








Characterizing Indirect Privacy Leaks in Mobile Apps with the Lumen Privacy Monitor

Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez



Protecting access to sensitive data














1st parties (Direct)

3rd parties (Indirect)





Project goals:

Identify 3rd-party advertising and tracking services on mobile apps

Evaluate their impact on user privacy

Promote mobile transparency and enable user control

How?

Search











Categories v

Home Top charts

New releases





My apps

Shop

Games

Family

Editors' Choice

Account

Redeem

Send gift

Add credit

My wishlist

My Play activity

Parent guide



Lumen Privacy Monitor


Int. Computer Science Institute-UC Berkeley Tools


**** 28 <u>*</u>


E Everyone


This app is compatible with all of your devices.

Installed










Research Efforts

900+ users 2500+ apps (paid and pre-installed ones)

1st-party vs. 3rd party services



How to distinguish ad networks and trackers (ATS) from CDNs?

ATS classifier (beta)

Goal: Automatically classify domains by their offered service:

- 1) Analytic services
- 2) Ad networks


Problem: Existing URL classification services may be incomplete:

URL	Status	Categorization	Reputation
http://www.flurry.com	Categorized URL	- Internet Services	Minimal Risk

Solution: Analyse their behaviour and the content of the domain's landing page using NLP


Results

- 280 domains (N=446) ATS domains:
 - 4% FPR
 - 58 domains remained unreported by MalwareBytes and Easylist



• 15% of apps connect to more than 5 trackers

ATS Penetration



68.5% of identified ATS domains are cross-platform

Tracking users without consent

Unique identifiers are highly sensitive data

Examples:

- IMEI
- Google ID

Android permissions control access to sensitive resources supposedly


Runtime.getRuntime().exec("getprop")

```
[dhcp.wlan0.domain]: [networks.imdea.org]
[net.hostname]: [android-db216281e95dfab1]
[persist.service.bdroid.bdaddr]: [40:B0:FA:5C:D0:80]
[ro.boot.serialno]: [04efb34e55e22fcc]
[ro.build.fingerprint]: [google/occam/mako:5.1.1/LMY48T/2237560:user/release-keys]
```

Abusive practices

```
11-02 13:26:14.077 9756 10171 I Haystack.Flow: Host: <a href="mailto:track.xxxx.com">track.xxxx.com</a>
11-02 13:26:14.077 9756 10171 I Haystack.Flow: Accept-Encoding: gzip
11-02 13:26:14.077 9756 10171 I Haystack.Flow:
11-02 13:26:14.077 9756 10171 I Haystack.Flow:
device=angler&installDate=2016-11-02_0126-0700&firstLaunchDate=2016-11-02_0126-0700&sdk=23&carrier=&date1=2016-11-02_0126-0700&af_preinstalled=false&advertiserIdEnabled=false&appsflyerKey=yZnL9BNtUzZLva6evLpUg5&lang=English&app_version_name=2.2.0&dkh=yZnL9BNt&android_id=84f942c74fffbdef&advertiserId=fff3ca7e-61d7-4298-ab14-256033002de9</a>&deviceType=userdebug&af_v=da33e2cb0879238eb1dc9d93e0ce38b4564fbd
9d&app_version_code=3&network=WIFI&operator=&brand=Android&date2=2016-11-02_0126-0700&af_timestamp=1478118372355&uid=1478118365655-1389078544330603868&isFirstCall=true&counter=1&product=aosp_angler&model=AOSP+on+angler
```

More details ...



Submission history

From: Rishab Nithyanand [view email]
[v1] Thu, 22 Sep 2016 23:45:20 GMT (163kb,D)
[v2] Wed, 26 Oct 2016 15:50:14 GMT (162kb,D)

Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)

(or arXiv:1609.07190v2 [cs.CY] for this version)

Link back to: arXiv, form interface, contact.



Takeaway

Method to identify and classify third-party tracking services

Anonymised data gathered with the Lumen Privacy Monitor

Promote user awareness and mobile transparency

Enable user control