evolution of parallel hardware ¹
- scrypt and argon2² provide better defense against offline parallel cracking

[1] Malvoni, Katja, and Josip Knezovic. "Are your passwords safe: Energy-efficient bcrypt cracking with low-cost parallel hardware." 8th USENIXWorkshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT 14). 2014.
 [2] Biryukov, Alex, Daniel Dinu, and Dmitry Khovratovich. "Argon2: new generation of memory-hard functions for password hashing and other applications." 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P). IEEE, 2016.

Attackers in Server & DB - Credential Breach

Password

- Plain text passwords can be used for credential stuffing
- password-hashing.net

Password Hashing Competition

and our recommendation for hashing passwords: Argon2

[1] Malvoni, Katja, and Josip Knezovic. "Are your passwords safe: Energy-efficient bcrypt cracking with low-cost parallel hardware." 8th USENIXWorkshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT 14). 2014.
 [2] Biryukov, Alex, Daniel Dinu, and Dmitry Khovratovich. "Argon2: new generation of memory-hard functions for password hashing

and other applications." 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P). IEEE, 2016.

ware¹

ng

Attackers in Server & DB - Session Stealing

- Session token generated by Google UUID (based on RFC 4122 and DCE 1.1: Authentication and Security Services)
- Valid for 180 days
- Stored in database as plain text
- Can be stolen and used to impersonate any user

<pre>mysql> select * from Sessions;</pre>					
++		+	+	+	++
Id	Token	l CreateAt	ExpiresAt	LastActivityAt	I UserId
					I
++		+	+	+	+
1rz45jc6spyrpxnxp3q7a8e7ra	3pqzoni6mtnezdxnu7opnry6he	1587621044790	1603173044790	1587621044790	 fg33amosfir67czezfkxgi57gc
er":"Chrome/81.0.4044","csrf":	"wftjtaqo37848f9ruok3msdd7o"	,"is_guest":"fal:	se","os":"Mac OS	","platform":"Mac	intosh"} I





Mattermost GitHub Plugin by wants to access your account



Notifications Read access

^

This application will be able to read your notifications (no code access).

② Learn more



Repositories

Public repositories

^

This application will be able to **read and write all public repository data**. This includes the following:

- Code
- Issues
- Pull requests
- Wikis
- Settings
- Webhooks and services
- Deploy keys

② Learn more

11	Organizations and teams Read-only access	^
	This application will be able to read your organization, team membership, and private project boards.	
	② Learn more	
Orgar	nization access	

\bigcirc Authorizin	Mattermost GitHub Plugin by wants to access your accour Notifications g OAuth Apps - Git × + help.github.com/en/github/a	Organizations and teams Read-only access This application will be able to read your organization, team membership, and private project boards.
Keeping your	account and data	
secure		Vote: Currently, you can't scope source code access to read-only.
	This application will be able to read and data . This includes the following:	vrite all public repository
	Enable Code Previews	⊖ true ● false
		(Optional) Allow the plugin to expand permalinks to github files with an actual preview of the linked file.
	Webhooks and services Deploy keys	
	Depioy keys② Learn more	

- GitHub token is AES-256 encrypted and stored in database
- Encryption key is randomly generated and stored in a json file
- Still safe when the database is dumped, but not safe when fully compromised

Scopes

🔲 api

Mattermost (

Configuration

Step 1: Register an OAuth

- 1. Go to https://gitlab.com/pro
- 2. Set the following values:
 - Name: Mattermost GitLau Flught Syde
 - Redirect URI: https://your-mattermost-url.com/plugins/com.g replacing https://your-mattermost-url.com with your Mattern
- 3. Select api and read_user in Scopes

Grants complete read/write access to the API, including all groups and projects, the container registry, and the package registry.

read_user

Grants read-only access to the authenticated user's profile through the /user API endpoint, which includes username, public email, and full name. Also grants access to read-only API endpoints under /users.

🔲 read_api

Grants read access to the API, including all groups and projects, the container registry, and the package registry.

Attackers as Non-Admin Mattermost Users



https://docs.mattermost.com/deployment/deployment.html

Attackers as Non-Admin Mattermost Users

A solid step. But what's next?

Target

• Intellectual property and trade secret (Posts), as the threat model suggests

Approach

- Become Mattermost's system admin (**XSS attack**, password cracking, SQL injection etc.)
- Trick other users (Phishing)
- Dump the database (SQL injection)

Session token is stored in cookies

-Steal token by XSS attack - document.cookie; Token is set to be httponly

RESTful API of role management

Send <script>XMLHttpRequest.open()</script> to the admin <> will be escaped to > <

Send [click me](JavAsCripT:alert();) to the admin URL will be checked before rendered

Session token is stored in cookies

-Steal token by XSS attack - document.cookie; Token is set to be httponly

w

×

weihao 1:58 PM

<script>alert("hacked");</script>

Send <script>XMLHttpRequest.open()</script> to the admin <> will be escaped to > < Headers Preview Response Initiator Timing Cookies

1:"", "message": "\u003cscript\u003ealert(\"hacked\");\u003c/script\u003e","

URL will be checked before rendered

```
%lt;script>alert("hacked")
;</script&gt;
```

Session token is stored in cookies

Steal token by XSS attack - document.cookie; Token is s

RESTful API of role management

Send <script>XMLHttpRequest.open()</script> to the admin <> will be escaped to > <

Send [click me](JavAsCripT:alert();) to the admin URL will be checked before rendered

Backend sends unescaped text file to user for file preview

-Upload a malicious HTML file and trick the admin to preview it Frontend escapes it

File preview won't be triggered for a link to the file

Bypass the frontend escape by posting a link to the HTML file

Content-Disposition in the header is set to attachment















Attackers as Non-Admin Users - SQL Injection

func query(e SqlExecutor, query string, args ...interface{}) (*sql.Rows, error) {
 executor, ctx := extractExecutorAndContext(e)

```
if ctx != nil {
    return executor.QueryContext(ctx, query, args...)
}
```

```
return executor.Query(query, args...)
```

}

Attackers as Non-Users



https://docs.mattermost.com/deployment/deployment.html

Attackers as Non-Users - User Onboard

- Email
- SAML
- Team Invitation

User Onboard - Email-based Registration

Signup

Enable Account Creation:	• true ○ false
	When false, the ability to create accounts is disabled. The create account button displays error when pressed.
Restrict account creation to specified email domains:	berkeley.edu, gmail.com, example.com
	User accounts can only be created from a specific domain (e.g. "mattermost.org") or list of comma-separated domains (e.g. "corp.mattermost.com, mattermost.org"). This setting only affects email login for users. For Guest users, please add domains under Signup > Guest Access.
Enable Open Server:	o true ○ false
	when true, anyone can signup for a user account on this server without the need to be invited.
Enable Email Invitations:	 true • false When true users can invite others to the system using email.
	Invalidate pending email invites

User Onboard - SAML-based Registration

- A XML-based protocol for exchanging identities between Identity Provider and Service Provider
- Used for Authentication
- Commonly used in Single-sign On application
- Fundamentally different from OAuth 2.0

How SAML 2.0 Works



SAML 2.0 - Sample Auth Request

<samlp:authnrequest <="" th="" xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"></samlp:authnrequest>
<pre>xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"</pre>
ID="pfx41d8ef22-e612-8c50-9960-1b16f15741b3"
Version="2.0"
ProviderName="SP_test"
IssueInstant="2014-07-16T23:52:45Z"
Destination="http://idp.example.com/SSOService.php"
<pre>ProtocolBinding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST"</pre>
AssertionConsumerServiceURL=" <u>http://sp.example.com/demo1/index.php?acs</u> ">
<pre><saml:tssuer></saml:tssuer></pre> http://sp.example.com/demo1/metadata.php <ds:signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"></ds:signature>
<pre><samlp:nameidpolicy allowcreate="true" format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress"></samlp:nameidpolicy> <samlp:requestedauthncontext comparison="exact"> <samlp:requestedauthncontext comparison="exact"> <saml:authncontextclassref>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport</saml:authncontextclassref> </samlp:requestedauthncontext> </samlp:requestedauthncontext> </pre>
samtp: Authinkequest

SAML 2.0 - Sample Auth Response

<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" ID="_8e8dc5f69a98cc4c1ff3427e5ce34606fd672f91e6" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2014-07-17T01:01:48Z" Destination="http://sp.example.com/demo1/index.php?acs" InResponseTo="0NELOGIN_4fee3b046395c4e751011e97f8900b5273d56685"> <saml:Issuer>http://idp.example.com/metadata.php</saml:Issuer> <saml:Assertion xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" ID="pfx61086f73-67d9-9633-17c5-f36349c000c8" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2014-07-17T01:01:48Z"> <saml:Issuer>http://idp.example.com/metadata.php</saml:Issuer><ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> <saml:AttributeStatement> <saml:Attribute Name="uid" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"> saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">test</saml:AttributeValue> </saml:Attribute> <saml:Attribute Name="mail" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"> saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">test@example.com</saml:AttributeValue> </saml:Attribute> </saml:AttributeStatement> </samlp:Response>

SAML Signature Algorithm is not Safe

onfig.go			Add Configuration
🧃 config.go 🛛			
143			
144	SAML_SETTINGS_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_SHA1	= "RSAwithSHA1"	
145	SAML_SETTINGS_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_SHA256	= "RSAwithSHA256"	
146	SAML_SETTINGS_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_SHA512	= "RSAwithSHA512"	
147	SAML_SETTINGS_DEFAULT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM	= SAML_SETTINGS_SIGNATURE_	ALGORITHM_SHA1
1/0			

SHA-1 is a Shambles

First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust

Gaëtan Leurent¹ and Thomas Peyrin^{2,3}

¹ Inria, France
² Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
³ Temasek Laboratories, Singapore

The first collision for full SHA-1

¹, Elie Bursztein², Pierre Karpman¹, Ange Albertini², Ya

¹ CWI Amsterdam ² Google Research info@shattered.io https://shattered.io

If attackers could forge the Signature



Identity Provider



User Onboard - Team Invitation

Signup

Enable Account Creation:	 o true ○ false 			
	When false, the ability to create accounts is disabled. The create account button displays error when pressed.			
Restrict account creation to specified email	berkeley.edu, gmail.com, example.com			
domains:	User accounts can only be created from a specific domain (e.g. "mattermost.org") or list of comma-separated domains (e.g. "corp.mattermost.com, mattermost.org"). This setting only affects email login for users. For Guest users, please add domains under Signup > Guest Access.			
Enable Open Server:	o true ○ false			
	When true, anyone can signup for a user account on this server without the need to be invited.			
Enable Email Invitations:	⊖ true 🧿 false			
	When true users can invite others to the system using email.			

User Onboard - Team Invitation

http just for test

Invite Members to 261test

—— Ŋ

Share This Link

http://34.94.128.164/signup_user_complete/?id=pqqcbcx9iprqpmjhrf

🔗 Copy Link

Share this link to invite people to this team.

Attackers as Non-Users - Team Invitation



The uuid package generates and inspects UUIDs based on RFC 4122 and DCE 1.1: Authentication and Security Services.

This package is based on the github.com/pborman/uuid package (previously named code.google.com/p/go-uuid). It differs from these earlier packages in that a UUID is a 16 byte array rather than a byte slice. One loss due to this change is the ability to represent an invalid UUID (vs a NIL UUID).

Install

go get github.com/google/uuid

Attackers as Non-Users - Team Invitation



Invite Members to 261test

Share This Link

http://34.94.128.164/signup_user_complete/vid=pqqcbcx9iprqpmjhrf

🔗 Copy Link

Share this link to invite people to this team.



Invite Members to 261test

Share This Link

http://34.94.128.164/signup_user_complete/	d=pqqcbcx9iprqpmjhrf	🔗 Copy Link
--	----------------------	-------------

Attackers as Non-Users - Team Invitation

<pre>mysql> select * from Teams; </pre>							
Id InviteId	CreateAt AllowOpenInvite	+ UpdateAt LastTeamIconUp	DeleteAt pdate Sch	DisplayNar emeId Grou	me Name upConstrained	T Description	Email
<pre></pre>	1587095073047	+ 1587095073047	+ 0 NUU	+ 	+ moweihao	I	l changzecu
w9wpbiw13tg18p31ha4rusbpcc pqqcbcx9iprqpmjhrf1nha3bfa	1586230140033 [°] 0	1586230140033 		261test	test261 NULL	l .	l weihao_do
++	++		+	+ 	+ +	+	+

Attackers as Non-Users - Login

A Enter a valid email or username and/or password, or sign in using another method.

admin

.....

Sign in

Password Reset

If the account exists, a password reset email will be sent to: admin@test.com

Please check your inbox.

Attackers as Non-Users - Login

A Your account is locked because of too many failed password attempts. Please reset your password.

changze

...

Sign in

Attackers as Non-Users - Login

A Your account is locked because of too many failed password attempts. Please reset your password.

changze

•••

Sign in

A Enter a valid email or username and/or password, or sign in using another method.

changzeeeeeee

...



Attackers as Non-Users - Phishing with webhook



Application A



Application **B**



Attackers as Non-Users - Phishing with webhook

• A BOT tag is attached to messages posted by webhook



weihao BOT 4:51 PM

Changze is our new team leader now, please add <u>changze@evil.com</u> to the github repo.

• Allows username and icon override



Robinhood BOT 4:51 PM

Your robinhood account is logged out, please login again. 🎉

Enable integrations to override usernames:

🔘 true 💿 false

When true, webhooks, slash commands and other integrations, such as Zapier, will be allowed to change the username they are posting as. Note: Combined with allowing integrations to override profile picture icons, users may be able to perform phishing attacks by attempting to impersonate other users.

Attackers in Supply Chain Vulnerabilities



https://docs.mattermost.com/deployment/deployment.html

Attackers in Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

49 personal projects Mattermost Server 271 open source projects in total				
Description America Americ America America Ame	Display="block-style="block-style-type: color: block-style; color:	armon / go-metrics	Deevik / etree	📮 miekg / dns
Code Issues 7 Pull reques	<> Code ① Issues 12 ① Pull request	<> Code ① Issues 20 ⑦ Pull req	uests ' <> Code ① Issues 4 ① Pull requ	Code () Issu
Fluent SQL generation for golang Go middleware to gzip HTTP responses A Golang library for exporting performance parse and generate XML easily in go DNS library in Go				
blang / server disintegration / imaging				
Image: display blay blay blay blay blay blay blay b				

Attackers in Supply Chain Vulnerabilities



Golang HTML to plaintext conversion library https://jaytaylor.com/html2text



func SendMail(c smtpClient, mail mailData, fileBackend filesstore.FileBackend, date time.Time) *model.AppError {
 mlog.Debug("sending mail", mlog.String(key: "to", mail.smtpTo), mlog.String(key: "subject", mail.subject))
 htmlMessage := "\r\n<html><body>" + mail.htmlBody + "</body></html>"
 txtBody, err := html2text.FromString(mail.htmlBody)
 if err != nil {
 mlog.Warn("Unable to convert html body to text", mlog.Err(err))
 txtBody = ""
 }

Attackers Aiming at Plugins

- Allows installing plugin binaries from untrusted third party
- No permission control for plugins
- Plugins have the same permission as Mattermost itself

Security

Plugins are intentionally powerful and not artificially sandboxed in any way and effectively become part of the Mattermost server. Server plugins can execute arbitrary code alongside your server and webapp plugins can deploy arbitrary code in client browsers.

While this power enables deep customization and integration, it can be abused in the wrong hands. <u>Plugins have full access to your server</u> configuration and thus also to your Mattermost database. Plugins can read any message in any channel, or perform any action on behalf of any user in the webapp.

You should only install custom plugins from sources you trust to avoid compromising the security of your installation.

Future Work Beyond Our Project

- A closer look at Mattermost
 - Notification system
 - Client side software
 - \circ Upgrading
 - License Management
- Apply our investigation method to similar applications (e.g., Slack)

Thanks