

### General Stats View Personal Stats | View Group Stats | View SSID/Manufacturer Stats | View Octet/Channel/File Stats

Registered Users: 98,742

Unique networks in DB: 27,884,416

Unique networks with location: 26,877,796 Unique locations in DB: 1,154,921,792

Files parsed: 258,376

Networks with crypto: 13,668,866 (49.0%) Networks without crypto: 7,769,268 (27.8%) Networks crypto unknown: 6,446,282 (23.1%) Networks with default SSID: 3,054,690 (10.9%)

New unique networks today: 17,942


New networks today with location: 17,849

Files from today processed: 139

Networks yesterday with location: 34,014 Files 1 day ago / 2 days ago: 215 / 234

Queued files waiting to process: 0

Ranks 1 - 100 of 7179.





 $1, \, \underline{2}, \, \underline{3}, \, \underline{4}, \, \underline{5}, \, \underline{6}, \, \underline{7}, \, \underline{8}, \, \underline{9}, \, \underline{10}, \, \underline{11}, \, \underline{12}, \, \underline{13}, \, \underline{14}, \, \underline{15}, \, \underline{16}, \, \underline{17}, \, \underline{18}, \, \underline{19}, \, \underline{20}, \\ \underline{21}, \, \underline{22}, \, \underline{23}, \, \underline{24}, \, \underline{25}, \, \underline{26}, \, \underline{27}, \, \underline{28}, \, \underline{29}, \, \underline{30}, \, \underline{31}, \, \underline{32}, \, \underline{33}, \, \underline{34}, \, \underline{35}, \, \underline{36}, \, \underline{37}, \, \underline{38}, \, \underline{39}, \, \underline{40}, \\ \underline{41}, \, \underline{42}, \, \underline{43}, \, \underline{44}, \, \underline{45}, \, \underline{46}, \, \underline{47}, \, \underline{48}, \, \underline{49}, \, \underline{50}, \, \underline{51}, \, \underline{52}, \, \underline{53}, \, \underline{54}, \, \underline{55}, \, \underline{56}, \, \underline{57}, \, \underline{58}, \, \underline{59}, \, \underline{60}, \\ \underline{61}, \, \underline{62}, \, \underline{63}, \, \underline{64}, \, \underline{65}, \, \underline{66}, \, \underline{67}, \, \underline{68}, \, \underline{69}, \, \underline{70}, \, \underline{71}, \, \underline{72} >>$ 

|    |    |           | Discovered | Percentage of  | <u>All</u>      | <u>Networks</u> | <u>Networks</u> |              |             |
|----|----|-----------|------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------|
|    |    |           | Networks   | Total Networks | <u>Networks</u> | This Month      | Last Month      | <u>First</u> | <u>Last</u> |
| Ra | nk | Username  | with GPS 🕂 | with GPS       | <u>Recorded</u> | with GPS        | with GPS        | <u>Post</u>  | <u>Post</u> |
| 1  | 1  | whitedice | 1,661,138  | (6.180%)       | 2,148,232       | 60,496          | 33,119          | 30-Apr-2006  | 21-Oct-2010 |
| 2  | 2  | ccie4526  | 1,578,577  | (5.873%)       | 1,904,058       | 39,227          | 20,702          | 27-Jan-2003  | 28-Oct-2010 |
| 3  | 3  | hratch    | 950,643    | (3.536%)       | 1,445,874       | 0               | 0               | 17-Jul-2002  | 28-Nov-2007 |
| 4  | 4  | mark571   | 764,808    | (2.845%)       | 1,157,220       | 0               | 0               | 28-Jun-2005  | 09-Aug-2007 |
| 5  | 5  | anonymous | 670,713    | (2.495%)       | 914,052         | 75,489          | 54,367          | 03-Oct-2001  | 29-Oct-2010 |
| 6  | ŝ  | Petzl     | 625,911    | (2.328%)       | 835,214         | 0               | 0               | 04-Sep-2003  | 23-Aug-2010 |



| Query 1 | for | netwo | rks |
|---------|-----|-------|-----|
|---------|-----|-------|-----|

| Query for networks                                 |
|--|
| Addresses are for the U.S. only (2002 Census data) |
| Street Address (1600 Pennsylvania Ave):            |
| State (DC):  |
| Zip (20502): 98125                                 |
| Variance (+/- degrees): 0.050 \$                   |
| Latitude (47.252643): to:                          |
| Longitude (-87.256243): to:                        |
| Last Update (20010925174546):                      |
| BSSID or MAC (0A:2C:EF:3D:25:1B):                  |
| SSID or Network Name (foobar): djw                 |
|  |
| ☐ Must Be a FreeNet                                |
| ☐ Must Be a Commercial Pay Net                     |
| ☐ Must Have DHCP Enabled                           |
| Only Networks I Was the First to Discover          |
|  |
| Query Reset  |

### Home | Download | Forums | Post File | Query | Screenshots | Stats | Uploads | Web Maps | MapPacks/Trees | Wiki | Logout



### Search Results:

Address Matches: 1

[1] coord: 47.71700287, -122.30154419

[1] name: Seattle [1] state: WA [1] zip: 98125

Using first match, with +/- 0.200:

Latitude: 47.51700287 to 47.91700287

Longitude: -122.50154419 to -122.10154419 Showing stations 1 through 2 of this query.

| map<br>it                | netid             | ssid   | comment | name | type  | freenet | paynet | firsttime                  | flags | wep | trilat      | trilong           | dhcp | lastupdt       | channel | active | bcninterval | qos | userfound |
|--------------------------|-------------------|--------|---------|------|-------|---------|--------|----------------------------|-------|-----|-------------|-------------------|------|----------------|---------|--------|-------------|-----|-----------|
| <u>Get</u><br><u>Map</u> | 00:40:96:40:bd:f7 | djw    |         |      | infra | ?       | ?      | 0000-<br>00-00<br>00:00:00 | 0061  | Υ   | 47.67974091 | -<br>122.29557800 | ?    | 20060127110714 | 6       | Y      | 100         | 1   | N         |
| <u>Get</u><br><u>Map</u> | 00:40:05:d0:b9:90 | djwo48 |         |      | BBS   | ?       | ?      | 1969-<br>12-31<br>16:50:23 | 81    | Υ   | 47.70046616 | -<br>122.34458160 | ?    | 20050121225331 | 3       | Υ      | 100         | 0   | N         |

WiGLE\_Home











Settings | Help | Business Solutions

Directions

**Gas Prices** 

### Printer-Friendly | E-Mail | Link to this Map


**\*** Latitude: 47.6797409 Longitude: -122.29557

Revise | New Map

#### Online Offers

- Hotels
- Schools in

- Insurance
- Homes in



Hack uses Google Street View data to stalk its victims

'Geo location gone terrible'

By Dan Goodin in San Francisco • Get more from this author

Posted in ID, 3rd August 2010 17:54 GMT

Free whitepaper – Eight threats your anti-virus won't stop

A security researcher has devised an attack suitable for stalking and similarly creepy endeavors that uses JavaScript and geo location data from Google to pinpoint a victim's precise location.

In a talk titled "How I Met Your Girlfriend," at the Black Hat conference last week, hacker Samy Kamkar demoed the technique, which he cleverly dubbed an XXXSS. Here's how it works:





## Hear how you run.

With Nike+ running shoes and a Nike + iPod Sport Kit or Sensor, your iPod nano or iPod touch will motivate you mile after mile.

Rock and run >

### Hear the burn.

Connect your iPod to a Nike + iPod compatible cardio machine at the gym and track your progress from one workout to the next.

Rock the gym ▶





Figure 2: A Nike+iPod sensor in a Nike+ shoe and a Nike+iPod receiver connected to an iPod Nano.




Figure 3: A gumstix-based Nike+iPod surveillance device with wireless Internet capabilities.




Figure 11: A screenshot of our GoogleMaps-based surveillance web application.



# I Can Stalk U

Raising awareness about inadvertent information sharing

Home

How

Why

About Us

Contact Us

# Who have we stalked recently?



ICanStalkU was able to stalk <u>jimagordon</u> at http://maps.google.com/?q=39.8672222222,-86.237777778 3 minutes ago · Map Location · View Tweet · View Picture · Reply to jimagordon



ICanStalkU was able to stalk <u>LiLiSorensen</u> at http://maps.google.com/?q=35.4013888889,-119.050277778 4 minutes ago · <u>Map Location</u> · <u>View Tweet</u> · <u>View Picture</u> · <u>Reply to LiLiSorensen</u>



ICanStalkU was able to stalk <u>sheridanrichey</u> at http://maps.google.com/?q=40.5547222222,-111.915 3 minutes ago · Map Location · View Tweet · View Picture · Reply to sheridanrichey



ICanStalkU was able to stalk <u>jamielikesthis</u> at http://maps.google.com/?q=39.6644444444,-75.68833333337 minutes ago · <u>Map Location</u> · <u>View Tweet</u> · <u>View Picture</u> · <u>Reply to jamielikesthis</u>



ICanStalkU was able to stalk <u>AlliMFuller</u> at http://maps.google.com/?q=38.618666667,-121.3985 8 minutes ago · <u>Map Location</u> · <u>View Tweet</u> · <u>View Picture</u> · <u>Reply to AlliMFuller</u>

## Links

- Mayhemic Labs
- PaulDotCom
- SANS ISC
- Electronic Frontier Foundation
- Center for Democracy & Technology

How did you find me?

Did you know that a lot of smart phones encode the location of where pictures are taken? Anyone who has a copy can access this information.

read more





iPhone 3G picture

Google Street View

Measured accuracy: +/- 1m








Fig. 3. Demodulating received programmer (left) and ICD transmissions. The top plot in each figure shows the phase of the raw RF signal, downconverted from 175 kHz to baseband. Both 2-FSK and DBPSK encode data by the phase *change* of the signal, pictured in the middle row. The final row shows the decoded bits: in 2-FSK the bit is determined by the sign of the phase change, and in DBPSK by whether it is closer to 0 or  $\pi$ . Note that there are fewer bits than samples; our 500 kHz sampling rate generates 40 samples per programmer symbol and about 6 per ICD symbol.




Fig. 4. Timeline of a conversation between an ICD programmer and an ICD. If a programmer is present it will acknowledge each packet automatically. When told by an operator to do so, the programmer asks the ICD for identifying information, which the ICD provides. The programmer then interrogates the ICD for patient data, which the ICD provides. Other commands (such as ICD programming commands) and their responses follow.




Fig. 1. Chest xray image of an implanted ICD (top right, near shoulder, solid outline) and electrical leads connected to heart chambers (center of rib cage, dotted outline).


# Hooligans Attack Epilepsy Patients During Epilepsy Awareness Month

Hooligans attack epilepsy support forum in an attempt to induce seizures amongst the members.

Houston, TX, November 19, 2007 -- (PR.com)-- Internet hooligans launched a malicious attack on Coping With Epilepsy (CWE), an internet web site that serves as a peer support network for people with epilepsy, last Saturday. The perpetrators flooded CWE with hateful messages, images of hardcore porn and, worst of all, animated images with rapidly flashing colors in an attempt to induce seizures in the photosensitive members (and guests) of the site.

# Hackers Assault Epilepsy Patients via Computer

By Kevin Poulsen ☑ 03.28.08



RyAnne Fultz, 33, says she suffered her worst epileptic attack in a year after she clicked on the wrong post at a forum run by the nonprofit Epilepsy Foundation. Photo courtesy RyAnne Fultz Internet griefers descended on an ep support message board last weekend JavaScript code and flashing compu animation to trigger migraine heada seizures in some users.

The nonprofit Epilepsy Foundation, the forum, briefly closed the site Surpurge the offending messages and to security.

"We are seeing people affected," says Lowenberg, senior director of web as publishing at the Epilepsy Foundation fortunately only a handful. It's possi people are just not reporting yet — possible affected by it may not be coming backforum so fast."

The attack lasted several hours as CV. I moderators, many themselves, battled to remove the offensive content as fast as it was being posted. The attack ended when CWE administrators arrived and locked down the site.

"I was able to trace back the source of the attack to a handful of sites where the



Fig. 8. To simulate implantation in a human, we placed the WISP in a bag containing bacon and ground beef.

## Apple Has An App For Calling In Air Strikes

September 30, 2010: The iPhone now has an app for calling in air strikes. This is part of a trend. Specialized, and now portable, computers have been used in the military for decades, to help troops who call in artillery fire, or air strikes. But these "forward controllers" have to lug around a lot of gear, as they move, often on foot, with the infantry they support. Every bit of weight counts. The less you carry, the more energy you have for life-and-death tasks. Now, Apple has an app for that, and the forward controllers can leave behind gear that has now been replaced by an iPhone app.

These military apps came about as the U.S. Army set up a special military apps program with the Apple Corporation. This evolved over the last few years because soldiers have long been enthusiastic users of Apple products (iPod and iPhone, and now the iPad as well). But Apple has tight control over what software can be used on these devices, so the military needed a close relationship with Apple just to get their custom military software on the iPods, iPhones and iPads the troops are so enthusiastic about.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htiw/articles/20100930.aspx



| Packet      | Result   | Manual<br>Override | At<br>Speed | Need to<br>Unlock | Tested on<br>Runway |
|-------------|--|--------------------|-------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| 07 AE 1F 87 | Continuously Activates Lock Relay                          | Yes                | Yes         | No                | <b>√</b>            |
| 07 AE C1 A8 | Windshield Wipers On Continuously                          | No                 | Yes         | No                | ✓                   |
| 07 AE 77 09 | Pops Trunk   | No                 | Yes         | No                | ✓                   |
| 07 AE 80 1B | Releases Shift Lock Solenoid                               | No                 | Yes         | No                |                     |
| 07 AE D8 7D | Unlocks All Doors  | Yes                | Yes         | No                |                     |
| 07 AE 9A F2 | Permanently Activates Horn                                 | No                 | Yes         | No                | ✓                   |
| 07 AE CE 26 | Disables Headlights in Auto Light Control                  | Yes                | Yes         | No                | ✓                   |
| 07 AE 34 5F | All Auxiliary Lights Off                                   | No                 | Yes         | No                |                     |
| 07 AE F9 46 | Disables Window and Key Lock Relays                        | No                 | Yes         | No                |                     |
| 07 AE F8 2C | Windshield Fluid Shoots Continuously                       | No                 | Yes         | No                | ✓                   |
| 07 AE 15 A2 | Controls Horn Frequency                                    | No                 | Yes         | No                |                     |
| 07 AE 15 A2 | Controls Dome Light Brightness                             | No                 | Yes         | No                |                     |
| 07 AE 22 7A | Controls Instrument Brightness                             | No                 | Yes         | No                |                     |
| 07 AE 00 00 | All Brake/Auxiliary Lights Off                             | No                 | Yes         | No                | ✓                   |
| 07 AE 1D 1D | Forces Wipers Off and Shoots Windshield Fluid Continuously | Yes <sup>†</sup>   | Yes         | No                | ✓                   |

Table II. Body Control Module (BCM) DeviceControl Packet Analysis. This table shows BCM DeviceControl packets and their effects that we discovered during fuzz testing with one of our cars on jack stands. A √in the last column indicates that we also tested the corresponding packet with the driving on a runway. A "Yes" or "No" in the columns "Manual Override," "At Speed," and "Need to Unlock" indicate whether or not (1) the results could be manually overridden by a car occupant, (2) the same effect was observed with the car at speed (the wheels spinning at about 40 MPH and/or on the runway), and (3) the BCM needed to be unlocked with its DeviceControl key.

| Packet      | Result                                       | Manual<br>Override | At<br>Speed | Need to<br>Unlock | Tested on<br>Runway |  |
|-------------|--|--------------------|-------------|-------------------|---------------------|--|
| 07 AE E5 EA | Initiate Crankshaft Re-learn; Disturb Timing | Yes                | Yes         | Yes               |                     |  |
| 07 AE CE 32 | Temporary RPM Increase                       | No                 | Yes         | Yes               | ✓                   |  |
| 07 AE 5E BD | Disable Cylinders, Power Steering/Brakes     | Yes                | Yes         | Yes               |                     |  |
| 07 AE 95 DC | Kill Engine, Cause Knocking on Restart       | Yes                | Yes         | Yes               | ✓                   |  |
| 07 AE 8D C8 | Grind Starter                                | No                 | Yes         | Yes               |                     |  |
| 07 AE 00 00 | Increase Idle RPM                            | No                 | Yes         | Yes               | ✓                   |  |
| 07 AE 25 2B | Engages Front Left Brake                     | No                 | Yes         | Yes               | ✓                   |  |
| 07 AE 20 88 | Engages Front Right Brake/Unlocks Front Left | No                 | Yes         | Yes               | ✓                   |  |
| 07 AE 86 07 | Unevenly Engages Right Brakes                | No                 | Yes         | Yes               | ✓                   |  |
| 07 AE FF FF | Releases Brakes, Prevents Braking            | No                 | Yes         | Yes               | ✓                   |  |