

**Don't Forget to Lock the Back Door!**  
**A Characterization of IPv6 Network Security Policy**

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
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

2016-02-22

San Diego, CA, USA

# IPv6??? Yawn... amiright?

- Actually, IPv6 adoption rate is now pretty robust. E.g.:
  - Google/Facebook ~10%; (U.S.: 23%)
- BUT: lack of maturity in stacks, processes, tools, operator competency
- Somehow, there's still this...
  - Myth #1: IPv6 is "More Secure."
- Not inherently more secure
- In dual-stack world: **IPv6 = second attack vector**




<https://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/statistics.html>

## Recent operator training seminar ad:

This expanded workshop also includes additional sections on IPv6 wireless, new information on IPv6 Security and address management, and new hands on lab exercises.

### Why IPv6?

- Inevitability
- Improved Security
- Enhanced Speeds
- Less URL Conflicts
- Efficient Transfers
- Traffic Encryption
- More IP Addresses
- No NAT Reliance



# Motivation

“In new IPv6 deployments it has been common to see **IPv6 traffic enabled but none of the typical access control mechanisms enabled** for IPv6 device access.”

— IETF Draft; Chittimaneni, et al. 2015

# Talk Roadmap

- Motivation
- Methodology
- Results
- Validation
- Scanning Feasibility
- Implications & Summary

# Methodology: Target Lists

- **Population: global dual-stacked routers and servers**
  - **Router Sample:** CAIDA Ark trace route data, router interface IPs
  - **Server Sample:** DNS ANY record queries against IPs and names discovered by Rapid7 service scanning & zone files
  - Find A, AAAA, and PTR DNS records; merge to identify same dual-stacked host (+ app-layer fingerprint validation)
  - End up with (v6 and v4 ping-responsive):  
**25K routers & 520K servers**

# Methodology: Probing


- We use **Scamper** [Luckie, IMC 2010] to **test connection over IPv4 and IPv6**
- Probed application ports:
  - **All Hosts** : ICMP echo, DNS, HTTP, HTTPS, NTP, SNMP, SSH, Telnet
  - **Routers** : BGP
  - **Servers** : FTP, SMB, MySQL, RDP
- Probe types (for each IP of each host against each application port):
  - **Basic** (ICMP Echo, TCP SYN, UDP request)
  - **Traceroute**-style (iterative with limited TTL/Hop Limit)
- Followed best-practices for scanning, including signaling benign intent, well-formed packets, opt-out lists, etc.

# Results: { NSA hacker in residence dishes on how to } SS

Latest Snowden docs offer lulz from NSA's internal hacker how-to board.

by Sean Gallagher - Mar 21, 2014 8:55am PDT


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Administrators' IP addresses can also be discovered by using an "awesome" NSA tool called Discoroute, which the author of the post said is "designed to suck up and database router configuration files seen in passively collected **telnet** sessions."

Discoroute can also be used to discover which IP addresses can access the router via **telnet**. And if the contents of **telnet** sessions are in the clear, they can often be used to expose router passwords, even if they're hashed. The author said that Cisco's "password 7" hashing is "ROFL-easy to crack. You can

# Results: Server Openness



(a) Servers ( $S_B$ )



# Results:


## Intra-Network Uniformity

Q: Are discrepancies one-offs or generally systematic security posture within network boundaries?

Uniformity metric:

For each network (routed prefix):  
 Across all hosts with v4 or v6 open,  
 find count of most common result (4,6,both)  
 and divide by total hosts in that network.

A: **misconfigurations generally systematic within network boundaries: consistency >90%**



# Results: Blocking Mechanism

Does the *manner* in which blocking happens differ for v6?

Mode	Router ( $\mathcal{R}_T$ )		Server ( $S_T$ )	
	Mean IPv4	Mean IPv6	Mean IPv4	Mean IPv6
Open	4.17	6.04	18.57	18.89
Passive:Target	43.50	27.15	36.06	31.17
Passive:Other	10.12	15.82	16.31	14.20
Active:Target	30.93	36.14	22.82	27.61
Active:Other	3.55	6.94	2.09	2.79

Yes, there appear to be **fewer policy devices (firewalls or ACLs) passively dropping** requests in IPv6

# Notifications & Validation


- Directly contacted 12 network operators including several with largest discrepancy
- Asked each if (1) findings were correct and (2) policy discrepancy was intentional
- All confirmed
- Post-paper full notification

<b>Operator</b>	<b>Host-App Pairs w/Only IPv6 Open</b>	<b>Response</b>
Global CDN 1	3	✓
Tier1 ISP 1	498	
Global Transit Pro. 1	201	✓
Large Hosting Pro. 1	≈800	
Large University 1	5	✓
Large University 2	6	✓
Large University 3	989	✓
National ISP 1	4757	✓
National ISP 2	89	
Research/Ed. ISP 1	1	✓
Research/Ed. ISP 2	523	✓
Research/Ed. ISP 3	77	✓
Research/Ed. ISP 4	17	✓
Small Hosting Pro. 1	17	✓
Small ISP 1	12	
Small Transit Pro. 1	2	✓

# Scanning Feasibility

- Could brute attackers/worms discover these open IPv6 ports sans DNS?
- 128 bit address space makes global exhaustive scanning prohibitive.  $O(10^{22}$  years)
- Site prefixes easily found in BGP
- Subnet IDs: Low 8 + upper 4 bits = 0.4% of space: 55-64% of subnets
- What about the Interface ID?

## 128-bit Address Layout



(source: <http://www.elec-intro.com/EX/05-15-08/17fig07.jpg>)

# Scanning Feasibility: IIDs

IID Bits Used	IID Value Range	Router		Server	
		%	Cum. %	%	Cum. %
1	<= 0x0001	23.74	23.74	5.83	5.83
4	<= 0x000F	37.89	61.63	5.94	11.77
8	<= 0x00FF	6.87	68.49	4.76	16.53
16	<= 0xFFFF	11.00	79.50	5.50	22.03
32	<= 0xFFFF FFFF	9.81	89.31	14.50	36.53
EUI-64	Middle == 0xFFFE	0.92	90.23	4.92	41.45
Other	Not in Above	9.77	100.00	58.55	100.00

- **Majority of routers and > 1/3 of servers could be found in just lower half of IID bits** (1 four billionth of the bit space!)
- Targeting one subnet using a modern scanner at 1.4 Mpps (**1 Gbps**):
  - Instead of **418K years** for naive brute-force scan of all 64 bits ...
  - Scanning low 32 bits + top 8 EUI-64 vendors finds: **90% of routers and 40% of servers in just 53 minutes (or just low 16 bits: 80% & 26% in 1sec.!)**

# Summary and Implications

- **Large discrepancies between v4 and v6 service reachability:**
  - 43% of hosts differ on at least one application (adoption concern)
  - 26% more open on v6 for at least one app port (security concern)
- **IPv6 more open than IPv4** for high-value application ports on large Internet samples routers and servers
- Results consistent within network boundaries: **systematic**
- Multiple evidence that **firewalls less common** on IPv6

# Implications

- **IPv6 here; but we found thousands of routers and servers lacking basic port security**
- **What to do if you run IPv6?:**
  - **Check yourself!** (We've made a scamper module available for probing your network)
  - **Protect yourself:** Is your firewall configured for IPv6? (And effective?)
  - **Hide yourself:** Your host addressing scheme may determine IPv6 scanning feasibility. Randomly-assigned IIDs strongly suggested.

**Questions?**

**Thank You!**