


Anatomy of a modern Pharma spam campaign



Courtesy Stuart Brown
modernlifeisrubbish.co.uk




Figure 4: The choice of a threshold value for image shingling determines the number of clusters.

<i>Scam category</i>	<i>% of scams</i>
Uncategorized	29.57%
Information Technology	16.67%
Dynamic Content	11.52%
Business and Economy	6.23%
Shopping	4.30%
Financial Data and Services	3.61%
Illegal or Questionable	2.15%
Adult	1.80%
Message Boards and Clubs	1.80%
Web Hosting	1.63%

Table 2: Top ten scam categories.




Figure 7: Proportion of ordinary phishing sites impersonating each bank.







Figure 5: User responses to phishing sites over time. Data includes specious responses.








Figure 9: Scatter plot of phishing site lifetimes over time.

Table 2. Phishing Website Lifetimes by Attack Type


-	Sites	Lifetime (hours)	
		Mean	median
<i>Free web-hosting</i>			
all	395	47.6	0
brand owner aware	240	4.3	0
brand owner missed	155	114.7	29
<i>Compromised machines</i>			
all	193	49.2	0
brand owner aware	105	3.5	0
brand owner missed	155	103.8	10

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<i>Rock-phish domains</i>	821	70.3	33
<i>Fast-flux domains</i>	314	96.1	25.5

Table 4. Website Lifetimes by Type of Offending Content

	Period	Sites	Lifetime (hours)	
			mean	median
<i>Child sexual abuse images</i>	Jan–Dec 2007	2585	719	288
<i>Phishing</i>				
Free web-hosting (two brands)	Jan 2008	240	4.3	0
Compromised machines (two brands)	Jan 2008	105	3.5	0
Rock-phish domains (all brands)	Jan 2008	821	70.3	33
Fast-flux domains (all brands)	Jan 2008	314	96.1	25.5
<i>Fraudulent websites</i>				
Escrow agents	Oct–Dec 2007	696	222.2	24.5
Mule-recruitment websites	Mar 07–Feb 08	67	308.2	188
Fast-flux pharmacies	Oct–Dec 2007	82	1370.7	1404.5



Are Bots & Spam the New Black Gold?

Storm worm 'making millions a day'

Compromised machines sending out highly profitable spam, says IBM security strategist

Clive Akass, Personal Computer World 11 Feb 2008

The people behind the Storm worm are making millions of pounds a day by using it to generate revenue, according to IBM's principal web security strategist.



Joshua Corman, of IBM Internet Security Systems, said that in the past it had been assumed that web security attacks were essential ego driven.




- Spam finance elements:

- ◆ Retail-cost-to-send vs. Profit-per-response
- ◆ Key missing element: spams-needed-per-response, i.e., *conversion rate*

How can we
measure this?






Spam conversion experiment

- Experimented with Storm March 21 – April 15, 2008
- Instrumented roughly 1.5% of Storm's total output


	Pharmacy Campaign	E-card Campaigns	
		Postcard	April Fool
Worker bots	31,348	17,639	3,678
Emails	347,590,389	83,665,479	38,651,124
Duration	19 days	7 days	3 days

Spam

Response rates by country



Time-to-click distribution



The Spammer's Bottom Line

- 28 purchases in 26 days, avg. "sale" ~\$100
 - ♦ Total: \$2,731.88, \$140/day
- **But:** we interposed on only ~1.5% of workers:
 - ♦ \$9,500/day (8,500 new bots per day)
 - ♦ \$3.5M/year (back of envelope - be very careful!)
 - Though if selling Viagra via *Glavmed affiliation*, cut is **40%**
- Storm: service provider or integrated operation?
 - ♦ Retail price of spam ~\$80 per million
 - Pharmacy spam would have cost 10x the profit!
 - ♦ Strongly suggests Storm operates as an integrated operation rather than a reseller