


Table I. HTTPS domains that are compromised because HPIHSL pages import HTTP scripts or style-sheets

Compromised HTTPS domain	The HPIHSL page that imports scripts	Domain and path of the HTTP script or
(the domain names are obfuscated)	or CSS	CSS imported by the HPIHSL page
https://www.j-store.com	The "men's shoes" page in	http://switch.atdmt.com/jaction/
The checkout service is in this domain	www.j-store.com	
https://www.OnlineServiceX.com	The account help page at	http://www.OnlineServiceX.com/support/
The checkout service is in this domain	www.OnlineServiceX.com/support/account	accounts/ bin/resource/
https://www.s-store.com	The "Appliances" page in	http://content.s-store.com/js/
The checkout service is in this domain	www.s-store .com	
https://www.CertificateAuthorityX.com	The "repository" page in www.	http://www.CertificateAuthorityX.com/css/
A leading certificate authority	CertificateAuthorityX.com imports a CSS	
https://www.eCommerceX.com	The homepage of www. eCommerceX.com	http://images.eCommerceX.com/media/
The checkout and user profiles are in this domain		
https://www.sb-store.com	The "Furniture" page in www.sb-store.com	http://graphics.sb-store.com/images/
The checkout service is in this domain		
https://www.CreditCardX.com	The homepage of www.CreditCardX.com	http://switch.atdmt.com/jaction/COF_Homep
A credit card company		age/v3/
https://www.b-bank.com	The page www.b-bank.com/ford.asp	http://www.google-analytics.com/
A bank in the Midwest		
https://CodeRepositoryX.net, Open source projects	The homepage of	http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/
management system. User logins are in this domain.	CodeRepositoryX.net	
https://uboc.MortgageCompanyX.com	The homepage of	http://uboc.MortgageCompanyX.com/Include
A California mortgage company	uboc.MortgageCompanyX .com	/Utilities/ClientSide/
https://cs.University1.edu, the department's login	The homepage of cs. University 1. edu	http://tags.University1.edu/
system is in this domain		
https://www.eecs.University2.edu	A student's homepage www.eecs.	http://codice.shinystat.com/cgi-bin/
	University2.edu/~axxxxxx	

## All Your iFRAMEs Point to Us [Provos et al, 2008]


Data collection period	Jan - Oct 2007
Total URLs checked in-depth	66, 534, 330
Total suspicious landing URLs	3,385,889
Total malicious landing URLs	3,417,590
Total malicious landing sites	181,699
Total distribution sites	9,340

Table 1: Summary of Collected Data.



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RATES






Figure 3: Fraction of search queries that resulted in at least one malicious URL . (7-day running avg.)

ent countries, and is most evident in China, with 96% of the landing sites pointing to malware distribution servers hosted in China.

Malware Dist. site	% of all	Landing site	% of all
hosting country	distribution sites	hosting country	landing sites
China	67.0%	China	64.4%
United States	15.0%	United States	15.6%
Russia	4.0%	Russia	5.6%
Malaysia	2.2%	Korea	2.0%
Korea	2.0%	Germany	2.0%
Panama	1.1%	Czech Republic	0.9%
Germany	1.0%	Ukraine	0.8%
Hong Kong	0.8%	Taiwan	0.8%
Turkey	0.7%	Poland	0.7%
France	0.7%	Canada	0.6%
Other	5.7%	Other	6.5%

Table 2: Hosting countries for the distribution sites.

Table 3: Hosting countries for the landing sites.




Figure 4: Distribution of malicious URLs in DMOZ categories.




Figure 13: CDF of the number of downloaded executables as a result of visiting a malicious URL

		Preferences	Security	Startup
URLs %	6.99%	23.5%	36.18%	51.27%

Table 4: Registry changes from drive-by downloads.




Figure 15: Detection rates of 3 anti-virus engines.

SEPTEMBER 14, 2009

## New York Times tricked into serving scareware ad

Fake Vonage ad was placed to the newspaper's Digital Advertising group

article, he performed an analysis of the site and discovered that the Times was allowing advertisers to embed an HTML element known as an iframe into their advertisements. This gave the criminals a way to include embedded Web pages in their copy that could be hosted on a completely different server, outside of the control of the Times.

Apparently the scammers waited until the weekend, when it would be hardest for IT staff to respond, before switching the ad by inserting new JavaScript code into that iframe.

