# Indoor Localization with Wi-Fi Signal Strength Fingerprints

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### Motivation of Indoor Localization Research

- Location based services
  - Indoor navigation
  - Occupancy-based energy saving
  - Augmented reality games
  - Item tracking
  - Targeted advertising
  - Social networking
  - Emergency response
- GPS doesn't work well in buildings
  - Buildings block or attenuate GPS satellite signals
  - Indoor localization requires more accuracy (sub-meter vs meters)

Original Work using Wi-Fi Signal Strength

Bahl and Padmanabhan. *RADAR: An in-building RF-based user location and tracking system.* INFOCOM 2000.

- Used 3 WiFi Access Points (AP)
- Collected signal strength at 70 distinct physical locations
- Collected in each of 4 directions



### Original Work using Wi-Fi Signal Strength



# Goals of this Work

- Validate assumptions about WiFi signals strengths, after 14 years
  - Whether Signal Strengths are consistent?
  - Whether Signal Strengths are distinguishable?
  - How much data are missing in one scan?
- Explore potential improvements of localization results
  - How it is applied to room level accuracy?
  - Are there other information I can use for localization?

# Data Collection

- 8 wall-separated rooms/ spaces in AMPLab
- Collect WiFi Signal Strengths using Android 2.3 phones (LG Revolution VS910)
- Each room takes at least one day
- Scan continuously, Android takes 800ms for one scan
- 4 phones in 465H, 3 Android phones in other rooms



# Raw Data Format

- Data are stored as CSV files grouped by a list of directories
- One directory contains data that one phone collected in one room (I'm looking at only room level accuracy)

#### Each CSV file contains these columns

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- **epoch:** UNIX timestamp of the sample
- **SSID:** Service Set ID, or Wi-Fi network name
- capability: the authentication, key management, and encryption schemes supported by the access point.
- **BSSID:** MAC address of the access point.
- **frequency:** The frequency in MHz of the channel over which the client is communicating with the access point.
- **RSSI:** The detected signal level in dBm

#### One WiFi scan generates several rows

# Raw Data Format

#### epoch,SSID,capability,BSSID,frequency,RSSI

1411334930872, EECS-Secure, [WPA2-EAP-CCMP], 00:17:df:a7:4c:f0, 2412, -80 1411334930872, EECS-Secure, [WPA2-EAP-CCMP], 00:22:90:39:70:a0, 2437, -93 1411334930872, EECS-PSK, [WPA2-PSK-CCMP], 00:22:90:39:70:a2, 2437, -95 1411334930872, EECS-Secure, [WPA2-EAP-CCMP], 00:22:90:39:b2:00, 2412, -96 1411334930872,1350, [WPA2-PSK-CCMP-preauth],7c:cb:0d:02:18:94,2412,-96 1411334930872, EECS-PSK, [WPA2-PSK-CCMP], 00:17:df:a7:33:12, 2462, -98 1411334930872, AMPCast, fa:8f:ca:71:6c:0c,2437,-35 1411334930872, attwifi, ,00:17:df:a7:4c:f5,2412,-79 1411334930872, AirBears, ,00:17:df:a7:4c:f3,2412,-81 1411334930872,410BOX,,00:24:a5:f5:50:bb,2437,-82 1411334930872, EECS-Guest, ,00:22:90:39:07:11, 2437, -86 1411334930872, attwifi, ,00:22:90:39:70:a5, 2437, -91 1411334930872, EECS-Guest, ,00:22:90:39:70:a1,2437,-93 1411334932261, AirBears2, [WPA2-EAP-CCMP], 00:17:df:a7:4c:f4, 2412, -82 1411334932261, EECS-PSK, [WPA2-PSK-CCMP], 00:17:df:a7:4c:f2,2412,-82 1411334932261, EECS-PSK, [WPA2-PSK-CCMP], 00:22:90:39:07:12, 2437, -85 1411334932261, AirBears2, [WPA2-EAP-CCMP], 00:22:90:39:07:14, 2437, -87 1411334932261, EECS-Secure, [WPA2-EAP-CCMP], 00:22:90:39:07:10, 2437, -84 1411334932261, EECS-Secure, [WPA2-EAP-CCMP], 00:23:04:89:cc:80, 2412, -90

### Interesting...

epoch,SSID,capability,BSSID,frequency,RSSI 1396946498451,Please Hackers, Just Dont Please,[WPA2-PSK-CCMP],d0:22:be:c9:d9:3e,2462,-98 1396946499253,Please Hackers, Just Dont Please,[WPA2-PSK-CCMP],d0:22:be:c9:d9:3e,2462,-98 1396775704009,Please Hackers, Just Dont Please,[WPA2-PSK-CCMP],d0:22:be:c9:d9:3e,2437,-95 1396775706286,Please Hackers, Just Dont Please,[WPA2-PSK-CCMP],d0:22:be:c9:d9:3e,2437,-94 1395593978380,Please Hackers, Just Dont Please,[WPA2-PSK-CCMP],d0:22:be:c9:d9:3e,2462,-98 1395593980765,Please Hackers, Just Dont Please,[WPA2-PSK-CCMP],d0:22:be:c9:d9:3e,2462,-97 1410797013384,Please Hackers, Just Dont Please,[WPA2-PSK-CCMP],d0:22:be:c9:d9:3e,2437,-95 1410967812647,Please Hackers, Just Dont Please,[WPA2-PSK-CCMP],d0:22:be:c9:d9:3e,2462,-97 1410967813473,Please Hackers, Just Dont Please,[WPA2-PSK-CCMP],d0:22:be:c9:d9:3e,2462,-95 1410967815081,Please Hackers, Just Dont Please,[WPA2-PSK-CCMP],d0:22:be:c9:d9:3e,2462,-95

# Interesting...



# Data Features

- 2,263,496 scans
- 37,813,320 RSSI values collected
- Each scan has 16.7 RSSI values on average
- 540 individual MACs we can hear in 8 rooms
  - A N-antena MIMO router can have N MACs
  - This includes many routers from other buildings

### Timestamps



# **RSSI Distribution**



### Are RSSIs Stable?

#### EECS-Secure 00:17:df:a7:4c:f0



#### AMPCast fa:8f:ca:71:6c:0c



### Are RSSIs Stable?

#### EECS-Secure 00:17:df:a7:4c:f0



#### EECS-Secure 00:17:df:a7:4c:f0



# Missing values



# Missing values



# Missing values



- Missing values are not bursty over time
- Missing possibilities seem consistent

# Access Point Durations





## Access Point Frequencies



### Are RSSIs Distinguishable?



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### Are RSSIs Distinguishable among Phones



### Are Appearance Possibility Distinguishable?



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# Localization Performance

- Normal RSSI Classification
- Remove Spurious APs
- Use Appear Possibility for Classification

# Normal RSSI Classification

- Stratified Cross
  Validation
- Use earliest group for training, which contains 22,639 scans
- Use latest group for testing, which contains 22,631 scans
- 76% accuracy



# Remve Spurious APs

- Only keep the union of 3 mostly appeared MACs in each room
- 69% Accuracy



# Use Appearance Possibility for Classification

- Aggregate MAC appearance possibility every 10 scans as features
- 88% Accuracy



# Use Appearance Possibility for Classification



# Conclusions & Future Work

- RSSIs are not consistent
- Appearance possibility can get more accurate results than using RSSI for localization
- They can potentially be combined

Thank you! Questions?